


Encounter between Enemies

Captivity and Ransom in the
Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem

Yvonne Friedman



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PREFACE

In October 1986, Ron Arad, a navigator from the Israeli airforce, was taken captive. Up until the present, no Israeli government has admitted definite failure to rescue or ransom him, but the chances of his returning alive diminish with time. I, who have never met Ron Arad and have not particularly studied his case, nonetheless see him as a symbol. The Israeli maxim of never leaving a wounded soldier on the battlefield, whatever the price, stems from the Jewish tradition of responsibility toward captives and is part of the ethos young Israelis are raised on. This tradition is so strong that there have never been any official thoughts about giving up or deciding that it is not worthwhile to try to redeem captives. Ron Arad's story induced me to ask myself questions about ransoming captives years ago when I first started the research for this book, making me wonder how people felt about prisoners of war in the past. What were they willing to do to release them, and how did the feelings of solidarity between fighters, if any, affect the way they fought? Although Ron is not the hero of this book, it is in a way dedicated to him and other prisoners of war and especially to all those who have not lost faith and hope and are willing to work for the release of prisoners of war, any war.

Among these are the members of the Cambridge Orthodox Synagogue who have continued to recite the prayer for the release of captives every Saturday for more than a decade, long after others lost hope. To me they are the essence of Jewish solidarity and of care and responsibility for distant members of their people.

The gates of Cambridge were opened to me by Anna and David Abulafia. Since my first visit they have both given generously of their precious time and knowledge and last, but certainly not least, their friendship. My love and gratitude go to Ron and Thelma Domb whose hospitality and friendship I have enjoyed so often, who have made their home mine. Shuli and Stephan Reif welcomed me not only to the Cairo Geniza but also to their home. I am grateful to the president and fellows of Lucy Cavendish College whose visiting scholarship gave me the compatible surroundings I find it easy to work in. The stimulating atmosphere at the college

contributed much to this book. My thanks to Ruth Fluss who always makes a warm home for wayfarers and who taught me what quiet courage means.

Unfortunately, I can no longer thank my beloved and honored teacher and mentor Avrom Saltman whose memory casts a long shadow over this work. My debt to him is beyond words. The late Joshua Prawer with his boundless and contagious enthusiasm for the world of the crusades also influenced this work, although many years have passed since I had the privilege to take part in his seminars. I am indebted to Jonathan Riley-Smith for welcoming me to the crusader seminar at Emmanuel College, Cambridge and the Institute of Historical Research in London. To its codirector Jonathan Philips and its members my thanks for making it an arena for testing new ideas.

To Dena Ordan, the English editor who has grown to be a close friend, with thanks for many shared granola bars as well as for her professional, meticulous, and patient work.

My home university, Bar-Ilan, has assisted with sabbatical leaves and scholarships: for these I thank the Research Authority, the Ingeborg Rennert Center for Jerusalem Studies, the Martin (Szusz) Department of Land of Israel Studies, the Dr. Simon Krauthammer Chair in Archaeology, and the Department of General History. Working in two departments means carrying a double load of administrative tasks, but it also means a double number of colleagues and friends, and I have been blessed with many. My doctoral students Anat Peled, Michael Ehrlich, Simon Gat, and Yael Guter, and all the students in the crusader seminar at Bar-Ilan University have likewise challenged me to keep in touch with wider issues outside the depths of captivity.

I am also pleased to acknowledge the generous assistance of the librarians and staff of the following institutions: Bar-Ilan University, the General Reading Room of the Jewish National and University Library, the Institute of Microfilmed Hebrew Manuscripts, the Cambridge University Library and its Geniza collection curator, the Parker Library at Corpus Christi College, the British Library, the Bibliothèque nationale and C.N.R.S in Paris, the Biblioteca Laurenziana in Florence, and the Vatican Library.

Many friends and colleagues worldwide have patiently listened to my thoughts on ransoming captives and shared their insights with me: Giulio Cipollone O.S.S.T., Miri Rubin, Bat-Sheva Albert,

Miryam Greilsammer, Sophia Menashe, Sylvia Schein, Abraham David, Amnon Linder, Michael Toch, and Joseph Drory have all given generously of their time and counsel. Special thanks go to Susan Edgington, who read the entire manuscript and whose sharp eye and erudite touch enhanced this book. I am profoundly indebted to her and to Esther Cohen: their support means more to me than they themselves realize and their generosity and friendship are greatly appreciated. If the final product is less than they expected, the fault is entirely my own.

Dena Ordan, Renée Melamed, Esther and Hanan Eshel, Esther Chazon, and Betsy Amaru, the ‘think tank’ of the Jewish National and University Library in Jerusalem, shared many cherished hours. Zohar Ariel from Haifa University also extended a helping hand and heart.

Finally I wish to thank Julian Deahl of Brill for his patience and encouragement.

My loyal and encouraging family members have lived in the shadow of medieval captivity for many years. Without their patience this book could never have been written, and without their impatience it might never have been finished. I dedicate this book to Zvi, who fought along with me on many battlefields. What is mine and yours is his (*Nedarim* 50a).

ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Albert of Aachen
BSOAS	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
CCCM	Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis
EHR	<i>English Historical Review</i>
FC	Fulcher of Chartres
JQR	<i>Jewish Quarterly Review</i>
MGH	Monumenta Germaniae Historica
OV	Orderic Vitalis
PG	Patrologia Graeca
PL	Patrologia Latina
PPTS	Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society
RHC	<i>Recueil des Historiens des Croisades</i>
Arm.	<i>Armeniens</i>
Lois	<i>Lois</i>
Occ.	<i>Historiens occidentaux</i>
Or.	<i>Historiens orientaux</i>
RHGF	<i>Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France</i>
RRH	Röhricht, <i>Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani</i>
WT	William of Tyre

gociū ad effectū vltiū exanimando & reuol-
 uendo in nō meo p longi tēpōe spaciū di-
 ligenter quantū vultūte q̄tū q̄ bonū at-
 fuerat: obsequio sēp p̄cessū m̄tra & ip̄o
 ruz psequitio transgredior ac cō mēmo-
 ria corū: michi videt̄ q̄ p̄sato auxi-
 galeazū armaturū q̄ obtinere possit v̄ra s̄i-
 tū ab nīlūis romāne et cyprī ac alijs
 si in illis p̄tibz p̄ncipales conatus & caput
 faciat ap̄lica celsitudo qd̄ solū aū d. gale-
 is p̄ audientz adīones amatis sufficient



ductū. Qd̄ si deo m̄p̄ere voluit & ut die
 tū est magis p̄tū the soldam & saracenz
 destrueret vos sanctissime p̄r qui gressu v̄re
 dei intendere cū oī gaudio arduū ad ita-
 pandū dictū tam s̄m̄ lugentz & plan-
 gentz amarissime q̄ v̄ra est v̄ra h̄ditas
 & tota h̄ne religionis nectio residū aliaz
 finūz quas tenet et tamen solam & et
 p̄clerantissimū populū saracenz // Et cū oī
 reuerentia loquar p̄r sanctissime p̄culum
 est in mora. Inuenit et legit. Semp̄ notu

Plate 1 - Exchanging Muslim captives for a king (Marino Sanudo, *Libri secretorum fidelium crucis*, Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, MS. Plut. 21.23, fol. 14).

specu ad effectus vlti exanimando & reuo-
uendo in no mco p longi tps spaciuz di-
ligenter quantoz vultate q tuq qz bonu at
fuerat obfuiatio fcoruz p ciffu m fta & ipfo
ruq psequutio transgrediu ac ex merno
ma corud; mch; videt q pnsato auce
galearu; armatuuz q obtinere pofit vna fa-
tis ab mifilis romanie at cypr; ac alijs
fi in illis ptib; pncipales conatus & cap-
faciat apfca celfitudo qd foluz au; d. gale-
is p andictuz adicionez amate fufficient



ducti. Ad si de; mapeare voluit & vt die
tuz est magna ptuz tle soldam & saraceno-
destruere vos sanctissime pz qui gunt vite
dei intendere cu oi gaudio azdimini ad ita
panduz dictu etiam scdm lugentes & plan-
gentu amaruissime q vna est vna fides
& tota; hanc religionis nectio residuu alia
frazuz quas tenet et tunciet soldam et
secleratuissim; populu; saraceno; Et cu oi
reuerentia loqua pz sanctissime pncipium
est in mora. Inuenit et legit. Semp notu



Plate 1 - Exchanging Muslim captives for a king (Marino Sanudo, *Libri secretorum fidelium crucis*, Florence, Biblioteca Laurenziana, MS. Plut. 21.23, fol. 14).

in modum letis
 ut treuge ad
 certamen. **Quod**
de populatu
 induit.
 . lit. felix. q. c. c. c.
 . elis. h. u. g. de n. u. n. a. t.
 . c. e. l. s. t. i.

dominus balaam cum paucis fratribus milicie
 templi. facta est autem hec misera belli cong-
 sio quinto scilicet & quarto nonas iuli infra
 octavas aploz petri & pauli. Quasit etiam ab
 hac clade theodoricus magister milicie templi.



Plate 2 - The Battle of Hattin: Saladin capturing the True Cross (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 26, fol. 140r, p. 279).



Plate 3 - Defeat of the French in 1240 (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 133v). Reprinted by permission of the Conway Library, Cortauld Institute of Art.

Ita gressus cum populus capone miraculosa
 xpianis civitatem dampnare dicitur. **urbis amittere**
 rane inuadissent. persequuntur murorum pro **caudibus**
 pugnacula omni carere defensione. nū cum festina **uigant**
 tione talis ad murum applicatis: civitatem certam
 timentur fideles. Sicque saluantes mundi precuntur
 nuals non emens capta est damna sine defensi
 one absque tumultu et uolentia expiatione. ut soli
 filio dei uicaria ascribatur. Et cum capere aut
 tantis uiculis regis babilonis. nū fuit ausus more solito xpa
 nos aggredi. si confusus aufugens ipse castra amittit
 sit. **Episcopus** itaque duce milites xpi damnam ingressi: pla



Turris Damnae



lum concussa fuit. Voluit enim deus integram,
 tradere eam seruis suis. ut clauem et auctoritatem to
 tius tunc egisset. **Sicut** ē autē amittit tunc tamasse et cā
 pum tabernaculi i terra gressu ut conuicti possunt xpi
 am que pascual' est **quoniam** filii isrl' tpe famis perire
 a piraone sicut legatur in ueteri testamento. **De cap**

Dapra igitur amittit. missi aone **castra** **duplores**
 sunt exploratores ad uari' uille in festo sū ele
 mentis in nauiculis p paruum flumen quod rap
 uis appellatur. ut de castellulis et uillis uictualib
 a querebant et sic locum diligenter explorarent
 cum aut appropinquasset ad castrum quoddam de

Qui
Dam



Plate 4 - Siege of Damietta (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 59v).




Plate 5 - The Hospitaller prison in Acre (photograph, A. Mashta).



Plate 6 -
Recesses for chains
for restraining
prisoners in the
Hospitaller prison
(photograph
A. Mashta).



Plate 7 - Trinitarian medallion from the Church of St. Thomas in Formis, Rome.



Plate 8 - Chapel of Mountjoy at Nabi Samwil (photograph, Y. Ganzel).



Plate 9 -
Quarry in the unfinished moat at Nabi Samwil (photograph, Y. Ganzel).

INTRODUCTION

Prisoners of war are not heroes. They are by definition failures, whether soldiers vanquished in battle or civilians unable to defend their homes. The alteration in status from a free to a powerless person is the first and critical phase of captivity; even a well-treated captive usually loses his former rank and status and his life is at the captor's mercy.¹ It may therefore seem strange to make the captive the focus of a monograph, particularly if the period under study is one when physical prowess and chivalry were central social ideals, and not just in times of warfare. In medieval society the warrior was a focal element and the economic infrastructure was geared to support him and enable him to fulfill his vocation, i.e., to fight. The warrior fought for power, property, and prestige and if he failed he lost all three.² This was true for medieval society at large, and even more so during the Crusades, a period replete with *gestes* – heroic and romantic deeds. Crusader society saw war not as a necessary evil, but as a holy task laid upon it by God and the Church, and the status of the warrior was enhanced accordingly.

The captive in such a period was the classic antihero, the failed warrior. This book's protagonists are, however, not only the captives, but also the society from which they came, or more precisely the warring Christian and Muslim societies. The determining criterion for making these societies the focal subject matter is their respective conduct toward captives. In essence, our main question is: how did these rival societies react to the fact that many of their members did not leave the battlefield as victorious heroes, and did not die martyrs' deaths, but remained alive as vanquished captives and had to be dealt with one way or another? This question in turn leads to more detailed queries: was there any correlation between the way one behaved toward one's captives, that is, toward enemy

¹ See A. Lieblich, *Seasons of Captivity: The Inner World of POWs* (New York, 1994) 6.

² J. France (*Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300* [London, 1999] 1-15) emphasizes warfare as a proprietorial enterprise. On medieval warfare in general, see H. Delbrück, *Medieval Warfare: History of the Art of War*, vol. 3, trans. W.J. Renfroe (Lincoln, 1982); P. Contamine, *War in the Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1984).

warriors who fell into one's hands, and willingness to take responsibility for one's own captives, that is, former comrades now in enemy hands?

We must inquire in addition if the meeting of enemies away from the battlefield led to more peaceful encounters between them. Did the need to deal with an unknown enemy on his home territory in order to free one's captives influence the relations between enemies? Did the belligerent sides learn modes of behavior and ethics from their adversaries? Or did they remain two totally divorced alien forces, untouched by each other's culture and mores? Did the norms and readiness to take responsibility for the vanquished soldiers one had sent into battle develop during two hundred years of almost constant warfare? What was the role of religion as a restraint upon the atrocities of war? What contribution did chivalrous ideals make to the everyday conduct of war? All these questions must be addressed in order to understand the complex problem of captivity in the entangled net of relationships between the adversaries.

The basis for a humane attitude toward prisoners of war, the restraint of the victors' wrath visited on the vanquished, ostensibly stems from a set of values that honors the human rights of the enemy. Such values could be based on natural moral feelings, or on religious laws, or on ethics based on social conventions, which in the medieval context would be identified as chivalrous ideals. We shall see that no set of norms was strong enough to protect the lives of captives under all circumstances, although all of them contributed to the creation of an accepted mode of conduct.

Religious values

In Judaism, Christianity, and Islam the attitude toward captives from one's own camp seems to be based mainly on social conventions and on concepts of religious charity (*Tsedaka*, *Şadaqa*, *Caritas*). All three traditions saw the ransom of captives as a meritorious deed of charity rather than as the moral obligation of the leaders who sent the soldiers to war. As a religious act one would expect to find it as a scriptural precept. However, none of the basic law books of the three religions our protagonists represent explicitly mentions ransom of one's captives as a religious duty. The paramount importance of ransom in Judaism is not grounded in the Bible, and the

Qur'an mainly treats behavior toward captives taken as booty in war.³

The most explicit biblical reference to captives is found in the pericope of how to treat a woman taken captive in war (Deut. 21:10-15), i.e., how to behave toward the 'other'. Biblical law sought to restrict the possibility of abuse by mandating that the captor allow such a captive a month-long mourning period for her family and by forbidding him to sell her as a slave if he no longer desires her. The biblical lawgiver apparently found it more expedient to restrain the victorious captor, and especially in the case of the more exposed and fragile female captive, than to deal with the need to ransom one's defeated comrades. One possible explanation for this might be that biblical law deals mainly with the victorious warrior, as if defeat were unthinkable for the Israelites. On the other hand, in the curses placed before the Israelites at the covenant, defeat and exile are main themes, and captivity is referred to explicitly.⁴ One is left with the feeling that captivity was an irremediable curse.⁵ As one could not expect the enemy to be merciful, the main emphasis was on self-restraint and not on charitable efforts to redeem one's own captives. This may explain why ransom of captives is not directly mentioned in the Pentateuch and not counted as one of its basic precepts. Nonetheless, postbiblical Jewish traditions defined ransom as 'a major precept'.⁶

Ransom of captives in Christianity is based on the Jewish tradition, with particular emphasis on charity. The charitable visitor of a prisoner is, as in other cases of charitable deeds, visiting Christ

³ Qur'an 47:4-5: "And when you meet in regular battle those who disbelieve, smite their necks; and when you have overcome them, bind fast the fetters – then afterwards either release them as a favor or by taking ransom – until the war lays down its burdens. That is the ordinance." On Islamic law, see A.A. Al Koosy, "Prisoners in Holy War between Theology and Law: A Muslim Reading of the Fifth-Sixth Century of Hejira – Eleventh-Twelfth Christian Century", in *La Liberazione dei 'captivi' tra Cristianità e Islam*, ed. G. Cipollone (Città del Vaticano, 2000) 621-28.

⁴ Deut. 28:41: "You shall have sons and daughters, but they shall not remain yours, for they shall go into captivity."

⁵ E.g.: "Your sons and daughters shall be given to another people, while you look on; you will strain your eyes looking for them all day but be powerless to do anything" (Deut. 28:32).

⁶ Babylonian Talmud, Tractate *Baba Bathra* 8b.

himself.⁷ Sometimes referred to as one of the seven good works expected of a pious Christian,⁸ the need to ransom captives is not mentioned in the New Testament, possibly because warfare was not a main theme.⁹ Not so the Qur'an, which emphasizes *jihad* (holy war) as one of the religious duties of a Muslim. But even in the Qur'an stress is placed on the division of booty and on behavior toward captives taken in battle, not on helping one's own captives.¹⁰ We can probably attribute this lacuna to unwillingness to dwell on defeat. War fought in the name of God is supposed to lead to victory. Despite the lack of an explicit command in their Scriptures, for medieval Judaism and Islam alike ransoming of captives was an important charitable deed, an individual as well as a communal obligation. When the chronicler Ibn al-Athir lamented the death of Saladin's secretary Qadi Fadhil (abd-Arrahym) in 1200 he described him as "a pious man, a great distributor of alms who accomplished many acts of devotion. He founded religious foundations for alms and ransoming captives and went on pilgrimage to Mecca."¹¹ Ransoming captives thus equaled the *Hag* as a sign of piety.

While the early Christian church in the West apparently saw ransom as an important charity and was willing to contribute to its fulfillment,¹² the duty of the individual was not as clear or well defined as in Islam and Judaism.¹³ Medieval Latin lexicons do not

⁷ C. Osiek, "The Ransom of Captives: Evolution of a Tradition", *Harvard Theological Review* 74 (1981) 365-86.

⁸ J.J. Gross, "Christo in Captivis: Early Trinitarian Activity", paper delivered at the International Medieval Studies Congress (Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, 4-7 May, 2000) 1, citing an illustration found in Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS lat. 8846. This fourteenth-century illustration depicts the church as a woman ransoming captives. I thank Reverend Gross for letting me use his paper prior to publication.

⁹ Cf. G. Cipollone, *Christianità-Islam Cattività e liberazione in nome di Dio: Il tempo di Innocenzo III dopo 'il 1187'*, *Miscellanea Historiae Pontificiae* 60 (Rome, 1992) 25-31.

¹⁰ See M. Hamidullah, *Muslim Conduct of State* (Hyderabad-Deccan, 1941-42); J. Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants", in *Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition*, ed. J. Kelsay and J.T. Johnson, *Contributions to the Study of Religion* 27 (New York, 1990) 197-220.

¹¹ Ibn al-Athir, *Al Kamil fi'l-Ta'rikh* (reprint, Beirut, 1966) 12:159.

¹² See W. Klingshirn, "Charity and Power: Caesarius of Arles and the Ransoming of Captives in Sub-Roman Gaul", *Journal of Roman Studies* 75 (1985) 183-203.

¹³ See Cipollone (*Cattività*, 18) for the different distribution of warlike words in the Old and New Testaments; e.g., *militia* 59 times in OT and 4 in NT; *captivitas* 92 times in OT and only 3 in NT, etc.

mention ransom as one of the obvious examples of *caritas* or *eleemosyna* from which we may infer that it was not among the most common means of charity.¹⁴ It was seen as an attribute of sanctity, a great deed performed by holy bishops, that is, as part of the institutional responsibility of the Church, rather than one of its parishioners' duties. In the medieval age charity was often pursued for the associated prestige it conferred on the donor. Ransoming captives probably did not fit this definition, as the captives themselves were viewed as shameful failures. The feeling of shame and ignominy connected to captivity appears to have been universal.¹⁵

In a recent interview on Israeli television (20 September 1999) a group of former captives from the Yom Kippur War (1973) were asked about their first reaction to captivity. Almost all of them answered, twenty-six years after the event, that the main and initial reaction was one of shame. This feeling was later mixed with strong feelings of anger, both because of the difficult conditions in captivity and the sense that they had been abandoned by the state, although in fact it ransomed them all. Both emotions, shame at having been taken captive and frustration at not being rescued, are grounded in the social conventions of the society that sent them to war. Similar reactions may be found in the crusader period. In Amia Lieblich's interviews of POWs she points out that they tried to overcome their feelings of shame by emphasizing the inevitability of their capture. However, feelings of shame lingered:¹⁶ "Only many years later, during our interviews, did the men reveal these pervasive self-doubts, and admit that being captured is not a great honor for a soldier."¹⁷

Another prevalent reaction cited by the modern captives was the feeling of being emotionally handicapped as a result of captivity. The ensuing psychological impairment brought with it problems of insomnia, nightmares, and the inability to form lasting relation-

¹⁴ See s.v. *caritas* and *eleemosyna* in the following lexicons: C.F. Du Cange, *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis* (reprint; Graz, 1954); J.F. Niermeyer, *Mediae latinitatis lexicon minus* (Leiden, 1976); R.E. Latham and D.R. Howlett, *Dictionary of Medieval Latin from British Sources* (Oxford, 1975-86).

¹⁵ William of Poitiers (*The Gesta Guillelmi of William of Poitiers*, ed. and trans. R.H.C. Davis and M. Chibnall, [Oxford, 1998] 2:15, 124-27) sees captivity as *hoc ignominia sempiterna infamatum iri* – the captives bring on themselves perpetual ignominy.

¹⁶ Lieblich, *Seasons of Captivity*, 318.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 319.

ships. Some even described feeling detached from reality. Whereas we are unlikely to find this kind of documentation for the crusader period, it may be useful to use modern reports and insights to understand the medieval protagonists, albeit exercising due caution. Reynald of Châtillon has often been described as a ruthless, irresponsible fighter who was to blame for breaking the truce in 1187 and ultimately causing the Battle of Hattin and the fall of the Latin Kingdom.¹⁸ His aggressive behavior is not usually connected with the well-known fact that he spent fifteen years in captivity.¹⁹ He reminds me of the modern navigator Gur Israeli, who after being released from Egyptian captivity in 1973 decided to go back to flying and eventually became a fighter pilot. Of the group of aforementioned captives he alone claimed that he had no ongoing problems associated with captivity. Perhaps the return to active fighting was a way to combat the ghosts from captivity and Reynald's belligerent irresponsibility and aggressiveness should be seen as a reaction to his experiences as a captive.²⁰ Although this proposed explanation does not add to or change the known facts, it may help us to understand an enigmatic and central figure in the drama of 1187 and the years leading up to this decisive defeat.

A different process took place in the case of Raymond III of Tripoli, who was in captivity for eight years. Like the modern victim of kidnapping Patty Hearst, he identified with and became close to his captors. The dovish policies he pursued after his return, seen by his contemporaries as treason, may have been the result of his experiences in captivity.²¹ This is the other side of the coin of the captivity phenomenon.

¹⁸ Recently, however, B. Hamilton (*The Leper King and his Heirs: Baldwin IV and the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem* [Cambridge, 2000], 117, 136, 159-85, 202, 224-31) has taken a different view, describing him as a sober, responsible statesman, one of the main pillars of Baldwin IV's reign, from both the military and political perspective.

¹⁹ B. Hamilton, "The Elephant of Christ: Reynald of Châtillon", in *Religious Motivation: Biographical and Sociological Problems for the Church Historian*, ed. D. Baker, Studies in Church History 15 (Oxford, 1978) 97-108.

²⁰ Hamilton ("Elephant of Christ," 97-108) saw a marked difference in Reynald's behavior in the second part of his life, that is, after his release from captivity, but he understood it mainly as a case of deepening religious motivation and devotion to the crusader cause. G. Regan (*Lionhearts: Saladin and Richard I* [London, 1998] 57) claims that "Reginald's sixteen years in a Muslim prison had mellowed the young fire-brand."

²¹ Hamilton, *Leper King*, 223, 227-29.

The story of ransoming captives in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem is based on a central narrative that sees the encounter between the enemies – Crusaders and Muslims – primarily through Christian eyes. Of course, Muslim documents will be consulted, but the perspective is mainly from the vantage point of the crusading society, as this society underwent a process of change. Having said this, I propose that some major changes in the conduct of the Franks in the Latin East stem from the influence of the Muslim enemy. Direct contact away from the battlefield and at the negotiating table led to a confrontation with different modes of behavior and mores, which had future implications for the development of rules of war that differed from former usage.

The narrative is only partly chronological. Taking the basic view that there is a progression, I shall try to show that the crusaders' attitude changed from one of unwillingness to ransom captives and take responsibility for one's failures to a gradual learning to cope with the problem, mainly by adopting ways already known in the East. From the first encounters in 1095 to 1101 until the gradual change during the second and third generations of settlers in the Latin Kingdom, a transformation is discernible. The great watershed seems to have been the Battle of Hattin in 1187. When almost the entire fighting force of the Latin Kingdom fell into captivity, the image of captivity was bound to change. The captive could no longer be seen as a lonely failure, one who had to fend for himself to be redeemed. Captivity became a societal (one could almost say 'national') phenomenon and had to be dealt with at the international level of the papacy as well as by the relatively few noncaptive survivors who started the difficult process of building the Second Crusader Kingdom from Tyre and Acre. The Third Crusade laid the basis for the Second Kingdom of Jerusalem strategically, but also brought in newcomers whose encounters with the East led them to restart the process of acculturation from scratch. This kingdom, even more than the First, was connected by an umbilical cord to the western European reservoir that could contribute new crusaders and settlers to the shrinking land. This period saw the institutionalization of ransom. Starting with the Trinitarian Order, the papacy and the European states took an active role in organizing ransom and formulating rules of war. These rules eventually ripened into the full-fledged European sets of laws formulated in the fourteenth century, for example, *The Trees of Battle*.

But the narrative is never a straightforward linear chronological story. The intermingling between East and West, the confrontational encounters by ever new crusaders with the Eastern situation, brought many exceptions to the rules. It is also clear that no distinct line demarcates East/Muslim from West/Christian. The crusading experience was enacted at different meeting points and the Levant was one of many battlefields. An important point of comparison is the progress of the Spanish Reconquista, which shares many similarities with the crusade in the Latin East. But in Spain the tempo of change was very different. Spain was not just another “honorary oriental land, which had somehow got washed up on the wrong shore of the Mediterranean”.²² In the sphere of ransoming captives Spain took the lead. While it took the crusaders in the East almost two centuries to arrive at an institutionalized resolution for the problems of captives, the contacts between enemies in Spain seem to have borne fruit much earlier in the tradition of municipal ransoming of captives. The redemptionist orders – Mercederian, Trinitarian, and the Order of Santiago – flourished in Spain, but they never achieved the same prominence in the Latin Kingdom. If the existence of laws of war is a criterion for viewing a country as Mediterranean, Spain would indeed merit a place of honor.

A significant subtheme is the Jewish role in the development of ransoming captives. This is not because the Jews were an important factor in the warfare in the East. They were not. As nonparticipants in Muslim-Christian fighting, though often caught in its midst, they had to develop efficient modes of ransom much earlier than the crusaders did. The Cairo Geniza provides a type of documentation of everyday life lacking in the chronicles and documents of the main protagonists, and therefore materials from the Geniza acquire disproportional importance.

The sources for our investigation are mainly literary – chronicles and histories of the period. There are several charters that can help us to achieve a picture of the practicalities of ransom, showing how money was raised and what sums were at stake. Ransom of captives

²² F. Fernández-Armestro, “The Survival of a Notion of *Reconquista* in Late Tenth- and Eleventh-Century León”, in *Warriors and Churchmen in the High Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Karl Leyser*, ed. T. Reuter (London, 1992) 126. For the historiography of the Reconquista and a discussion of the concept and its underlying reality, see *ibid.*, 123-44.

receives mention as a charity in a few testaments. But basically the writers' negative concept of captivity leads to very little being written about it in record sources. Although we know that the military orders played a role in ransoming captives and in negotiating for their ransom, the subject is almost absent from their statutes and charters. There is very little to compare with the rich sources found in the Geniza which acquaint us not only with personalities dealing with ransom, some of them very prominent leaders, but also with prices and the everyday vicissitudes and problems of the returning captives. Occasionally a knight impoverished by the burden of ransom would sell his manor to an ecclesiastical institution, which has preserved their charters in their archives, but such cases provide very few glimpses into the problems of captivity and ransom.

The legal sources are not very rich either. At the end of the eleventh century the laws of war were in the process of emerging from the realm of undefined custom to regulated usage. Only in the thirteenth century do we find some attempts to codify the problems of captivity. This leaves us mainly with the chronicles and histories written by contemporaries or near contemporaries of the Franks in the Latin East. Because the Crusades were seen as a pivotal event in the history of humankind and Christianity, we have many such sources. These are complemented by *chansons de geste*, epic cycles whose main theme is the crusaders and their deeds. The line between history, romance, and poetry is not a clearly demarcated one, and purely literary descriptions are sometimes a useful means of gaining insight into the mentality of the age. However, all three kind of narrative sources – chronicle, romance, and chanson – have as their aim to tell the story of the heroes of the crusader movement, among whom captives allegedly had no place.

We must also distinguish between two different kinds of captives, namely those who fought and lost their freedom on the battlefield and civilians reduced to captivity by conquest. During the First Crusade this line of demarcation was blurred, as the noncombatants, including women and children, were part of the itinerant camp and never far from the actual battlefield. These noncombatants were part of the crusader camp besieging Antioch and other cities. Only after the establishment of the Latin Kingdom, however tiny and fragile at the start, does the division between combatants and noncombatants acquire any meaning. Thereafter, the difference between active fighters and civilians caught in a raid or siege

may have been more clear-cut. We shall see, however, that it was the social division between captives, between the higher and lower echelons of society, that was most significant, and not that between combatants and noncombatants. Women dominate the latter group, although there are some documented cases of fighting crusader women. In general, women were more likely to be spared and taken captive than men. Therefore a discrepancy exists between their marginal role in fighting and their large representation among the captives. Moreover, although women were more likely to be taken captive than men, the literary chansons, such as *Les Chétifs*, make the male captive the hero of the narrative. Captive women are relegated to the sphere of romantic fantasies of sexual conquest. This connection between captivity and sexual relations makes the return of female captives even more problematic than that of men, as it was taken for granted that their captivity included sexual harassment, and they were thus considered morally tainted.

Examining the crusaders and the Franks in the Latin East as a 'society organized for war', it is possible to discern several stages of development in their dealings with captivity and ransom. When the crusaders set out their basic conception seems to have been disregard of captivity as a possible outcome of crusade. Confronted with an unexpected reality, their first reaction was a complete refusal to deal with the problems that grew out of such encounters with their enemies. Later, when forced to reevaluate the situation, we can discern a softening of their former opposition. The need to confront a new situation was dealt with as a group, firstly because the ties of the individual crusader with his former group, e.g., Lotharingians, Provençals, etc., were at this point still very strong,²³ and secondly because diplomatic dealings with the enemy were the leadership's responsibility. Thus the individual crusaders had to learn to behave as part of the great enterprise and, at the same time, if taken captive, they were at first left to deal with the situation without much real support from their group. Only when great leaders were taken captive do we see the development of the group responsibility toward the individual captive.

Last, as part of the process of absorbing the norms of the East,

²³ J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders, 1095-1131* (Cambridge, 1997) 21-22 and passim.

Frankish society gradually learned to deal with the complexities arising from the need to encounter the enemy away from the battlefield. This led to more frequent captive exchanges, to the establishment of new ways of ransom, to the perception of the problem at the group level, and finally to the formulation of rules of war. The process of turning from a crusading society into a Latin Kingdom made it imperative to act *vis-à-vis* the realities in that land. The newly learned norms were elsewhere distilled into written laws. In the Latin Kingdom the stages of conforming to the norms and developing them into written law were not attained. Partly this was because each new generation of crusaders from the West had to start the process of acculturation afresh, and partly because the kingdom did not exist long enough to complete the process. We can only speculate what direction the Latin Kingdom would have taken had it been allowed to remain on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

One model for small group development posits the following sequence of development: forming, storming, norming, and performing.²⁴ Although formulated to explain the stages of development in small task-oriented groups, this model may be relevant to the stages of a large group with a long, indefinite group life like the crusaders, or indeed of fighting societies at large. Each new wave of crusaders arriving from the West had to go through the different stages as they came to take part in the tasks of crusade and possible settlement. Moreover, the encounter was never between two static groups. The newcomers had to deal both with an alien Muslim society and a Latin society in the stage of forming. If the crusaders seem mainly to have been storming, the constant fluctuation of their society both in Europe and in the East may have been one of the reasons. Some lessons were learned. One possible outcome of this adversarial encounter may have been the formulation by European society of clear rules of warfare after the fall of the Latin Kingdom. These laws of war included prescriptions governing behavior toward captives, rules of ransom, and restraint in battle.

²⁴ B.W. Tuckman, "Developmental Sequence in Small Groups", *Psychological Bulletin* 63, no. 6 (1965) 384-99. Tuckman (p. 392) mentions an additional stage identified by *The Tulane Studies in Social Welfare* (New Orleans, 1957) which I call 'performing'. See also B.W. Tuckman and M.A.C. Jensen, "Stages of Small-Group Development Revisited", *Group and Organization Studies* 2 (Dec. 1977) 419-27.

Thus the legacy of the Latin Kingdom may have played a partial role in the maturing of international laws of war. The prism of captives and captivity in the Latin East focuses this attempt to chart how these changes came about.

CHAPTER ONE

THE FIRST ENCOUNTERS: CRUSADERS FACE CAPTIVITY

The concept of captivity

What did the First Crusaders expect would happen to them in captivity? What did they think of their chances to survive and regain their freedom? Not only do we have no inkling, apparently the Crusaders themselves had no real notion either. Moreover, it appears that they did not even plan for the eventuality that they themselves would take enemy captives. Strange as it may seem, the great host that set out on an armed pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1096 gave little thought to the possibility of captivity.

Historians who strive to understand the Crusades have scrutinized crusader propaganda as a means of decoding the expectations and goals of the warriors of the Holy War.¹ While the ideological background of the Crusades has been thoroughly researched, very little is known about its leaders' strategic plans, how they expected to fight and win the war, or what their plans were in case of defeat.² Even less is known about the thoughts of the ordinary soldiers. Although contemporary historians of the movement report on-the-scene reactions to victory and defeat, little advance thought seems to have been given to the outcome of the greatest expedition Western Europe had known for centuries. As God's own war the Crusade was supposed to be a victorious armed pilgrimage that would end at its goal – Jerusalem.

But what if they failed? To judge from one participant's letter written during the events, but after the first military encounters with

* Parts of this chapter appeared in "The Ransom of Captives in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," in *Autour de la première croisade: Actes du Colloque de la SSCLE (Clermont-Ferrand, 22-25 juin 1995)*, ed. M. Balard (Paris, 1996).

¹ C. Erdmann, *The Origin of the Idea of Crusade*, trans. M.W. Baldwin and W. Goffart (Princeton, 1977), and J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading* (London, 1986) are still basic works for the ideological background of the Crusades.

² J. France, *Victory in the East* (Cambridge, 1994) especially chaps. 1 and 4.

the Turkish army, this was not feasible. Count Stephen of Blois assured 'his beloved wife Adela' after the conquest of Nicea (19 June 1097) that, God willing, the crusaders would reach Jerusalem in five weeks, if Antioch did not become an obstacle.³ Little did he know that the siege of Antioch would prove an almost insurmountable obstacle and that he himself would desert the besieging army the day before the city fell.⁴ However, the letter demonstrates the writer's confident mood, or at the very least that he wanted to convey a mindset with no place for thoughts about possible defeat.

Metaphorical use of captivity

In crusader propaganda it is the goal of the expedition – Jerusalem – that is described as a captive waiting for armed liberation; captivity nowhere appears as a potential outcome of the conflict. According to Robert the Monk, Pope Urban II's famous speech at Clermont (27 November 1095) presented the prospective crusaders with the objective of liberating Jerusalem from captivity: "This royal city in the centre of the world is now captive in the hands of her enemies...she prays to be liberated and asks you to come and free her."⁵

Whether or not Urban actually used this as a battle cry, the chronicler, writing after the successful First Crusade, clearly presumed that the audience at Clermont would feel an immediate need to free a captive city. Orderic Vitalis used the same image when he described the triumphant entrance into Jerusalem: "The Christians invested Jerusalem on 6 June, not as stepsons would a stepmother, but as sons would a mother. As friends and sons they surrounded her...not to deprive her of freedom, but to free her from captivity."⁶

³ H. Hagenmeyer, ed., *Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088-1100* (Innsbruck, 1902) 140. In an oral communication (Emmanuel College, Cambridge, 14 February 2000) Prof. J. Riley-Smith suggested that Stephen originally wrote that they would reach Jerusalem in five months, a more accurate estimate for the distance from Nicea to Jerusalem, and the copyist changed it to five weeks. In fact, it took more than two years.

⁴ See J.A. Brundage, "An Errant Crusader: Stephen of Blois", *Traditio* 16 (1960) 380-95.

⁵ Robertus Monachus, *Historia Iherosolimitana*, RHC Occ. III, p. 729.

⁶ Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, ed. M. Chibnall (Oxford, 1975), V, 9, 15, p.157 (hereafter: OV). Orderic probably relies on Baldric of Dol

The image of Jerusalem as a captive woman is biblical and so is the concept of cleansing the city from its polluting inhabitants,⁷ but the choice of certain biblical metaphors is adapted to and presumably reflects the mental world of the nobility to whom this propaganda was addressed. The same metaphors were used in a contemporary charter that described the Provençal leader of the First Crusade, Raymond of Saint-Gilles, as going “on pilgrimage to wage war on foreign peoples and defeat barbaric nations, lest the Holy City of Jerusalem be held captive and the Holy Sepulchre of the Lord Jesus be contaminated any longer”.⁸

Was this concept of freeing one’s captives from enemy bondage really an integral part of crusader thought and practice? Rallying around a cry to free a captive heritage may well have been part of the reflexive conduct of a feudal army, but it does not seem to have carried over into a feeling of responsibility for vanquished soldiers who were taken captive during the war. The need to free captives may have been a strong incentive to fight and could be used to summon warriors to battle. It was certainly used by military leaders in prebattle speeches,⁹ in which the expected victory would include redemption of former captives. But this rallying cry did not include any promise to free the fighting soldiers if they themselves were taken captive.

Thus it seems that although the concept of captivity was used as a metaphor in crusader preaching, the First Crusaders were conceptually unprepared for the problems of captivity. In the group self-definition of the crusade, there was no place for captivity as a possibility that required forethought.

(*Historia de peregrinatione Jerosolimitana*, RHC Occ. IV, p. 11) who sees Muslim pollution of the Holy places as making Jerusalem a stepmother: *a propriis filiis in captivitatem abductis orbatam...et filiis suis mater Ecclesia in novercam alienata est*.

⁷ P. Cole, “‘O God, the heathen have come into Your inheritance’ (Ps. 78.1): The Theme of Religious Pollution in Crusade Documents, 1095-1188”, in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. M. Shatzmiller (Leiden, 1993) 84-111.

⁸ Gerald of Cahors, *Histoire général de Languedoc*, vol. 5, cited by J. Riley-Smith, “The Idea of Crusading in the Charters of Early Crusaders, 1095-1102”, in *Le Concile de Clermont et l’Appel à la Croisade, Actes du Colloque Universitaire International de Clermont-Ferrand (23-25 juin 1995) organisé et publié avec le concours du Conseil Régional d’Auvergne* (Palais Farnèse, 1997) 155-66.

⁹ C. Morris, “Propaganda for War: The Dissemination of the Crusading Ideal in the Twelfth Century”, in *The Church and War*, ed. W.J. Sheils, *Studies in Church History* 20 (Oxford, 1983) 79-101.

Absence of captivity in preaching

The absence of captivity as a possible outcome is heightened against the background of the extensive attention lavished on death and victory in the preaching of the First Crusade. Peter Tudebode even made Urban elaborate on the misery awaiting the crusaders: "It is necessary that we suffer greatly for Christ's sake; clearly this means misfortune, poverty, persecution, want, illness, nakedness, hunger, thirst and other tribulations...and finally you shall receive great rewards."¹⁰

Note that captivity does not appear among the possible hardships awaiting the crusaders, although many of the tribulations Tudebode noted might well occur as its result. Tudebode wrote with hindsight, so this lacuna does not stem from lack of experience. Even on the eve of the Second Crusade, after many crusaders had in fact been taken captive, we find no ideological reference to them. In his enthusiastic preaching of the Second Crusade, Bernard of Clairvaux knew of only two possibilities: *Sive autem supervixerint, sive mortui fuerint*. He thought that crusaders could only win – either victory or the crown of martyrdom. Captivity meant defeat – and was not taken into account.¹¹ This is not to say that the First Crusade was not well prepared. Both on the level of leadership and of personal preparations,¹² the crusaders seem to have anticipated the possibility of death on the way or in battle.¹³ Again, the option of cap-

¹⁰ Peter Tudebode, *Historia de Hierosolymitano itinere*, ed. J.H. Hill and L.L. Hill (Paris, 1977). English translation by J.H. Hill and L.L. Hill (Philadelphia, 1974) I, p. 16.

¹¹ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 96-100.

¹² G. Constable has demonstrated the economic preparations via scrutiny of charters showing individuals raising money to cover their expenses, as in the charter of Achard of Montmerle, who mortgaged his properties to Cluny before leaving for the East. See A. Bernard and A. Bruel, eds., *Recueil des Chartres de l'Abbaye de Cluny* (Paris, 1901) 5:51; G. Constable, "The Financing of the Crusades in the Twelfth Century", in *Outremer*, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer, and R.C. Smail (Jerusalem, 1982) 64-88; idem, "Medieval Charters as a Source for the History of the Crusades", in *Crusade and Settlement*, ed. P.W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985) 73-89. See also J. Riley-Smith, *First Crusaders*.

¹³ Bernard and Bruel, *Chartres de Cluny*, 52: "Thus if I die in the pilgrimage to Jerusalem, or if I should decide to stay in those parts, that which is the subject of this mortgage...shall become a rightful and hereditary possession of the monastery of Cluny."

tivity was not usually provided for.¹⁴ A good example of such 'going forth bravely prepared for battle or death' may be Baldwin I's address to his soldiers before battle (1101), according to his chaplain's record:

Come then, soldiers of Christ, be of good cheer and fear nothing! ...If you should be slain here, you will surely be among the blessed. Already the gate of the Kingdom of Heaven is open to you. If you survive as victors you will shine in glory among all Christians. If, however, you wish to flee remember that France is indeed a long distance away!¹⁵

Missing here again are the consequences of flight and capture in the East. Therefore, the crusaders had to create their ideology and practice dealing with captivity in response to events. They had to find a solution not only to the military engagement with their enemies, but also to the problems that emerged within their own camp as a result of this engagement. The initial encounter with the problems of captivity and ransom will be defined here by the actions and reactions of the first generation in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, when the crusaders were first confronted with the problem of ransoming captives, whether as captors or as ransomers.

¹⁴ Cf. Riley-Smith, *First Crusaders*, 149 citing the case of the knight R. Gabard in Poitou, who allegedly made arrangements to deal with eventual captivity before going to Jerusalem, ca. 1120. See *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de l'abbaye de la Trinité de Mauléon*, ed. B. Ledain, Archives historiques du Poitou 20 (Poitiers, 1889) 15. It seems to me that the *pro captione corporis rectam talletam*, mentioned in the document among other tallages, is a local debt and not connected to the pilgrim's fate in the Holy Land.

¹⁵ Fulcher of Chartres, *Fulcheri Carnotensis Historia Hierosolymitana (1095-1127)*, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1913) (hereafter FC). Fulcher, II, 11, 8: *Eia Christi milites, confortamini, nihil metuentes...quod si hic interieritis, beati nimirum eritis. Iamiamque aperta est vobis ianua regni caelestis. Si vivi victores remanseritis, inter omnes Christianos gloriosi fulgebitis, si autem fugere volueritis, Francia equidem longe est a vobis*. Translation cited from *A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127*, trans. F. R. Ryan, ed. H.S. Fink (Knoxville, 1969) 157-58. Cf. William of Poitiers (*Gesta Guillelmi*, ed. and trans. R.H.C. Davis and Marjorie Chibnall, 2:15, pp. 124-26) who makes William the Conqueror elaborate on the possibility of captivity in his speech to his men before the Battle of Hastings.

Reactions to captivity

Based on the above, it is my opinion that the crusaders did not at first expect to take captives. They saw themselves as heirs of the biblical Joshua who were supposed to exterminate and disinherit the unclean pagans who polluted the Holy Land.¹⁶ There is no feeling of uneasy moral judgment when contemporary chroniclers describe warfare with no quarter given. Albert of Aachen's description of the mood after the victory in Jerusalem shows this clearly:

But now we must be careful lest we lose it through avarice or sloth or the pity we have for our enemies, sparing prisoners and gentiles still left in the city. For if we were to be attacked in great strength by the king of Babylon we should be suddenly overcome from within and without, and in this way carried away into eternal exile. And so the most important and trustworthy advice seems to us that all the Saracens and gentiles who are held prisoner for ransoming with money or are already redeemed should be put to the sword without delay, so that we shall not meet with any problem from their deceit or devices. After they heard this advice, on the third day after the victory judgment was pronounced by the leaders and everyone seized weapons and surged forth with a wretched massacre of all the crowd of gentiles which was still left, bringing some out from fetters and beheading them, slaughtering others who were found throughout the city streets and districts, whom they had previously spared for the sake of money or human pity; they were beheading or striking down with stones girls, women, noble ladies, even pregnant women, with very young children, paying attention to no one's age.¹⁷

The crusaders' massacre of the inhabitants in Jerusalem was not an unusual event during the conquest of a besieged city.¹⁸ It may have been more thorough and cruel than usual, but harsh action after a capture by storm, including killing civilians, was accepted as a convention of war.¹⁹ Albert's account does not, however, report deeds carried out during the conquest, in the heat of battle. According to Albert, the cold-blooded massacre of captives and noncombatants occurred three days later, and in spite of that he thought that

¹⁶ Cole, "Religious Pollution."

¹⁷ Albert of Aachen, *Historia Hierosolymitana*, ed. and trans. by Sue Edgington (forthcoming), VI, 29-30. I would like to thank Dr. Edgington for her generosity in letting me use her critical edition of the Latin text and English translation, both to be published by Oxford Medieval Texts (hereafter: AA).

¹⁸ France, *Victory in the East*, 355.

¹⁹ J. Bradbury, *The Medieval Siege* (Woodbridge, 1994) 296.

human pity for the captives would in this case have been 'avarice or sloth'.²⁰ We know from other sources that some captives were in fact ransomed in Jerusalem,²¹ but according to Albert this was contrary to crusader ideology and 'trustworthy advice'.

An earlier example of unbridled cruelty calmly reported by the chroniclers is the crusader conquest of Ma'arrat al-Nu'man (11 December 1098):

Our men all entered the city, and each seized as his own whatever goods he found in houses or cellars, and when it was dawn they killed everyone, man or woman, whom they met in any place whatsoever. No corner of the city was clear of Saracen corpses, and one could scarcely go about the city streets except by treading on the dead bodies of Saracens.... While we were there some of our men could not satisfy their needs, either because of the long stay or because they were so hungry, for there was no plunder to be had outside the walls. So they ripped up the bodies of the dead, because they used to find hidden bezants in their entrails, and others cut the dead flesh into slices and cooked it to eat.²²

This contemporary description of the military victory at Ma'arrat was one of the first in a series of descriptions of massacres by the crusaders which culminated in the conquest of Jerusalem in 1099. It has contributed to a popular image of the Crusades not as a holy war, but as a violent adventure restrained neither by law nor by any ethical custom.²³ As depicted, the crusaders killed indiscriminately,

²⁰ Albert is the only contemporary chronicler to say that the massacre took place three days after the conquest.

²¹ The sources in question come from the Cairo Geniza and are cited by S.D. Goitein, "Contemporary Letters on the Capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders", *Journal of Jewish Studies* 3 (1952) 162-77. R. Rogers (*Latin Siege Warfare in the Twelfth Century* [Oxford, 1992] 61) thinks that mostly Jews survived to be ransomed. There seems to be no reason why the crusaders should have shown Jews special pity; some of them certainly had a different record. Jewish fund-raising for ransom is better documented, but there seems to be no proof that they were saved in greater numbers than Muslims. Ibn al-Athir, who claims that 70,000 Muslims were killed in al-Aqsa, says that women and children were taken captive. This is late evidence (1160-1223) and clearly not very accurate, but it shows that captives were in fact taken (cited from D. Ephrat and M.D. Kabha, "Intensified Religious Fidelity and Higher Barriers: Muslims and Franks in *ash-Sham*", *Cathedra* 92 [1999] 49-64 [Hebrew]).

²² *Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum*, ed. Rosalind Hill (London, 1962) 80-81.

²³ T. Jones and A. Ereira, *Crusades* (London, 1994) 9-12, based on a television series by the BBC (Christmas, 1994) which used the motif of Crusaders as cannibals as an introductory sequence.

looted and plundered, and even descended to cannibalism.²⁴ Collaborated by other chroniclers,²⁵ the influence of the shocking nature of the story of Ma'arrat is reflected in the detailed description of the *Tafurs*, the lawless and fearless cannibals, by the romantic *Chanson d'Antioche*.²⁶

After the battle at Ascalon (August 1099), Tudebode depicts similar behavior toward the vanquished enemy:

In their great fright they climbed and hid in the trees, only to plunge from boughs like falling birds when our men pierced them with arrows and killed them with lances. Later the Christians uselessly decapitated them with swords. Other infidels threw themselves to the ground groveling in terror at the Christians' feet. Then our men cut them to pieces as one slaughters cattle for the meat market. By the sea coast Raymond of Saint-Gilles put to the sword countless numbers, and those who could not flee plunged into the sea.²⁷

In all these cases the reporters seem to take pains to stress the cruelty of the conquerors, not in a censorious way, but rather in a laconic, matter-of-fact narrative. The notion of giving quarter to a vanquished enemy was clearly not part of their mores.

The crusaders were probably familiar with an ideology of protecting noncombatants from the hazards of warfare from their homelands, namely the precepts of the Peace of God.²⁸ But none of these regulations was valid for holy war against the infidel. There everything was permitted and, some thought, even commendable. Killing the vanquished enemy did not require any excuse, sparing him did. If, however, the crusaders perceived the war as an anni-

²⁴ For the motif of cannibalism in crusader propaganda during the First and Third crusades, see A.S. Ambrisco, "Cannibalism and Cultural Encounters", *Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 29 (1999) 499-528.

²⁵ AA, V, 29. Albert's set of priorities sounds strange to modern ears: "It is extraordinary to relate and horrifying to the ears: these same torments of famine grew so great around these cities that – it is wicked to tell, let alone to do – the Christians did not shrink from eating not only killed Turks or Saracens, but even dogs whom they snatched and cooked with fire, on account of the scarcity of which you have heard." Cf. FC, I, 25, 2.

²⁶ *La Chanson d'Antioche*, ed. S. Duparc-Quioc, Documents relatifs à l'Histoire des Croisades 9 (Paris, 1977), vol. 1, lines 4039-4118.

²⁷ Tudebode, *Historia*, XII; trans., p. 125.

²⁸ R.C. Stacey, "The Age of Chivalry", in *The Laws of War*, ed. M. Howard, G.J. Andreopolus, and M.R. Shulman (New Haven, 1994) 27-32; T. Renna, "The Idea of Peace in the West, 500-1150", *Journal of Medieval History* 6 (1980) 143-67.

hilative one, they could hardly expect better treatment from their adversaries and therefore should not have expected to be taken captive themselves. In other words, the crusaders envisaged a war with no quarter given and no need to care either for their own or for enemy captives.

Strangely enough, the same Albert of Aachen who was an apologist for the massacre of captives in Jerusalem seems to have expected the enemy to have mercy on at least some of the Christian captives. In narrating a meeting between Kerbugha of Mosul and Peter the Hermit before the decisive battle at Antioch, Albert of Aachen places the following words in Kerbugha's mouth:

Know one thing, Peter, that the Christians should choose, that is to say that they shall send all their unbearded youth to us, as slaves to me and my lord the king of Khurasan, and we shall bestow on them great favours and gifts. Similarly girls who are still virgins shall have access to us, and permission to live. But any with beards or any gray hair are for beheading, with the married women. Otherwise I shall spare no one on grounds of age, but shall destroy them all by the sword, whom moreover I shall wrap in chains and iron fetters. And when he had said this he showed Peter a countless and infinite abundance of every kind of chain and fetter.²⁹

One could of course argue that Kerbugha's terms ought to be compared with those offered in negotiations for surrender, which were usually more lenient than when a city was taken by force and slaughter was to be expected.³⁰ However, Albert claims that Kerbugha prepared large numbers of fetters before his departure for Antioch,³¹ and that after the victory at Antioch the crusaders found chains and fetters in the vanquished army's tents, in readiness for taking prisoners from among the crusaders. In other words, the crusaders must have known by then that their enemies did take prisoners, whether for slavery or for ransom, but this did not immediately lead to ideological reciprocation.

In fact the Turkish army took crusaders captive from the first battles between them. The first battle with the enemy left the noncom-

²⁹ AA, IV, 45.

³⁰ Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 325-33.

³¹ AA, IV, 8: "He directed smiths who lived all over the region to manufacture fetters and chains, in which the conquered and captured pilgrims would be led off into exile in barbarous lands."

batant members of the crusade easy prey for the Turks, who followed the fugitive fighters to their camp, killed many and spared some (Civetot, 1096): "They took away only young girls and nuns, whose faces and figures seemed to be pleasing to their eyes, and beardless and attractive young men."³² Incidentally, these are the same terms as those later put in Kerbugha's mouth when he laid siege to Antioch, but at Civetot they were executed in the wake of a battle.

In 1101 thousands of Christian captives were taken to Khorasan, most of them women and noncombatants. We do not hear of them afterwards, and there were no negotiations for their ransom. Some of the most prominent of these captives passed into the realm of legend, such as Ida, margravine of Austria, whom legend makes the mother of the Muslim leader Zengi. Such a brave Muslim warrior had to be of Christian descent. The legend gave a heroic flavor to Ida's disappearance and was easier to accept than the other, more historical versions that claimed that she was torn limb from limb by horses' hooves or raped along with other women and taken into captivity.³³ But no efforts were made to ransom these captives. Whatever their real fate, they were left to it.

The first negotiations for liberating crusader captives were conducted by the Byzantines after the capture of Nicaea (19 June 1097) as part of the terms of surrender of the city. The crusaders themselves played a passive role.³⁴ The prominence of the Byzantines in redemption of captives as compared to crusader inactivity may have led to later approaches to Constantinople to free Latin captives.³⁵ After the siege of Antioch, Guynemer of Boulogne was set free by his Byzantine captors after a long period in captivity.³⁶ In

³² AA, I, 21.

³³ AA, VIII, 39: "Countess Ida was either captured and taken away, or was torn limb from limb by the hooves of so many thousand horses: to this very day her fate is not known, except that they say she was carried off among so many thousands of women into the land of Khorasan in eternal exile."

³⁴ William of Tyre, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, *Guillaume de Tyr, Chronique*, CCCM 63, 63a (Turnhout, 1981), trans. by E.A. Babcock and A.C. Krey as *A History of Deeds Done beyond the Sea* (New York, 1943) (hereafter WT) III, 11: "We earnestly beseech your serene highness, therefore, not to delay to send to these parts some of your principal men.... They must also arrange for the transference of a great number of captives."

³⁵ See chapter 4.

³⁶ AA, V, 24: "Also at that time Guynemer of the land of Boulogne, who was taken prisoner at Latakia by the Greek king's Turcoples, was set free at Duke Godfrey's re-

1102, after the Battle of Ramle, Eudes Harpin le Bourges asked the Byzantine emperor to intervene and ransom him from Cairo.³⁷ The Latin leader then in charge of the army was apparently unable or unwilling to do so, and the Byzantine emperor was perceived as a potentially better bet.

When the crusaders had to fend for themselves, they made it clear that they were unwilling to pay great sums to ransom captives. Their first reaction to the new reality – or way of war – was total refusal to negotiate ransom, even if it meant jeopardizing the lives of their comrades. Whereas they were willing to risk their lives to free important captives by force, as in the ill-fated crusade of 1101, they preferred rather to allow their captive soldiers to rot in prison or be killed than to lay out money for ransom or give up strongholds in order to free them.

Tudebode's moving story about Rainald Porchet, who was taken captive at Antioch, may serve as an example:

On the next day [3 April 1098] the Turks led to the top of an Antiochian wall a noble knight, Rainald Porchet, whom they had imprisoned in a foul dungeon. They then told him that he should inquire from the Christian pilgrims how much they would pay for his ransom before he lost his head.³⁸

So far this was normal procedure in the East, and as good a way as any to determine how much the knight was worth for ransom. The Antiochenes wanted to negotiate the price of Rainald's ransom, and apparently did not, at this point, really plan to kill the captive. From their point of view this was the usual diplomatic method of starting a peaceful encounter with the enemy, in the between-fighting interlude, utilizing their ability to put pressure on a prominent captive to their advantage. The end of the story differed, however, from their expectations:

quest after a long time in fetters and spending a long period in prison, but he suffered from severe pain when he was brought back to Antioch." In this case the redemption may be connected with the ransom of Shams ad-Daula's mother and two sons for 3,000 besants, but Albert does not connect the two events directly.

³⁷ AA, IX, 6. Harpin became a hero of *Les Chétifs* and his whereabouts are shrouded in legend. He had sold his viscounty to the King of France to raise money for his crusade (OV, V, 10, 20, p. 325).

³⁸ Tudebode, *Historia*, 79; trans., p. 58.

From the heights of the wall Rainald addressed the leaders: "My lords, it matters not if I die, and I pray to you, my brothers, that you pay no ransom for me. But be certain in the faith of Christ and the Holy Sepulchre that God is with you and shall be forever."

The emir of Antioch, Yaghi Siyan, immediately ordered him to descend from the wall and offered him his life in return for apostasy. Muslim law required that this offer be made prior to execution.³⁹ Rainald refused and was killed, and his soul was transferred to the bosom of Abraham. The enraged commander had all the other captured crusaders brought before him and burnt on a great pyre: "The Christians, those knights of Christ, shrieked and screamed so that their voices resounded in heaven to God for whose love their flesh and bones were cremated."⁴⁰

Rainald became one of the great heroes of the *Chanson d'Antioche*, and was hailed in the chanson as a martyr.⁴¹ We may ask if this attribution of holiness was not at least in part due to the uneasy feelings of the crusaders who had refused to negotiate his ransom, and instead sang his praises after his death. The death of all the other Christian captives was a result of Rainald's courageous behavior as well as of their compatriots' reluctance to ransom them. The burning captives' voices resounding in heaven and in the camp at Antioch cannot have made pleasant listening. The chronicler telling the story evidently found it an edifying tale of Christian martyrdom, and, naturally, a Christian who was beheaded because he refused apostasy was a martyr. But the fact remained that the crusaders had not freed their men and had rejected an offer to negotiate ransom with disastrous results for their fellow brothers-in-arms. Apparently, they did not view ransom and negotiations with the enemy as a valid solution at this stage.

Exchange of prisoners may, however, have taken place at Antioch, although not mentioned by the contemporary chroniclers. This was to be expected, as it was regular usage in the East for centuries, and the Muslims were accustomed to this type of transaction with their Christian enemies.⁴² We hear about those negotiations as

³⁹ See chapter 2. See also R. Guemara, "La libération et le rachat des captifs: une lecture musulmane", in *Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 333-44.

⁴⁰ Tudebode, *Historia*, 79-81; trans., p. 58. Cf. Riley Smith, *First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, 115.

⁴¹ *Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 3766-3780, 3900-4265, 4355-4400.

⁴² See chapter 2.

a sideline when Albert of Aachen writes about the brave knight Roger of Barneville's death in an ambush:

He was always watchful in ambushes and slaughter of the gentiles and his extraordinary deeds were much greater than our pen can explain. His fame was even pre-eminent among all the Turks and they used willingly to see and hear him in any business they were doing with the Christians, or in the restitution of prisoners on both sides, or when at any time they were arranging a truce between them.⁴³

John France interprets this to mean that Roger was famous because of his ransom of captives.⁴⁴ I understand it differently. Because Roger of Barneville was a distinguished fighter, the Muslims accepted him as a negotiator, which seems to indicate that the initiative was theirs. They recognized Roger as a mediator according to the traditional regional way of negotiating, where it was usual to confer on the person chosen as a go-between both honor and a safe-conduct.⁴⁵ Roger was selected because he was a renowned fighter, not in spite of it.⁴⁶ In any event, if the crusaders did ransom captives in Antioch, the chroniclers failed to dwell on this.

Another case that demonstrates the existence of encounters between the enemies in Antioch is the final fall of the city by treason. A man called Firuz negotiated with Bohemond and finally let his men gain entrance to the besieged city. According to Albert of Aachen the reason for this treachery was:

Certain of them also said that in the attack and struggle of people fighting to and fro the young son of that same Turk was captured and by chance came into Bohemond's hands. For the sake of his ransom the boy's father began to be a confidant of Bohemond, and, at the last resort preferring the life of his son to the safety of all the inhabitants, he decided on treachery against King Yaghi-Siyhan and entered into an agreement with Bohemond for the restitution of his son, and thus he admitted the faithful soldiers of Christ into the city.⁴⁷

⁴³ AA, IV, 27.

⁴⁴ France, *Western Warfare*, 227.

⁴⁵ *The History of al-Tabari (Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l muluk)*, vol. 30, trans. C.E. Bosworth (Albany, 1989) 239, 257, 262, 291. For the importance of emissaries, see *ibid.*, vol. 34, trans. J. Kraemer, 138-39.

⁴⁶ The *Gesta Francorum* (II, 8, pp. 16-17) notes Roger of Barneville as one of the prominent warriors at the siege of Nicaea.

⁴⁷ AA, IV, 16. A similar reason is given by *La Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 5806-5810. Other chronicles know nothing of Firuz' son.

If there be any truth to this version,⁴⁸ it seems to portray a very unusual way of ransoming captives. The negotiations are private and clandestine, and the Armenian,⁴⁹ Firuz, who must have been used to another way of conducting such matters, seems to have understood that he had no alternative option to obtain the redemption of his captive son whose life was indeed imperiled. To reach such an extreme conclusion, he must have been persuaded by the crusaders' earlier behavior towards captives that diplomatic negotiations for ransom were doomed to failure. In the writer's eyes there was a clear dichotomy between the 'treacherous' father and the 'faithful soldiers of Christ', whose steadfast refusal to save captives by ransom gained them victory at Antioch.

It seems that we can believe the *Chanson d'Antioche's* poetic description of negotiations for exchange of captives, even if the details are legendary. According to the chanson the Christians were the ones who broke off negotiations for the ransom of Rainald Porchet, because they had tortured their captive, the emir's nephew, to death and therefore did not have anyone valuable enough to exchange. As a result the negotiations failed. In any event, the chanson found it more important to emphasize that Rainald's death was duly avenged by the crusaders than to dwell on the fate of his fellow captives.⁵⁰ Whereas we do not know what measure of success Roger of Barneville enjoyed in his efforts to release captives, we do know that in the case of Rainald Porchet in Antioch the crusaders refused to negotiate. It may seem speculative to construct a sequential historical narrative based on the above hints, but perhaps we could say

⁴⁸ FC, I, 17, 2-5 depicts a completely different scenario. According to him, Firuz had three consecutive visions of Christ telling him to return Antioch to Christian rule. As part of the negotiations with Bohemond, who promised him a great sum of money in return, he gave his son as hostage to prove his truthful intentions. The *Gesta Francorum* (VIII, 20, pp. 45-46) says that Firuz was a Turk who became friendly with Bohemond and wanted to become Christian. In his version there are no visions, but the boy is given as a pledge to Bohemond.

⁴⁹ According to Ibn al-Qalanisi (*Dhayl tarikh Dimashq*, translated by H.A.R. Gibb as *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades* [London, 1932] 45-46) he was Armenian and Fulcher certainly makes him sound Christian. Raymond d'Aguilers (*Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, translated by J.H. Hill and L.L. Hill [Philadelphia, 1968] 46, 47) who strives to belittle Bohemond's part in the conquest of Antioch reports that one of many Armenians, forcibly converted fourteen years earlier, gave the city up. The *Gesta Francorum* (VIII, 20, p. 44) sees him as a Muslim Turk in the process of apostasy.

⁵⁰ *La Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 3766-3780, 3900-4265.

that during the siege of Antioch the Muslims offered to exchange captives and negotiations headed by Roger of Barneville ensued. The crusaders, who had tortured the prisoners they held to death, were unwilling to carry out the proposed terms and to pay a high ransom for their most prominent captives in Antiochene hands. After the breakdown of negotiations and the execution of the Christian captives, they retaliated by taking vengeance on some of the captives they still held. Firuz, despairing of any opportunity to ransom his son, resorted to an act of desperation and betrayed his city to save his son. If there is any truth to this reconstruction of the sequence of events, the crusaders had good reason to be pleased with themselves and their conduct toward prisoners of war, as it was instrumental in gaining them the city of Antioch.⁵¹

A similar case of spurning the mores of their foes in the case of captives happened shortly thereafter. During the crusaders' first siege of Arsuf (1099) the besieged inhabitants of the city tied the hostage Gerard d'Avesnes to a mast like a crucifix to stop the crusaders from shooting at them. Gerard tearfully asked Godfrey of Bouillon to have mercy on him and received the following discomfiting answer:

In no way, Gerard, very brave knight, can I take pity upon you and turn aside so many men from revenge for this town's insult...if you were my own blood-brother, you could not be free from this predicament...it is better that you alone die...than that this city should always remain a danger.⁵²

Although Godfrey was not moved by Gerard's predicament to end the siege, in this case the story had a happy ending, as Gerard was later returned safe and sound to the Franks as part of the treaty between Godfrey and Ascalon.⁵³ The question of ransom was not raised at all, but the Muslims saved the hostage's life as a valuable asset for use in later negotiations. The crusaders, who did not expect this to happen, were pleasantly surprised at Gerard's return. Again, the initiative to use a captive in diplomatic negotiations

⁵¹ Cf. J. France, "The Fall of Antioch during the First Crusade", *Dei Gesta per Francos: Etudes sur les croisades dédiées à Jean Richard. Crusade Studies in Honour of Jean Richard*, ed. M. Balard, B.Z. Kedar, and J. Riley-Smith (Aldershot, 2001) 13-20.

⁵² AA, VII, 2.

⁵³ AA, VII, 15.

came from the Muslim side, in accord with their tradition of warfare. They assumed that the crusaders would take responsibility for their men, while the leader of the nascent Latin state was willing to let the hostage die.

Slightly later, the crusaders again refused to free one of their prominent leaders from captivity and made it clear that they would not relinquish territories to free distinguished prisoners. When approached by messengers to ransom Gervaise, the prince of Galilee, in exchange for Acre, Haifa, and Tiberias, Baldwin I flatly refused:

As for those states you are asking for: if you were holding in chains my own blood-brother and my entire family and all the leaders of the Christian people, we would never give these states in return for any assurance of their lives, much less for a single man, when, if you were to kill him, our strength will not on that account be at all diminished, but at some time we shall exact retribution from you in return for his death; it is not impossible with God and our Lord.⁵⁴

In King Baldwin's eyes the captive's life was not the primary issue. At stake was the question of honor that would be resolved if the captive were avenged. As a result of Baldwin's answer, Gervaise was publicly executed in Damascus.⁵⁵ In this case, however, Baldwin was willing to negotiate a price for ransom and said so explicitly: "If you were looking for gold and silver and other precious things in return for Gervase's safety and ransom, you could for certain obtain from us over a hundred thousand besants."⁵⁶ The fact that he cites the price of 100,000 gold besants, a king's ransom, may prove that the crusaders had by then, 1101, learned something of Levantine usage. The message the king wished to convey was that the Latin Kingdom was there to stay, and that he would not be blackmailed. Although the results for the captive were the same as in the case of Rainald in Antioch, that is public execution, the difference between diplomatic negotiation with a king and bargaining about ransom should not be understated. What the king sought to convey was that although ransom for money was no longer immediately rejected, giving up territory or strategic goals was inconceivable. More im-

⁵⁴ AA, X, 56, 57.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 56. Ibn al-Qalanisi (*Damascus Chronicle*, 87) says that the captives offered a sum of money for their release, but that the atabek refused to accept it.

portant than saving the captive's life was revenge for his death, as seen in the *Chanson d'Antioche* when the crusaders catapulted the head of the captive they had killed into the city of Antioch to avenge the death of their captives.⁵⁷ The refusal to give quarter and ransom their own captives may have been the result of the crusaders' desperate situation. They could not afford to be perceived as softhearted and compassionate. The image of savage, cruel, and fearless warriors better suited their needs. But the flouting of humane conventions was more than a propaganda feature, it was probably their true conviction.

During the siege of Jerusalem, the crusaders decided the fate of a noble captive:

They held captive one of them, a very noble knight, a bald-headed man, of outstanding stature, elderly and corpulent. They brought him back to Jerusalem and bound him in fetters in the tent of the aforesaid Baldwin. But this man sat down in state on Baldwin's couch, which was covered with most precious purple cloth. Moreover the Christian princes, who saw that this same Saracen was a wise, noble and vigorous man, frequently enquired about and discussed his life and customs, and tried to convert him to the faith of Christianity. But as he scorned this faith in every way he was brought out in front of the Tower of David to frighten the guards of the citadel and was beheaded by Baldwin's squire in full view of all.⁵⁸

The belligerent sides clearly spoke different languages. Via his undaunted behavior the noble Muslim prisoner tried to demonstrate his rank, and perhaps to insinuate that he was worthwhile keeping alive. The crusaders, who understood his importance, undoubtedly gave him the chance to convert to Christianity as a result. Failing that, he was publicly executed in order to terrorize the enemy. The choice between conversion and death was seemingly identical to that given to Rainald Porchet in Antioch. It should be noted, however, that the Muslims started negotiations for ransom first, and it was only after these failed that the alternatives left before the prisoner were death or conversion. The crusaders gave no such opportunity.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ *Chanson d'Antioche*, line 4445.

⁵⁸ AA, VI, 5.

⁵⁹ The *Gesta Francorum* (p. 89) describes the same skirmish and says that one of the enemy was spared so that he could give them information. Baldric of Dol (p. 98) de-

The crusaders learned gradually that giving quarter to the enemy had its sunnier side. Even though their first conquests supposedly involved the almost total annihilation of the inhabitants of the captured cities, such as in Ma'arrat and Jerusalem, the crusaders learned that captives could be a lucrative source of income. The enemy was willing to pay and funds were sorely needed. Every battle or siege left captives on one or both sides. As their numbers accumulated, and given the Muslim preparedness to negotiate, the crusaders began to get used to the idea, even if reluctantly. Necessity proved a better teacher than human feelings of pity for the vanquished. Witness Albert of Aachen's rather apologetic description of Baldwin I's preference for a high ransom over executing his prisoners:

The king took counsel with his nobles in order to receive a price for the prisoners, because in this new and unknown land he lacked much money for paying wages. And so now he spared all forty-five prisoners, whom he had decreed were to be beheaded, and in return for an unheard of sum of money, over fifty thousand golden bezants, they were released of their handcuffs and chains and put out of the Tower of David, and he sent them all, alive and unharmed, peacefully into the land of Damascus.⁶⁰

The 'unheard of sum of money', an average of about a thousand besants per captive, was actually the usual, even if crippling, sum paid for the ransom of a noble warrior in the East.⁶¹ It was a pleasant novelty for the crusaders. This new development quickly became part and parcel of the crusaders' outlook, so much so that in 1105 the king's chaplain complained that the captives of the battle of Ramle did not render a huge ransom:

Oh if Semelmulc [Sena al-Mulk], the commander of their army, could have been captured, how much money might have been paid for his ransom to King Baldwin! But Gemelmulc [Jamal al-Mulk], the Amir of Ascalon and a very rich man did not escape. He was slain, which caused no little desolation among those people.⁶²

scribes how intelligence was extracted from the prisoner of war, but neither gives as detailed an account as Albert.

⁶⁰ AA, VII, 53.

⁶¹ See table 2.

⁶² FC, II, 32, 9; trans., p. 186.

The triumph achieved by killing a prominent enemy was short-lived, while a formidable sum paid for ransom could be more helpful in the long run. The lesson that holding captives for ransom might be more profitable than killing them had to be learned.

Learning the advantages of ransom over killing captives did not automatically mean absorbing the feeling of responsibility for one's own captives and willingness to pay for their ransom. In 1104 Baldwin of Bourcq was captured in a battle outside Edessa and Tancred was appointed ruler in his place. A legation from Shams-ad-Daula of Mosul and the nobles of Khorasan approached the rulers of Antioch and Edessa, Bohemond and Tancred, with the offer to exchange Baldwin for a noble Saracen woman whom they had taken captive, or to pay 15,000 besants for her ransom. The Christian princes decided to take the money and let Baldwin remain in captivity.⁶³ King Baldwin I, the prisoner's uncle, demanded that they make the exchange and received a polite letter in reply:

To their lord Baldwin, most Christian king of Jerusalem, Bohemond and Tancred send unceasing obedience. We have freely decided to obey your commands in all things concerning the ransom of Baldwin our friend and comrade, and this is and always will be our concern. But at this time it is necessary to dissemble and keep quiet about this matter, to see if we can find a way to extract some money as well as our brother Baldwin himself in return for the restoration of this woman, for we are very sadly in need of funds to repay the soldiers who are sweating with us in hard labours.⁶⁴

The two northern rulers had other reasons, apart from greed, to prefer to accept the money and let Baldwin stay in prison, such as being deputy ruler in his name. But at this stage they could get away with it — albeit reported by the chronicler with unveiled irony — as apparently their set of priorities was seen as valid, and refusal to give up money to ensure a captive's freedom was acceptable. Baldwin's loyal vassal and relative, Joscelyn of Courtenay, was the one who raised the funds to ransom Baldwin and, according to other sources, risked his life to save him. His brothers-in-arms made, so Albert says, speeches about Christian solidarity,⁶⁵ but did

⁶³ AA, IX, 46.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ AA, IX, 43: "For you should reflect that in this land of pilgrimage we are few, and so all the more reason why we should not easily fail through any war-weariness

nothing tangible to free Baldwin. Although the first generation of crusaders had started to learn the advantages of taking captives and holding them for ransom, they were not yet ready to take full responsibility for the fate of their brothers-in-arms and to pay for their freedom.

To appreciate the slow changes in crusader behavior it is necessary to compare their ideals and conduct of war with the background they came from and with the conventions in the East. It would be anachronistic to judge their behavior according to modern standards of conduct towards prisoners of war and moral sensitivities. In order to appreciate the crusaders' standards they have to be measured against two scales of moral conventions – those in the world they came from and those in the new land they had come to conquer and settle.

or exertion against enemies, who are very carefully and keenly watchful in order to attack and destroy us; but, whether it is convenient or not, always carrying burdens for one another, we shall endure as one, we shall make progress as one, putting up with bad times and good times.”

CHAPTER TWO

PRISONERS OF WAR IN THE LEVANT

The world the crusaders encountered when they arrived in the East was totally alien to them, not only because of different, competing religions, foreign languages, and different cultures. The crusaders found even the enemy's morals and lifestyle new and disconcerting. While they reacted to most of the differences between themselves and their enemy with an air of superior disgust, and described their enemies as infidels and pagans, the conduct of war had immediate bearing on life and death, so it could not just be dismissed contemptuously. The crusaders grudgingly admitted that the Turkish and Arab fighters were not inferior to the European knight. This grudging admiration for their opponents' prowess may have influenced the Christian knights' gradual acceptance of their mores and laws of war.

The crusaders were not the first Christian enemy to engage in conflict with the Muslims in the Middle East. From the seventh century, when the Arab conquests of the important Byzantine provinces of Egypt, Syria, and Palestine created a new situation in the East, an almost constant state of war existed between the two empires. The Muslims saw this war as jihad, but after the consolidation of the Muslim Empire the fervor of religious war slackened considerably. The frontier warfare, conducted seasonally in the same regions on an almost annual basis, soon lost its exclusively 'religious' and 'ideological' character. It became an integrated aspect of day-to-day existence and reality, a state that radically affected attitudes toward the enemy,¹ diminishing the anxiety and fear of the unknown on the part of the less affected populations and that of the imperial capital. Among the soldiers and their leaders fear was replaced by a growing feeling of mutual respect for and recognition of the enemy warriors and their achievements.² Be-

¹ J.F. Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204* (London, 1999) 243-49.

² Ibid., 244. See M. Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War: Studies in the Jihad and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier* (New Haven, 1996).

tween the fighting seasons cultural contacts and commercial relations continued.

During the eight and ninth centuries an established praxis of mutual behavior toward prisoners of war emerged and became institutionalized. The exchange of captives on the border became a comparatively frequent event and was an integral part of the diplomacy of war and peace conducted by the belligerents. The formidable list of such exchanges is evidence that this had become an accepted way of ending strife, even if only temporarily. The *fida'* – exchange or ransom of captives as part of a treaty – was the honorable pretext for the Muslim ruler to cease warfare, which according to the principle of jihad had to be incessant in the absence of some special reason to end it.³ Ransom of prisoners could, if the imam so decided, be the pretext for a peace treaty. Similarly, in his book on war and diplomacy written for the benefit of his son, the young emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus cited the ransom of Christian captives as the rationale for forming a marriage association with the Bulgarians, although he was in principle opposed to such alliances.⁴ Using captives as a pretext cannot be equated with real concern for them, but it seems that both sides took a keen interest in the fate of their captives. Prisoner exchanges and the associated treaties became part of everyday life on the frontier, just as raids and skirmishes were.⁵

The importance of the redemption of captives in Muslim thought is demonstrated by the fact that these transactions were not only executed, they were recorded both by contemporary and later chroniclers as memorable feats. In the fourteenth century the chronicler al-Maqrizi still thought the facts concerning prisoner exchanges in the ninth century worth recording. He provided a de-

³ Al-Shaybāni, *Siyar*, trans. M. Khadduri as *The Islamic Law of Nations* (Baltimore, 1966) 19.

⁴ Constantine Porphyrogenitus (*De administrando imperio*, ed. G. Moravcsik, trans. R.J.H. Jenkins, Dumbarton Oaks Texts 1 [Washington, D.C., 1967] 72) explained why Romanus I Lecapenus gave his granddaughter Maria to Peter the Bulgarian: "This alone by way of specious excuse, that by his actions so many Christian princes were ransomed, and that the Bulgarians too are Christians."

⁵ For life in the frontier regions, the Arab *thughur* and the Byzantine *akritia themata*, see C.E. Bosworth, "Byzantium and the Syrian Frontier in the Early Abbasid Period", *Bilād al-Shām during the Abbasid Period: Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on the History of Bilād al-Shām*, ed. M. Adnan Bakhit and R. Schick (Amman, 1991) 54-62; and idem, "The City of Tarsus and the Arab-Byzantine Frontiers in Early and Middle Abbasid Times", *Oriens* 33 (1992) 268-86.

tailed list of what he saw as thirteen main exchanges of prisoners of war and seven less important ones between the Byzantine Empire and the Abbasid caliphate during the ninth and tenth centuries, all in a 161-year span.⁶ Almost all of these exchanges took place at the frontier between the two empires, on the banks of the Lamos River, near Tarsus. When they took place at another location this was because the border had moved due to Byzantine conquests. Maqrizi's list is based on information derived from chroniclers closer to the events, such as Mas'udi⁷ and al-Tabari,⁸ who apparently found the ransom of Muslim captives from the Byzantines an important issue worthy of mention in their histories. Al-Tabari tells the story of each diplomatic exchange as one of the main events of the year in which it took place, but does not list them separately. Mas'udi, on the other hand, provides a detailed list, which formed the basis for Maqrizi's later inventory.

No similar literature exists for the Byzantine camp, although it seems that the Byzantines often took the initiative in beginning negotiations for ransom, and were the first to dispatch ambassadors to the other side.⁹ Nor are any systematic reports of captive exchanges from the Byzantine side extant, although some chroniclers occasionally mention single events. Why then did Mas'udi deem it important to preserve the ransom lists for posterity? It seems to me that the only possible explanation is that ransom was not only regarded as a memorable act, but as a prestigious achievement. It was therefore important to record who was in charge both of the negotiations and of the eventual exchange itself. Politicians and military

⁶ Ahmad ibn Ali al-Maqrizi, *Kitâb al-Mawâ'iz wa-l-I'tibâr fi dhikr al-khitat wa-l-âthâr yakhtassu dhâlika bi akhbâr iqlîm Misr wa-l-Nîl wa dhikr al-Qâhira wa mâ yata'allahu bihâ wa-bi-iqlîmihâ* (Cairo, 1853), extracts translated into French by Maria Campagnolo-Pothitou, "Les échanges de prisonniers entre Byzance et l' Islam aux IX^e et X^e siècles", *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* 7 (1995) 11-21.

⁷ Abû-l-Hasan al-Mas'udi, *Muruj al-dhahab*, ed. and trans. C. Barbier de Meynard as "Le livre de l'indication et de l'admonition", in *Les Prairies d'or*, vol. 9 (Paris, 1878) 356-62; idem, *Kitâb al-Tanbih wa al-Ishrâf*, ed. de Goeje (Leiden, 1893), trans. B. Carra de Vaux as *Le Livre de l'avertissement et de la révision* (Paris, 1896); excerpts in French in A.A. Vasiliev and M. Canard, *Byzance et les Arabes*, vol. 1 (Brussels, 1935) 336-37, vol. 2:pt. 2 (Brussels, 1950) 405-8.

⁸ Al-Tabari, *Ta'rikh al-rusul wa'l-muluk: The History of al-Tabari*: vol. 30, trans. C.E. Bosworth (Albany, 1989); vol. 34, trans. J. Kraemer (Albany, 1989); vol. 38, trans. F. Rosenthal (Albany, 1985).

⁹ A. Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and His World* (London, 1973) 383-89, 390-93.

leaders wanted to be part of and remembered for this achievement. Thus Mas'udi and Maqrizi recorded the names of the caliph and emperor in whose reign the exchange took place. As Mas'udi usually noted the exact date, including the month and year, the mention of the ruling potentates was not primarily intended to date the event but rather to enhance their prestige. The current local military rulers of the frontier were also named as they were in fact in charge of the captives' release, in this serving as the caliph's local representatives.

The list found below emphasizes some features that became part and parcel of Muslim conduct and ideology in the Middle East: the official character of the exchanges, the value of the captives, and the importance of the mediators. Although the list emphasizes the public nature of the exchanges, Muslim society maintained the ethos of ransom of captives as an individual duty even when the state took the initiative.

Official character of the exchanges. As part of diplomatic negotiations between the sides after the cease-fire, the exchange or ransom of captives was clearly the responsibility of the state. It was not the private problem of the captive and his family. Because of the captives' political significance for peace talks, negotiations for their ransom were conducted at high military and political levels.

Value of captives. As both sides adapted the procedure of prisoner exchange, the numbers and ranks of the captives acquired military importance. Prisoners of war became a valuable trump card for future negotiations. This perception of captives' potential value probably led to a more humane attitude toward the vanquished enemy on the battlefield. The defeated enemy was not worthless, and giving quarter could have immediate bearing on the fate of one's own soldiers who were in enemy hands. To kill a captive under such circumstances was not expedient.

The author of a Byzantine military treatise on skirmishes mentions the taking of captives as a positive outcome of raids. Even if the skirmishes did not end in victory they were worthwhile because of the great number of captives taken. Such an accomplishment could be seen as a triumph only in a society in which captives were valued as a military asset for later use.

Conducting raids – skirmishing – is a method of fighting suited to the frontier. As this was the nature of the Byzantine-Muslim warfare, captives were thus endowed with special military

value,¹⁰ of which important captives were themselves aware. Thus, in 860 a *patrikios* caught near Lu'lon was sent to the caliph al-Mutawakkil, who handed him over to the military commander al-Fath ibn Khaqan. The latter first proposed that the patrikios adopt Islam (according to Muslim law a captive had to be offered the option of apostasy before being put to death). When the patrikios refused the Muslim commander's response was to threaten to execute him. To which the patrikios responded, "You know better".¹¹ In the final event the Byzantines offered to exchange him for one thousand Muslim captives as part of that year's general exchange. Evidently the patrikios' confidence was grounded in the custom of prisoner exchange.

Mediators. Negotiators were named by the chroniclers and their whereabouts thought worth recording, which indicates that they were important individuals. They usually received a safe-conduct and were honored by both sides. The technical details of ransoming captives were left to important state officials. Al-Tabari tells the story of one such Muslim emissary, Nasr b. al Azhar al-Shi'i, sent by the caliph al-Mutawakkil to the emperor Michael (860). Upon arriving at the Byzantine court, as a means of obtaining a more favorable negotiating stance, he refused both to change his clothing and to relinquish his weapons and dramatically left the court. Although his behavior flew in the face of Byzantine etiquette he was brought back to the negotiating table. His sumptuous presents were honorably received and he was lodged in accord with his rank:

When I went to Constantinople, I visited [Emperor] Michael's palace with my black robe, sword, dagger, and cap. I had a discussion with the maternal uncle of the ruler, Bardas [Empress Theodora's brother], who was in charge of the affairs of the realm. They refused to let me enter with my sword and my black robe, whereupon I said that I was leaving, which I did. But I was brought back while I was on my way. I had gifts with me, including about 1,000 musk bags, silk garments, much saffron, and exquisite pieces.... The emperor accepted my gifts and did not give orders that any of them be handed on to anyone else. He was congenial to me and honored me, and had a house prepared for me close by him. I went out and took up residence there.¹²

¹⁰ G.T. Dennis, ed. and trans., "Skirmishing, By the Emperor Lord Nikephorus", in *Three Byzantine Military Treatises* (Washington, 1985) 177, 181, 183, for example.

¹¹ Tabari, *History*, 34:165.

¹² Tabari, *History*, 34:168-69.

This passage shows that mediators and negotiators had already developed the attributes of international diplomats and were treated accordingly.¹³ The Byzantine court placed great emphasis on the reception of diplomatic delegations from foreign lands and received them with much pomp and magnificence. Aimed at simultaneously impressing and intimidating the envoy, the ceremony was deliberately elaborated to tip the balance of power in their favor. The Muslim court in Baghdad reciprocated in kind and received Byzantine delegates with an ostentatious display of riches and power. In such circumstances, to be worthy of his task, the negotiator had to be a skillful man, armed not only with linguistic proficiency, but also with diplomatic expertise and a noble background. While at court, the highborn negotiator was in fact a sort of hostage in his host's eyes, but his role as a vehicle of communication between the belligerent sides conferred protection. Mediation was a risky profession, but *bon ton* demanded that the negotiator's safe conduct be honored even when the bearer of an unpleasant message. In 841 Basilios was sent to the caliph Mu'tasim with two letters – one conciliatory in the event the caliph was open to negotiations, and a threatening one if he were not. The caliph, angered by the second letter, returned the emperor's presents and started a war. The envoy, however, was not harmed.¹⁴

Identical procedures pertained to the preparations for negotiations on both sides. These started with an exchange of letters through an official intermediary. The next step was to dispatch ambassadors on a mission to that effect and demand the release of prisoners through intermediaries – usually the highest officers of the army, through exchange of presents, and finally through the ceremonial reception of official emissaries at court.¹⁵

Although the state was responsible for negotiating the release of

¹³ J. Haldon, "Blood and Ink": Some Observations on Byzantine Attitudes towards Warfare and Diplomacy", in *Byzantine Diplomacy*, ed. J. Shepard and S. Franklin (Aldershot, 1992) 281-94.

¹⁴ Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography of Gregory abu'l-Faraj, 1225-1286*, commonly known as *Bar-Hebraeus*, trans. E.W. Budge (London, 1932) 139. For other cases, see R.J.H. Jenkins, "Leo Choerosphactes and the Saracen Vizier", in *Studies on Byzantine History of the 9th and 10th Centuries* (London, 1970), article 11, pp. 167-75.

¹⁵ S. Patoura, *Hoi aichmalotoi hos paragontes epikoinonias plerophoreses* (Prisoners of War as Agents of Communication and Information) (Greek, with French summary) (Athens, 1994) 125-31.

captives, the notion of an individual, religious contribution to a meritorious deed was retained in the ritual of making the ransom a public spectacle in which many spectators took part; presumably those invited to attend had donated money to ransom captives. According to the list, in 917, 938, and 966 the Byzantines held larger numbers of prisoners than the Muslims.¹⁶ This did not change the principle of 'man for man, woman for woman' which according to Theophanes was the rule,¹⁷ but the Muslims had to ransom the excess number of captives with money and horses. The need for large sums to effect these transactions made it necessary to call for private contributions. The preexchange publicity and the large number of invitees – some of whom came from afar to take part in this public ceremony – may have also served as a fund-raising device.¹⁸

By stressing its charitable and meritorious aspects, those involved hoped to move people to donate money for the purposes of ransom. Such contributions came to be regarded as a prestigious way of fulfilling the precept of charity, *ṣadaqa*, and became an integral part of Muslim conventions. Tabari describes people streaming to Lamos to participate in the transactions of 856,¹⁹ and how a prominent qadi asked for a deputy to take his place to enable him to attend.²⁰ Three centuries later, after paying for the release of captives, Usamah ibn Munqidh returned to his master in Shayzar and related what he had done. By so doing he challenged him to take the opportunity to participate in the deed by contributing money. Usamah acted as if he were doing his master a favor. For his part, the master complied and immediately paid the money.²¹ Thus, for the Muslim side, ransoming captives had a dual aspect: on the one hand, it was a prestigious act of charity; on the other, it was a public display of diplomatic achievement.

The following table is based upon data culled from contemporary chroniclers, Mas'udi, Tabari, and on Maqrizi's exhaustive list in

¹⁶ Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus*, 388-89; see table 1 below for the years 845, 938, and 946.

¹⁷ Theophanes Confessor, *Chronographia*, ed. C. de Boer (Leipzig, 1883), trans. C. Mango and R. Scott as *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor* (Oxford, 1997) 613.

¹⁸ Campagnolo-Pothitou, "Les échanges", 1-56.

¹⁹ Tabari, *History*, 38:32-33.

²⁰ Tabari, *History*, 34:139.

²¹ Usamah ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-i'tibār*, trans. P.K. Hitti as *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah ibn-Munqidh* (New York, 1929) 111.

particular. Based on three previous attempts to summarize the data graphically,²² especially the latest one by Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, the present table seeks not to add information but rather to emphasize the frequency of prisoner exchanges in the East and the large number of prisoners involved. It also calls attention to the prominent role played by mediators and local commanders in these exchanges. (See table 1, pp. 48-54.)

The extensive list of ransoms might convey the impression that the captive's lot was an easy and comfortable one. Such an impression would be misleading. There were certainly cases where captives were slaughtered, tortured, humiliated, and subjected to harsh conditions of confinement. The Byzantine military manual recommends killing captives, according to strategic needs, in the event of an unsuccessful skirmish.²³ Victorious commanders and emperors paraded prisoners of war ceremonially when they returned to the capital.²⁴ In 856 the empress Theodora killed 12,000 prisoners before exchanging others,²⁵ and Muslim captives from Crete who refused baptism were tortured to death in 866.²⁶ Nor was the indifference to human life one-sided.²⁷ Mas'udi claims that when the caliph Ma'mun was en route to campaign at Podandon (833), he was approached by a Byzantine messenger who offered to pay all his expenses and return seven thousand Muslim captives in exchange for nonbelligerency, to which he replied:

²² Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus*, 390-93; Campagnolo-Pothitou, "Les échanges", 15-31; A. Kolia-Dermitzaki, "Some Remarks on the Fate of Prisoners of War in Byzantium (9th-10th Centuries)", in *Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 583-620, table, pp. 614-20.

²³ Dennis, "Skirmishing," 185.

²⁴ Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions*, ed. and trans. J.F. Haldon (Vienna, 1990) 141, 147-48, 151.

²⁵ Tabari, *History*, 34:138-39. The numbers are exaggerated, as the final number of prisoners exchanged was not the alleged remaining 8000, but 2000 at most.

²⁶ Theophanes Continuatus, *Chronographia*, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1838) 300-301; Leo, *Tactica*, PG 107, cols. 976-980; V. Christides, "The Conquest of Crete by the Arabs (ca. 824): A Turning Point in the Struggle between Byzantium and Islam" (Ph.D. diss., Athens, 1984) document no. 2; L. Simeonova, "In the Depths of Tenth-Century Byzantine Ceremonial: The Treatment of Arab Prisoners of War at Imperial Banquets", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 22 (1998) 75-104.

²⁷ A. Ducellier, "Byzance, Juge Cruel dans un Environnement Cruel? Notes sur le 'Musulman cruel' dans l'Empire byzantin entre le VIIème et XIIème siècles", in *Crudelitas: The Politics of Cruelty in the Ancient and Medieval World*, ed. T. Viljamaa, A. Timonen, and C. Krötzl (Krems, 1992) 148-80.

You have in your power only two kinds of captives – those who fought for God and their salvation, and they have attained their aim, and those who fought for the wealth of this world, and they do not deserve that God should break their chains.... Go back to your master. Between him and me there is nothing but the sword.²⁸

Ma'mun here followed Muslim law, preferring the interests of the Muslim *Ummah* to saving the individual. Prisoner exchanges followed in the wake of a military campaign, but not necessarily instead of one. But even this story shows that in principle the leader of the army was regarded as responsible for the fate of the prisoners. In offering the Muslim leader what he saw as a valuable incentive for peace, the Byzantine emperor Theophile probably based his proposal on earlier experience. Evidently, although we know of instances of cruelty toward captives and even their execution, the norm seems to have been to hold them for ransom.

Conditions in captivity

The rulers' solicitude for their subjects who were in enemy hands did not end with diplomatic efforts to free them. Both sides saw themselves as responsible for the way their men were treated in captivity. Negotiations for exchange were often complex and protracted; consequently many captives had to endure long periods of captivity. The miseries of captivity were described in literary sources, often of the genre that made the captive the hero of an unexpected deliverance due to divine intervention or the prisoner's wits.²⁹ One such *adab* compendium tells the story of a group of prisoners who were transported to another province and warder every month in order to increase their suffering. One of these captives succeeded in gaining his freedom through his clever replies in a

²⁸ Mas'udi, *The Meadows of Gold: The Abbasids*, trans. P. Lunde and C. Stone (London, 1989) 218.

²⁹ M. Canard, "Les aventures d'un prisonnier Arabe et d'un patrice Byzantin à l'époque des guerres Bulgaro-Byzantines": Récit tiré de Tanukhi (X^e siècle), al-Faradj Ba'd Ash-Shidda, La délivrance après l'angoisse", in *Byzance et les musulmans du Proche Orient* (London, 1973), article 15, pp. 51-72.

theological debate at the Byzantine court.³⁰ The caliph's first question after hearing the captive's story was: "How were you treated?"

According to Ma'sudi,³¹ the caliph Mu'awiya responded to the indignant cry of a noble Muslim captive of the tribe of Quraish that it was his responsibility to avenge unjust behavior towards him while being held in Byzantine captivity. The caliph apparently admitted this responsibility and not only ransomed the captive, but also saw to the restitution of his honor by kidnapping the man who had slighted him so that he could take revenge in public.³²

In his book *Nishwar al-Muhadarah* al-Tanukhi records a story that similarly evinces concern for the conditions in which captives were held.³³ The vizier of the caliph Muqtadir, Ali ibn Isa (913-917 and 926-929), was distressed at the conditions in which Saracen prisoners were being held in Constantinople. Though they had previously been treated with kindness and consideration, recently the prisoners' condition had undergone a change for the worse. They were now deprived of food and clothing, tortured and bullied into converting to Christianity. Their suffering and hardship were great. Nor did the vizier see how, short of war, he could improve their lot. His counselors suggested that an embassy representing the Christian patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem be sent to Constantinople to remonstrate with the emperors. In the event that the prisoners' maltreatment did not cease, the patriarchs would be held responsible and the caliph would take reprisals against the Christian subjects in his realm. This was done. The patriarchal envoys were allowed to see the prisoners at the Praetorium jail for themselves. They found them properly fed and with new clothes "as men who had just come out of a tomb"; in other words, they understood that the prisoners' conditions had been bettered only because of their visit. Believing this improvement to be only temporary in nature, the caliph evidently took action against his Christian subjects, as seen from a letter written by the Byzantine patriarch in which the

³⁰ We may well doubt that a Byzantine emperor would free a prisoner who made fun of Christian beliefs, but then the *adab* compendiums were not meant to be accurate historical narratives.

³¹ Mas'udi, *Meadows of Gold: The Abbasids*, 8:75-88, par. 3202-3212, pp. 320-21.

³² For a fuller treatment of this anecdote, see chapter 9.

³³ Cited by R.J.H. Jenkins, "The Emperor Alexander and the Saracen Prisoners", *Studies on Byzantine History of the 9th and 10th Centuries* (London, 1970), article 15, pp. 289-93.

latter protested against the sultan's anti-Christian measures and promised better treatment of Muslim captives in the future.³⁴

The reciprocity of prisoner handling was evidently an effective threat that made the Byzantine emperor change his policy. In other words, both the vizier and the emperor saw the conditions of 'their' captives as their business and were willing to make an effort to better them. Another significant point in these stories are the jails constructed especially to house captives. These prisons are mentioned in many tenth-century reports, including that of Muqaddasi regarding a spacious house built near the palace to accommodate noble Muslim prisoners in the reign of Basil II (976-1025). One of the four prisons built in the capital was for ordinary Muslim prisoners of war.³⁵ The Byzantines built prisons for captives according to their rank, a more comfortable one for the highborn, and dark and depressing ones for the rank and file. But regardless of the conditions in these buildings, their construction is significant in and of itself. There was no reason to invest such an outlay of money and resources if the aim were not to keep the captives safe and sound until a possibility to capitalize on them arose. Likewise, the prison the Muslims built at the *thughur* near Tarsus was undoubtedly used for Byzantine captives³⁶ as jails were not yet used as penal institutions either in the West or in the East in the Middle Ages. While these prisons were certainly not choice residences, their maintenance meant that the rulers intended to keep the prisoners alive and eventually free them.

Prices for captives

The principle of exchanging prisoners in equal numbers, 'man for man, woman for woman' did not always solve the problems. A Byzantine patrician, a Sicilian bishop, or a noble warrior from the

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Simeonova, "Tenth-Century Byzantine Ceremonial," 89-90. The *deir al-Balat* mentioned by Muqaddasi was probably the prison near the Praetorium mentioned above, n. 33.

³⁶ Abu Amr 'Uthman al-Tarsusi, *Siyar al-thughur*, cited by Bosworth, "City of Tarsus", 268-86. See idem, "Abu 'Amr 'Uthman Al-Tarsusi's *Siyar al-Thughur* and the Last Years of Arab Rule in Tarsus (Fourth/Tenth Century)", *Graeco-Arabica* 5 (1993) 183-95.

tribe of Quraish did not carry the same weight as the rank and file of the army. This may explain the uneven numbers that occur in the list of exchanges, as prominent prisoners were worth many ordinary ones. Apparently both sides had an agreed-upon table of ransom-values acceptable to each. Already in the early tenth century prices fetched for prisoners are quoted.³⁷ In the late tenth and in the eleventh century a set price for the ransom of a 'simple' captive is quoted,³⁸ and the prices for the nobility seem to have been fairly well known, varying considerably with rank. A prominent captive's worth was determined by negotiation, as larger sums were at stake. The sum of ransom was presumably higher than the sum that could be fetched for the same man or woman on the slave market, in order to make the upkeep of the captive worthwhile. It is difficult to determine these differences as many captives were used by their captors as slaves until they were ransomed.

When Saladin's secretary stated that there were so many captives in Muslim hands after the Battle of Hattin that their price deteriorated on the slave market and a man could be bought for a pair of sandals,³⁹ he was probably aware of a customary price known to others as well. These fixed prices, notwithstanding inflation in times when the captives were affluent, contributed to the captive's security. Usually, everybody concerned – captor, captive, and ransom – more or less knew the value of the captive and the sums needed to liberate him, and this regularity facilitated the ransom procedure.

The heritage of ransom in the East

Why do we have lists of exchanges only for the ninth and tenth centuries? According to Mas'udi and Maqrizi, the Umayyad caliphs

³⁷ Tabari (*History*, 38:148) quotes a price of a thousand dinars per cavalryman for 904. For the years 931-32, see Ibn al-Athir, *Al-Kamil fi'l-Ta'rikh* (Beirut, 1966), 8:224-36; Vasiliev and Canard (*Byzance et les Arabes*, vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 152-53) quote 136,000 dinars as the price fetched for all the prisoners.

³⁸ Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Muqaddasi, *Ahsan al-Ta'asim fi Ma'rifat al-Aqalim*, trans. B.A. Collins as *The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions* (Reading, 1994) 161.

³⁹ Beha ed-Din, *The Life of Saladin or What Befell Sultan Yusuf*, trans. C.W. Wilson, PPTS 13 (London, 1897) 114-15.

(551-750) did not effect any important prisoner exchanges,⁴⁰ although there is sufficient evidence to show that, the insinuations of later chroniclers aside, the Umayyad dynasty was not indifferent to the fate of its captives.⁴¹ But the institutionalized custom stems from the Abbasid period (750-1250).⁴² This does not, however, explain Maqrizi's failure to list any later ransoms when he wrote his list in the fourteenth century. It seems that frequent, institutionalized exchanges were typical of frontier warfare, when the belligerent sides lived together between the raids. In the eleventh century there were no longer two empires facing each other on a static frontier. Asia Minor passed into the hands of the Seljuqs and the petty Seljuqid emirates in Syria were practically independent of Baghdad. The Fatimids (969-1171) in Egypt were the Shiah enemies of Sunna Baghdad. The Muslim *Ummah* was fragmented. The Byzantine Empire fought the Seljuqs, but was busy on its other borders too. After 1071 the Byzantine frontier was nearer the capital and warfare changed its character from skirmishing to a more defensive strategy. The ransom and exchange of captives continued, but was done on a local basis, and not deemed an important diplomatic achievement worthy of historical record.

We have, however, evidence that the customs and mores that grew out of the ninth- and tenth-century ransoms continued and were still valid when the crusaders arrived in the East. Muqaddasi describes the ransom of captives in Palestine on a local basis in the late tenth century:

All along the sea-coast of the Province of Syria are the Watch-stations (Ribât), where the levies assemble. The war-ships and the galleys of the Greeks also come into these ports, bringing aboard of them captives taken from the Muslims; these they offer for ransom – three for a hundred Dinars.... At the stations, whenever a Greek vessel appears, they sound the horns; also if it be night they light a beacon there, on the tower, or if it be day, they make a great smoke...calling the people down to their watch-station by the sea, and they hurry out in force, with their arms, and the young men of the villages gather together.

⁴⁰ Compagnolo-Pothitou, "Les échanges," 21 ff.

⁴¹ W.E. Kaegi, "Observations on Warfare between Byzantium and Umayyad Syria", *The Fourth International Conference on the History of Bilād al-Shām during the Umayyad Period*, ed. M. Adnan Bakhit and R. Schick (Amman, 1989) 49-70.

⁴² Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Edinburgh, 1999) 103-6. She claims that in this period the spirit of Jihad was lacking in Syria and Palestine.

Then the ransoming begins. One prisoner will be given in exchange for another, or money and jewels will be offered; until at length all the prisoners who are in the Greek ships have been set free.⁴³

Muqaddasi describes a standard procedure of ransom, in which both sides are cognizant of the rules and prices of ransom. The exchange of prisoners, although apparently not organized by the central authority, seems to have been conducted along the same lines as the earlier ones on the *thughur* at Lamos. It is probable that if the same customs continued from the ninth to the late tenth century, they did not change fundamentally in the eleventh century before the arrival of the crusaders.

In the eleventh century the Jewish community in Alexandria paid the same price, three for a hundred dinars, to ransom Byzantine Jews captured by Muslim pirates.⁴⁴ The fund-raiser writing the letter found in the Geniza from which we learn of this transaction says that the sum has to be collected quickly, as the pirate is in a hurry to start another raid in order to capture yet more prisoners. In this case, as in the case of the war on the frontier, warfare has become seasonal and the ransom of captives has become routine.

According to Muslim sources the negotiations between the Fatimids and the Byzantine Empire to rebuild the Church of the Holy Sepulcher after its destruction in 1009 dragged on until 1033 and included the Byzantine emperor's promise to release all Muslim prisoners captured during his reign and that of his predecessor. Due to the earthquake of 1033 this was not accomplished, but in 1035 a treaty was signed whereby the caliph al-Mustansir allowed the emperor to rebuild the Church of the Holy Sepulcher at his expense and appoint a patriarch in Jerusalem in exchange for five thousand Muslim prisoners.⁴⁵

⁴³ Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Muqaddasi, *Ahsan al-Ta'asim fi Ma'rifat al-Aqalim*. Translation cited from G. Le Strange, *Description of Syria including Palestine by Mukaddasi*, PPTS 3 (London, 1896) 61-62.

⁴⁴ MSS Cambridge, T-S 10 J 27; T-S 13 J 14. See J. Mann, *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs* (London, 1922) 86-87, 344-345, 349; S.D. Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, vol. 2 (Berkeley, 1971) 137.

⁴⁵ Yahya b. Said, *Tarikh* (Beirut, 1909) 195-96, 243-44, 266, 269; Maqrizi, *Itti'az al-Hunafa' bi-akhbar al-a'imma al-Fatimiyyin al-Khulafa'*, vol. 2, ed. Muhammed H.M. Ahmad (Cairo, 1971) 187; cited by M.A. Hiyari, "Crusader Jerusalem, 1099-1187", in *Jerusalem in History*, ed. K.J. Asali (Buckhurst Hill, 1989) 138. See also 'Abd

Last but not least, when the crusaders captured Jerusalem and the Jewish community in Egypt again had to collect money to ransom their coreligionists, this time from Jerusalem, the fundraising letter explicitly mentions the regular price for a captive: three captives for a hundred dinars.⁴⁶ Thus in 1095 the agreed-upon price of a captive was the same as a century before when Muqaddasi, who was conversant with the customs in Jerusalem, described the habitual way of ransoming captives. It seems safe to assume on this basis that the other customs connected to ransom of captives remained valid as well.

To sum up. In the Muslim world the crusaders encountered, the established practice was to hold captives for ransom, and prisoner exchanges were a regular part of diplomatic dealings between the opposing sides. The important features of captive exchanges: their official nature, the known value of captives, and the role of mediators were already well established in Muslim society when the crusaders arrived in the East. Moreover, as an accepted part of treaty making, participation in prisoner exchanges conferred status on its official representatives. Ransom belonged to the Muslim precept of *Ṣadaqa* and was viewed as both an individual and a 'state' responsibility. In short, the world the crusaders confronted in the East had a much more developed system of dealing with captives than the places from which the crusaders originated.

al-Rahman al-Hanbali (Mujir al-Din), *Al-Uns al-jalil bi-Tar'ikh al-Quds wa al-Khalil* (Amman, 1973) 1:303 cited by H. Dajani-Shakeel, "Natives and Franks in Palestine: Perceptions and Interaction", in *Conversion and Continuity*, ed. M. Gervers and R.J. Bikhazi (Toronto, 1990) 164-65.

⁴⁶ Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, vol. 5 (Berkeley, 1982) 374-79. This is a translation of MSS Cambridge, T-S 10 J 5, fol. 6 and of T-S 20.113.

TABLE 1*

Exchanges of Arab and Byzantine Captives

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Mediator and / or commander of front</i>	<i>Numbers and prices of ransom mentioned</i>
769 ¹			
797	Lamos	Iyad ibn Sinan, commander ²	
803			Release of 320 Muslim captives for withdrawal of raiding Arab force ³
804/5	Lamos (?) ⁴	Abu Sulayman Faraj, al-Qasim b. al-Rashid	3700 Muslims
807/8	Lamos, Podandon	Thabit b. Nasr b. Malik	2500 Muslims, men and women ⁵
810	Lamos (?) ⁶		
816	Lamos (?) ⁷		
837			Liberation of Byzantine captives from Melitene and Sozopetra ⁸
841			Byzantines captured by Abu Sa'id liberated in battle ⁹

* Notes can be found on pp. 53-54

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Mediator and / or commander of front</i>	<i>Numbers and prices of ransom mentioned</i>
845	Lamos	Khaqan al-Khadim the Turk; Ahmad b. Sa'id (Abi Dawd)	Ca. 4300 captives from Sozopetra, Amorion, and the expedition of 831 ¹⁰
856	Lamos	Nasr b. al-Azhar b. Faraj, Ali b. Yahya al-Armani, Shunayf al-Khadim, and George the Byzantine	2200 men, or 2000 men and 100 women ¹¹
860	Lamos	Ali b. Yahya al-Armani, Nasr b. al-Azhar	2367 Muslims for ca. 1000 Byzantines + one patrikios ¹²
860/1			Almost 100 Byzantine generals and officers ¹³
861/2	Lamos (?) ¹⁴	Muhammad b. 'Ali	
867	Lamos (?) ¹⁵	Shafi' al-Khadim	
872	Lamos (?) ¹⁶		
884	Lamos (?) and Sicily		Exchange of the people of Satidama, ransom of inhabitants of Syracuse, more than 300 Muslims exchanged in Sicily for Byzantines captured during the fall of Syracuse (878) ¹⁷

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Mediator and/or commander of front</i>	<i>Numbers and prices of ransom mentioned</i>
896	Lamos	Ahmad b. Tughan, Yahya b. Abd al-Baqi, Symeon the Byzantine	2504 (or 2534) men, women, and children, 2495 men and women (or 3000 men) ¹⁸
903			Unknown number of Muslim captives liberated as gift to al-Muktafi by Leon VI, who asked for a prisoner exchange ¹⁹
904			4000 Muslims liberated by Leon of Tripolis in Thessalonike; each cavalryman priced at 1000 dinars ²⁰
905	Lamos	Abu al-‘Asha’ir, Rustum b. Nazdawi; Astanah the Byzantine	1200 or 1155 captives. Exchange interrupted by the Byzantines ²¹
906			Unknown number of Muslim captives liberated by Andronikos Doukas after his desertion to the Arabs ²²
908	Lamos	Leon Choirosphaktes, Rustum	Ten Muslims liberated as a gift from Leon VI to al-Muktafi along with an exchange proposal (in 907) ²³ of ca. 3000 men and women ²⁴ against 4000 Byzantine captives

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Mediator and / or commander of front</i>	<i>Numbers and prices of ransom mentioned</i>
909/10	Lamos (?) ²⁵		
914			Ransom of an unknown number of Christian captives taken by Arabs in Italy. One litre of gold paid by Byzantines ²⁶
917	Lamos	Mu'nis al-Khadim, Abu 'Umayr Adi b. Ahmad	Ransom of surplus Muslim captives = 3336 ²⁷
925	Lamos	Muflih al-Muqtadiri, Bashir, representing Thamal al-Khadim	3983 men and women ²⁸
925	Trani or Tarant		Unknown number of 10,000 inhabitants of Oria in Apulia, captured by African Arabs with their governor and bishop Leon, liberated for 5000 gold coins ²⁹
938	Lamos, Podandon	Ibn Waraqa al-Shaybani, Bashir al-Thamali	6300 Muslim men and women + 800 six months later because of the lack of an equivalent number of Byzantine captives ³⁰
946	Lamos	Nasr al-Thamali	2482 prisoners exchanged; 230 Muslims, being a surplus in Byzantine hands, ransomed for money ³¹

<i>Year</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Mediator and / or commander of front</i>	<i>Numbers and prices of ransom mentioned</i>
953	Alexandria	Three embassies to Sayf ad-Daula, 953-955	60 men and women ³²
962			Liberation of 1200 Byzan- tine captives after the fall of Aleppo ³³
964	?	Nicephorus Phocas sends embassy to Sayf ad-Daula ³⁴	
966	Samosata- bank of Euphrates		3000 Muslims, being a sur- plus in Byzantine hands, ransomed for 240,000 'Greek dinars' ³⁵
968			10,000 Arab captives (old men and women) set free by Nicephorus Phocas ³⁶
969			Unknown number out of 100,000 young Arab captives set free by Nicephorus Phocas. Liberation of patrikios Niketas, along with an unknown number of Byzantines captured in Sicily (964) ³⁷

- ¹ Theophanes, *Chronographia*, trans. Mango and Scott, 613; Toynbee, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus*, 390 (hereafter: Toynbee). Not counted by Mas'udi.
- ² Mas'udi, *Kitāb al-Tanbih wa al-Ishrāf*, trans. A.A. Vasiliev and M. Canard, in *Byzance et les Arabes*, II/2, 408 (hereafter: Mas'udi); Maqrizi (trans. M. Campagnolo-Pothitou, "Les échanges", 20 (hereafter, Maqrizi), following Mas'udi did not see this exchange as one of the important ones, but gives the exact date: Shawal 181 (December 797) under the caliphate of al-Rashid; Toynbee, 390.
- ³ Tabari, *History*, 30:239.
- ⁴ Mas'udi=Maqrizi; Tabari, *History*, 30:257 and n. 887 there. Cf. Toynbee, 390.
- ⁵ Mas'udi=Maqrizi, 16; Tabari, *History*, 30:291; Toynbee, 390.
- ⁶ Mas'udi, II/2, 408; Toynbee, 390.
- ⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸ Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. 3, XII, 19, p. 89; Theophanes Cont., 268, 11-15; Skylitzes, 136, 22-27; Kolia-Dermitzaki (hereafter: KD), 587 n.13.
- ⁹ Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. 3, XII, 21, p. 102, Bar-Hebraeus, 139.
- ¹⁰ Mas'udi, I, 336= 4047 or 4362; Tabari, *History*, 34:38-43=3500; Maqrizi, 16=4362; Ibn al-Athir (Vasiliev, *Byzance et les Arabes*, I, 353)=4460; Bar-Hebraeus, 140=4362; Toynbee, 391; KD, 615.
- ¹¹ Mas'udi, I, 336=2200; Tabari, *History*, 34:140=910 (785 men, 125 women); Bar Hebraeus, 142; Tabari, *History*, 34:138= 20,000 Muslims in the hands of the Byzantines, 12,000 executed for refusing Christianity.
- ¹² Mas'udi, I, 337=Tabari, *History*, 34:168. Seventy-seven prisoners sent by Michael III to al-Mutawakkil with exchange proposal (859); *ibid.*, 156; Bar Hebraeus, 144.
- ¹³ Skylitzes, 99, 37; KD, 615.
- ¹⁴ Mas'udi, II/2, 408; Maqrizi, 20.
- ¹⁵ Mas'udi, II/2, 405; Maqrizi, 18.
- ¹⁶ Mas'udi, II/2, 408; Toynbee, 391. Cf. Maqrizi, 20; KD, 615.
- ¹⁷ Ibn al-Athir, II/2, 139; KD, 616.
- ¹⁸ Tabari, *History*, 38:32-33=2504; Mas'udi, II/2, 405=2495.
- ¹⁹ Tabari, *History*, 38:133.
- ²⁰ Tabari, *History*, 38:148; Sibṭ ibn al-Gauzi in Vasiliev, II/2, 167.
- ²¹ Tabari, *History*, 38:153-54=1200; Mas'udi, II/2, 43=1154; Maqrizi, 18=1155, KD, 617.
- ²² Tabari, *History*, 38:180-81.
- ²³ Tabari, *History*, 38:181.
- ²⁴ Tabari, *History*, 38:185; Bar-Hebraeus, 154-55=3000; Mas'udi, II/2, 43=2842; Maqrizi, 18=2942 men and women; KD, 617.
- ²⁵ Sibṭ ibn al-Gauzi, II/2, 168.

²⁶ KD, 618.

²⁷ Mas'udi, II/2, 406=3336 men and women; Sibṭ ibn al-Gauzi, II/2, 171=5500; Maqrizi, 18; KD, 618.

²⁸ Mas'udi, II/2, 406; Maqrizi, 19=3933.

²⁹ KD, 618.

³⁰ Toynbee, 392; Maqrizi, 19; KD, 619.

³¹ Mas'udi, II/2, 407-8; Ibn al-Athir, II/2, 157; Maqrizi, 19; KD, 619.

³² Maqrizi, 20-21; KD, 619.

³³ Bar Hebraeus, 168.

³⁴ KD, 619.

³⁵ Toynbee, 393; KD, 620.

³⁶ KD, 620.

³⁷ Bar Hebraeus, 172; KD, 620.

CHAPTER THREE

THE WESTERN LEGACY

The moral conventions of Frankish society in the East could have derived, as we have seen, from two different scales – those in the world they came from and those of the new land they had come to conquer and settle. While the first legacy may be envisioned as cultural baggage taken with them on the road, the second had to be absorbed and learned in everyday life, gradually and slowly. This chapter will examine the possible influence of existing moral codes the crusaders could have brought with them pertaining to two spheres: the ransom of captives and the laws of war governing restraint in battle. Given the paucity of evidence for full-blown laws of war in pre-Crusader Western Europe, this task is difficult. The earliest direct evidence for the existence of codified rules of war dates only from thirteenth-century Spain¹ and fourteenth-century France,² which inevitably raises the questions of how and when these codes developed. I argue that although we can assume that the crusader knights had codes based on custom, which bound them to a certain way of conducting warfare, there is, however, no solid evidence for the existence of codified, written rules of law in their former homelands for the period prior to the First Crusade.³ Thus in attempting to uncover what influenced crusader behavior, we shall have to offset the relative weight of Western European custom as opposed to learned mores derived from their adversaries

¹ Alfonso X, *Las Siete Partidas del Rey Don Alfonso el sabio* (Madrid, 1807), partida 2:13-30.

² M. Keen, *The Law of War in the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1965). The first elaborate lay book of laws of war was Honoré Bonet's *L'arbre des batailles*, ed. E. Nys (Brussels, 1883), trans. G.W. Coopland as *The Tree of Battles of Honoré Bonet* (Liverpool, 1949). It was clearly indebted to the work of the canon lawyer John of Legnano. See Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de bello, de represaliis, et de duello*, ed. T.E. Holland, trans. J.L. Brierly (Oxford, 1917). Both works were written in the fourteenth century.

³ According to E.L. Cheyette ("Giving Each his Due", in *Debating the Middle Ages: Issues and Readings*, ed. L.K. Little and B.H. Rosenwein [Malden, 1998] 170-79) any law in the West prior to the thirteenth century was synonymous with custom: "We

in the East. Given the inchoate nature of the European evidence, it appears that the Latin Kingdom's encounter with Muslim tradition was perhaps the more decisive influence.

If in fourteenth-century France and England we find written codes, it seems a safe assumption that they were based upon prior custom and social conventions defining honorable behavior for a warrior. In searching for the emergence of such moral restraints, we have to investigate the behavior of European warriors in two contexts: (1) our primary theme, namely responsibility toward their own captives and willingness to ransom them, and (2) our secondary theme, their behavior toward the enemy in battle, which determined if captives would be taken in the first place. While the beginning of changes in Frankish behavior were attested in the 'first encounter', as we shall see, its European origins remain clouded and controversial.

Religious sensitivities

In the search for what I see as incipient moral codes several areas suggest themselves as possible precedents. Among these we must note religious sensitivities, ecclesiastical laws, and lay laws of war, or more plausibly, an unconscious mix of all three. Our examination of the multifaceted sphere of religious sensitivities begins with its theological aspect. In the West, the Church had a long tradition of seeing ransom of captives as an important act of charity, based, in Carolyn Osiek's opinion, on the Jewish heritage.⁴ Christianity developed a theology of ransom in which the ransomer was more important than the captive, thus differing from the Jewish tradition in which emphasis was placed on communal responsibility for the welfare of its members.⁵ For Christianity redemption was not essentially an act of charity *per se*, but rather a means of identification

can use law, first of all to denote the ways the members of a society or group in society habitually perform certain acts, whether or not they consciously put those ways into words. This definition makes it impossible to distinguish law from custom and from morals and proper conduct, but for analyzing the situation in eleventh to twelfth century France it is adequate as neither distinction was evident in day to day practice" (p. 170).

⁴ C. Osiek, "Ransom of Captives," 356-86.

⁵ Y. Friedman, "The 'Great Precept' of Ransom: The Jewish Perspective", in *La Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 161-71.

with the King, Jesus: "I was in prison and you came to me" (Matt. 25:36). This virtuous act is judged on a level with feeding the hungry, giving shelter and clothing to the needy, and visiting the sick, all part of the traditional biblical concept of charity.⁶ Thus, the object of charitable deeds was in a way not the needy receiver, but the benefactor who perfected his religious life by imitating Jesus.

How was this theological concept realized in practice, in formal ecclesiastical traditions and laws? In his study of the development of the praxis of ransom in early medieval Christian society, William Klingshirn maintains that in sixth-century Gaul the ransom of captives was not only or even mainly an act of Christian charity.⁷ It was also a power- and influence-aggrandizing tool in the hands of the bishop in charge of organizing and implementing the act of redemption. The act of ransom often meant saving Christians from losing their faith, or simply the purchase or conversion of pagan slaves.

Prominent leaders of the early medieval church, saints like Archbishops Caesarius of Arles and Adalbert of Prague,⁸ worked strenuously to ransom captives and to buy freedom from slavery. As an attribute of saintly behavior these activities were recorded in the *vitae* of these saints, as appropriate behavior on the part of a person in a position to use his influence to save fellow Christians. Thus Anskar, the ninth-century missionary bishop to the Danes and Swedes, bought young men from captivity and raised them as monks and servants of the church.⁹ But it should also be noted that if ransoming captives was considered saintly behavior, it was probably not expected of the Christian layman. In other words, the saintly paradigm did not apply to nonclergy as an everyday moral commitment.

Ransom of captives had a place in canon law, though not a central one. In a letter Pope Gregory the Great (597) ruled that church ves-

⁶ Matt. 25:36, 39, 43.

⁷ Klingshirn, "Charity and Power," 183-203.

⁸ *Vita s. Adalberti episcopi Johannis Canaparii*, chap. 12, MGH, Scriptores 4, ed. G.H. Pertz et al. (Hannover, 1982) 586; M. Toch, "The European Jews of the Early Middle Ages: Slave-traders?" (Hebrew), *Zion* 64 (1999) 39-64 and esp. 52 nn. 60-64. I want to thank Michael Toch for enlightening me on this subject.

⁹ Rembert, *Vita Anskarii*, ed. G. Waitz, MGH, Scriptores Germanicarum in usum scholarum, 10/34 (Hannover, 1884), chap. 15, p. 56; chap. 35, p. 109; chap. 35, p. 113. Rembert emphasizes the humanity of the deed. My thanks to Bat-Sheva Albert for this reference.

sels could be alienated for only one purpose – ransom of captives.¹⁰ This decree was later incorporated into twelfth-century canon law in Gratian's *Decretum*.¹¹ There are some instances proving that this law was actually implemented: for example, when the Vikings captured Emma, the wife of the viscount of Limoges in 1010, church vessels were sold to ransom her,¹² and the monks of Cluny stripped the altar of their church to free their abbot Mayol after he sent them a letter requesting that they ransom him and his entourage.¹³ Nonetheless, ransom was not regarded as part of regular clerical duties.

We must note in this context that none of the above examples of early ransom in the West was connected with knights taken captive in battle. The examples cited above, that is ransoming of noncombatants, do not necessarily reflect on the conduct of knights or their lords in regular warfare, which is our main concern here. It may even be that the church's positive view of ransom of captives and its willingness to contribute toward it shifted the burden of responsibility off the shoulders of lay forces. Law did not enforce charity, and viewing ransom as one of many charities placed it in competition with more prestigious goals, among them endowments to ecclesiastical institutions. Although ransom of captives was considered a pious act, there is no evidence that it was perceived as the duty of the lay leader toward his warriors in pre-Crusade Western Europe.

In addition, despite the above-mentioned legislation allowing Church vessels to be sold to ransom captives, the Church did not see this task as one of its most central problems in the early-Crusade period. Twelfth-century Church councils did not deal with the captive problem. It receives mention neither in the first Lateran councils – Lateran I (1123), Lateran II (1139), and Lateran III (1179) – nor in local Church councils such as Paris (1188), Rheims (1189),

¹⁰ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 234-37.

¹¹ *Vasa sacra, nisi pro redemptione captivorum non sunt alienanda. Apostolicos et paternos canones renovans hec sancta et universalis synodus diffinivit, neminem prorsus episcopum vendere vel utcumque alienare cimelia et vasa sacrata, excepta causa olim ab antiquis canonibus ordinata, videlicet pro redemptione captivorum....Melius fuerat, ut vasa viventium servares quam metallorum.* E. Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici. Decretum magistri Gratiani*, I, Secunda pars, C. XII, q.II, c.13-16,70 (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 690-91, 710.

¹² Adhemar of Chabannes, *Ademari Cabannensis Chronicon*, ed. P. Bourgain et al., CCCM 129 (Turnhout, 1999), bk. 3, chap. 44, p. 164.

¹³ Ralph Glaber, *Historiarum libri quinque*, ed. and trans. J. France, bk. 1, iv, 9 (Oxford, 1989), p. 20.

Rouen (1190), York (1195), and Montpellier (1195).¹⁴ Thus it appears that the fate of captives in the West was not in the hands of religious legislators.

If the Church offered no institutional solution to the problem of captivity, we do find miraculous stories in which the unbounded compassion and mercy of saints play a central role in the freeing of captives, even posthumously. The miracles of Saint Foy¹⁵ and Saint Benedict¹⁶ include the deliverance of captives in Europe from their coreligionists. In the church of Saint-Benedict-sur-Loire (Fleury) one of the sculptures depicts a captive released from his chains via the saint's intervention.¹⁷ Many of the Fleury sculptures depict miracles that aim to prove the authenticity of Saint Benedict's relics rather than to tell the story of the saint's life and deeds. The deliverance of captives fits this hagiographic program.¹⁸

In his classification of medieval miracles, Pierre-André Sigal categorizes the deliverance of prisoners as a particular type and registers 159 miracles of deliverance out of a total of 4,756 miracles examined.¹⁹ Of these, only five are miraculous escapes and none is performed by the saint while alive. In the most usual case a prisoner invokes the name of a saint or prays to him on the saint's day or on his vigil and is subsequently freed. It seems that some saints even specialized in redemption; for example, Saint Foy, Saint Leonard de Noblac,²⁰ Saint Nicholas,²¹ and Saint Mary-Magdalene. The sixth-

¹⁴ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 247.

¹⁵ *The Book of Sainte Foy*, trans. P. Sheingorn (Philadelphia, 1995) 2:2, pp. 115-20; 4:4, pp. 185-86.

¹⁶ *Miracula Sancti Benedicti*, in *Les Miracles de Saint-Benoît écrits par Adrevald, Aimoin, André, Raoul Tortaire et Hugues de Sainte Marie*, ed. E. de Certain (Paris, 1858) 116-17; bk. 9 (Hugh of Saint Mary) 356-71.

¹⁷ E. Vergnolle, *Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire et la sculpture du XI^e siècle* (Paris, 1985) pl. 259, no. 4c: "le paysan libéré de ses liens du Goth Tzalla" (left entrance of northern apsis of the transept); P. Verdier, "La vie et les miracles de Saint Benoît dans les sculptures de Saint-Benoît-sur-Loire", *Mélanges de l'école Française de Rome* 89, no. 1 (1977) 117-53.

¹⁸ B. Ward, "The Miracles of Saint Benedict", in *Signs and Wonders* (Brookfield, 1992) article 8, pp. 1-14.

¹⁹ *L'homme et le miracle dans la France médiévale (XI^e-XII^e siècle)* (Paris, 1985).

²⁰ *Acta Sanctorum*, Novembris III, "Vita et miracula Sancti Leonardi (6.11)", ed. C. de Smedt et al. (Brussels, 1910) 148-73: *quicumque in vinculis seu in carceribus fuissent detenti, confestim sine ullo impedimento dimitterentur liberi, quod usque hodie conservatur; si quando quippe rex galliae ad predictam urbem devertitur, omnes ex carceribus absoluti exeunt et ad reddendas gratias obviam ei prosiliunt.*

²¹ In *Les Chétifs*, ed. G.M. Myers (Tuscaloosa, 1981), lines 1884-1891, 1989-1994, the captives invoke the names of Saints Nicholas and Mary.

century monk Leonard de Noblac became known as a redemptory saint only in the eleventh century. Apparently, the need for a special saint for prisoners was probably more pressing then. In the eleventh century, that is prior to the Crusades, fifteen percent of miracles relate to miraculous deliverance. In the first century of the Crusades the percentage goes down to nine percent.²² Perhaps the acquisition of norms of ransom in the East is partially responsible for this decline.

Why were such miracles necessary? Stories of miraculous deliverance by saints do not mean no captives were ransomed in Europe, just as healing miracles do not prove a lack of medicine. However, many medieval miracles were connected to restoration of health to ailing believers, probably because contemporary medicine was inadequate. Could this not be the case for captives as well? If a miracle or a saint's personal intervention was needed to free somebody from captivity, apparently the more terrestrial ways of accomplishing it had proved ineffectual, and alternative solutions were sought.²³ The need for miraculous redemption reflects the mores of medieval society and also shows that releasing captives was somehow seen as the responsibility of the Church, whether by natural or unnatural means.

Lay laws of war

As opposed to the Church-defined designation of ransom as an act of charity, in the pre-Crusade period lay laws of war, if they existed at all, were to be found at the level of custom, not as codes. In the late eleventh century ransom of knights taken captive seems to have been their private plight and not the responsibility of the lords for whom they fought. There are those, such as Strickland, who believe that ransom of captives was already the norm in the West in the mid-eleventh century,²⁴ based upon the treaty between Hugh of Lusignan and Count William V of Aquitaine, drawn up in the first quarter of the eleventh century in France. Although this treaty as-

²² Sigal, *L'homme et le miracle*, 268-70.

²³ Cf. M.T. Kelsey, *The Christian and the Supernatural* (London, 1977).

²⁴ M. Strickland, *War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217* (Cambridge, 1996) 134.

sumes the ransoming of captured knights as a norm, interestingly, in this case, this principle was violated. The treaty reveals that Hugh's opponent Geoffrey de Thouars had mutilated some of Hugh's knights. In reprisal Hugh refused to let some of Geoffrey's men he had captured be ransomed.²⁵ While the treaty does seem to provide evidence of a convention of ransom, and even mentions a price for a knight, it alone does not prove that taking responsibility for one's knight was the regular usage. It appears that in the West a knight who was lucky enough to be held for ransom and not killed knew that he had to fend for himself. Thus, for example, on the eve of the First Crusade Guibert of Nogent recounts how his father had been taken captive by William the Conqueror (1054). The prisoner did not see any chance of being freed, as "it was the custom of this count never to hold prisoners for ransom, but to condemn them to captivity for life."²⁶ Apparently Guibert's father managed to attain his freedom somehow, in spite of the count's custom, as he was present at Guibert's birth.

Fulcher of Chartres cited disregard for captives as one of the wrongs Urban II wanted to redress in calling for Crusade:

He saw that people stole worldly goods from one another, that many captives were taken unjustly and were most barbarously cast into foul prisons and ransomed for excessive prices, or tormented there by three evils, namely hunger, thirst, and cold, and secretly put to death.²⁷

Once again we see here a dichotomy between the Church and lay society. It appears that the Church perceived assisting captives as its duty, whereas lay society did not. As seen from the above examples, in the eleventh century ransom was not the customary outcome of captivity.

Two early literary sources seem to point to the same conclusion.²⁸

²⁵ J. Martindale, "Conventum inter Guillelmum Aquitanorum comes et Hugonem Chiliarchum", *EHR* 84 (1969) 528-48: *Et ut vidit Ugo quod non haberet terram cepit de caballarios Toarcinse XLIII ex meliores. Potuissetque habere pacem et suas terras firmas et iusticiam de malifacio; et si accipere voluisset redemptionem, potuisset capere solidos xl milia* (p. 543).

²⁶ See Guibert of Nogent, *Self and Society in Medieval France: The Memoirs of Abbot Guibert of Nogent*, ed. J.F. Benton (New York, 1970), I, 13, p. 69.

²⁷ FC, I, 1, 2; trans., p. 61.

²⁸ This point is also substantiated by two illustrations found in Barbara Abou-El-Haj, *The Medieval Cult of Saints* (New York, 1994) 402-3: "Dotto the Frank orders a prisoner hanged" and "the prisoner is hanged" (Valenciennes, Bibliothèque municipale, MS. 500, fol. 61v).

One is a poem written by Ermoldus Nigellus (826-828),²⁹ which tells of a Carolingian knight called Datus whose mother was taken captive while he was away fighting the Saracens. He tracked the captors down and the Saracen leader offered to trade the mother for Datus' warhorse. Datus declined and witnessed his mother's execution. Later, overcome by remorse, he became a hermit. In the tenth century Hrotsvita of Gandersheim wrote a drama called *Pelagius* based on an oral report of an event that happened in Spain a generation earlier. The Christian ruler of Cordoba was taken captive by 'Abd-e-Rahman II. When offered his life in exchange for a king's ransom his saintly son Pelagius presented himself as a hostage against payment and was thrown into Muslim prison. From there he was taken to the sultan and upon refusing his amorous advances was martyred and his body thrown over the walls of the city. Notwithstanding Pelagius' steadfast sanctity the facts behind the story, if any, show that a royal captive was not ransomed and was later killed by the Saracens. In both narratives the Saracen enemy offers to free a Christian captive for ransom, killing the captive only after negotiations failed. Against this background of a lack of solicitude for captives in pre-Crusade Europe it is perhaps not surprising that the Franks in their Latin Kingdom needed some decades to change their norms.

Peace of God

If we have seen that ransom of captives was not a prominent part of western conventions in pre-Crusade Europe, it remains to examine what happened in the area of battlefield restraint, the second area in which I attempt to chart changes. The Peace of God movement can be seen as a meeting point between religious and lay conventions, or more precisely as an ecclesiastical legislative attempt to intervene in lay warfare. Born in late-tenth-century Aquitaine, the Peace of God quickly spread throughout France and from there to

²⁹ Ermoldus Nigellus, *In honorem Hludowici Christianissimi Caesaris Augusti Ermoldi Nigelli exulis elegiacum carmen*, in *Ermold le Noir, poème sur Louis le Pieux et épîtres au roi Pépin*, ed. E. Faral (Paris, 1932) 22-24; *Book of Sainte Foy*, 6.

Normandy and Germany.³⁰ The Church tried to restrain warfare by legislating against violence directed at the unarmed.³¹ Many historians of the tenth- and eleventh-century Peace of God movement attribute its emergence to the absence of lay laws of war after the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire, leaving a social and governmental vacuum into which the Church moved in an attempt to restrict violence and lawless behavior. The regulations promulgated by well-orchestrated Church councils were geared at arousing the *populus* against the violence of the warrior classes.³² The underlying interest of the Church was first and foremost proprietorial, to defend its property and clergy against unrestricted violence. The Peace of God was, however, formulated as a set of moral precepts: whoever violated the peace by killing a Christian was hurting Christ himself. The protection of unarmed civilians, particularly the clergy, was supposed to restrain violent behavior in battle.

Two generations after the main Peace of God councils it was clear that although the movement strove to solve the problems of disorder it had not succeeded. Dolorosa Kenelly concluded that the movement of peace, although “an eminently practical approach to problems of disorder in its day, was unequal to the task of enforcing peace in feudal Europe”.³³ Marcus Bull came to a parallel conclusion when he dismissed the existence of a significant link between the movement for peace and the First Crusade. In his opinion the ethical demands of the Peace of God were pitched over the heads of the lesser *milites* and the greater *principes* who set out on the First Crusade. Moreover the movement failed: the thrust of the councils had passed its peak by the 1040s while violence continued. “Peace

³⁰ J. Flori, “L’Eglise et la guerre sainte, de la ‘paix de Dieu’ à la ‘croisade’”, in *Croisade et chevalerie, XI-XII siècles* (Paris, 1998) 7. See also M. Frassetto, “Violence, Knightly Piety and the Peace of God Movement in Aquitaine”, in *The Final Argument: The Imprint of Violence on Society in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, ed. D.J. Kagay and L.J. Villalon (Woodbridge, 1998) 13-27; G. Halsall, ed., *Violence and Society in the Early Medieval West* (Woodbridge, 1998).

³¹ J.A. Brundage, “Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers”, in *The Crusades, Holy War and Canon Law* (Aldershot, 1991), article 10, pp. 99-140.

³² F.S. Paxton, “History, Historians and the Peace of God”, in *The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000*, ed. T. Head and R. Landes (Ithaca, 1992) 21-40.

³³ D. Kenelly, “The Peace of God: Fact or Fiction?” (Ph.D. diss., University of Berkeley, 1962) 238; eadem, “Medieval Towns and the Peace of God”, *Medievalia et Humanistica* 15 (1963) 35-53.

ideals were, at most, peripheral,” he stated.³⁴ In Flori’s opinion the Peace of God did not discredit the military profession, it rather reserved it to a class of *milites* as a sport of the elite.³⁵ The Peace of God movement had little control over knightly behavior. It did, however, create a mechanism later utilized by the Church in its call for Crusade.

Even if the Church councils failed to inaugurate a messianic period of peace in Europe, they could still have directed the moral sensitivity of the warriors toward more humane behavior in battle. Could the Church’s efforts, coupled with lay chivalric ideas, to be discussed below, have been decisive? To try to ascribe different standards of warriors’ behavior to secular tradition or to religious teaching may be impossible at this early stage.³⁶ Even if we could prove success in implementing moral inhibitions at the individual level, the behavior of the Crusaders as a group, as found in the conquest descriptions from the First Crusade, seems far from influenced by any such ideals.

It should, moreover, be noted that the moral inhibitions the movement of peace strove to implement applied solely to war between Christians. War against the infidel was a different matter altogether. As the brutal attacks on the Jewish communities in the path of the Crusade show, the First Crusaders did not shy from violence against unbelievers, nor did they think they were expected to show them any mercy. The chroniclers Guibert of Nogent³⁷ and Ralph of Caen³⁸ claimed that the crusaders combined two mutually exclusive elements – Christian piety and violence – so that those previously inhibited by such a contradiction were now galvanized by sanctified warfare.³⁹ Should we then expect the crusaders in the

³⁴ M.G. Bull, *Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Crusade: The Limousin and Gascony c.970-1130* (Oxford, 1993) 68 and review by R. Landes in *Speculum* 71 (1996) 135-38.

³⁵ Flori, “L’Eglise et la guerre sainte”, 10.

³⁶ C.J. Holdsworth, “Ideas and Reality: Some Attempts to Control and Defuse War in the Twelfth Century”, in *The Church and War*, ed. W.J. Sheils, Studies in Church History 20 (Oxford, 1983) 59-78.

³⁷ Guibert de Nogent, *Dei Gesta per Francos*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, CCCM 127a, I, (Turnhout, 1996), trans. R. Levine as *The Deeds of God through the Franks* (Woodbridge, 1997) 28.

³⁸ Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi Siciliae Regis in expeditione Hierosolymitana*, RHC Occ. III, 605-6.

³⁹ Bull, *Knightly Piety*, 4.

East to have brought with them a code of restraint when battling Muslims?

Ecclesiastical efforts to restrain intra-Christian violence did bear some fruit, however, and it is with them that we begin to see the outlines of the laws of war as these would later emerge in the age of chivalry. By defining for the first time a reasonably consistent set of noncombatant immunities, and by clearly reiterating the principle that the conduct of war between Christians ought to be fundamentally different from warfare between Christians and non-Christians, the Peace of God movement must be taken into account as contributing to the formulation of the laws of war in western Europe that took place centuries later.⁴⁰

Chivalry

When we speak of the Crusades and the development of restraint in war, it is knightly behavior that is most relevant, and we must remember that the most knightly act was to go on Crusade. Twelfth- and thirteenth-century literary sources reflect a chivalric code, which achieved formal written codification only in the fourteenth century. In the case of knights, lay laws and customs mean the mores of chivalry. Seeing the laws of war as stemming from a moral code of chivalry does not, however, help us to date the phenomenon as it only substitutes one undated phenomenon for another. It is far from clear from what point in time the notion of chivalry in Europe included not only the technical aspects of mounted warfare and the social aspects of a defined class but also moral codes.⁴¹ Most historians of chivalry tend to place the change in the twelfth century, and as this is contemporaneous with the first crusades it is very difficult to define the influence of the growing chivalric codes on the crusaders.⁴² Flori

⁴⁰ Stacey, "Age of Chivalry," 29.

⁴¹ M. Bennet, "The Myth of Military Supremacy of Knightly Cavalry", in *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France*, ed. M. Strickland, Harlaxton Medieval Studies 7 (Stamford, 1998) 304-16.

⁴² For example, G. Duby, "Au XII^e siècle: les 'jeunes' dans la société aristocratique dans la France du nord-ouest", *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 19 (1964) 835-46; idem, *Les trois ordres ou l'imaginaire du féodalisme* (Paris, 1978) 347-52; M. Vale, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (London, 1981); M. Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven, 1984) 25 (dating

even claimed that the crusades may have contributed to chivalry and not vice versa.⁴³

Any attempt to date the more elusive realm of changes in moral behavior is even more doubtful. It is difficult to establish whether there were any rules defining ethical behavior in war in the pre-Crusade period. Is it possible to extrapolate the existence of restraints on cruelty and violence from the actual conduct of war? John France, who has written extensively about warfare both in the East⁴⁴ and in the West in the crusader age, maintains that combat was not without restraints: "War had its ethics, and these were grafted on to the warrior ethos which infused the upper ranks of society and exalted the military virtues of bravery and loyalty to form what we call chivalry, the 'Code of Conduct' of the European upper class."⁴⁵ If operative ethics of war were part of the lay knights' social self-definition and cultural identity, when did they come into existence? Can one talk about chivalric mores in the West at the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries when the first crusades set out? It seems to me that when the crusaders left for the Holy Land these operative ethics were still in their embryonic stage. We search in vain for theoretical definitions of properly conducted warfare such as those found in Geoffrey of Charney's fourteenth-century *Book of Chivalry*. Twelfth-century theoreticians of the law in the West found it more crucial to define a just war – *ius ad bellum* – than to ponder lawful behavior in war – *ius in bello*. If the cause and its aims were just, actions taken to implement them were perceived as justifiable.⁴⁶ If the Crusade was seen as the typical just war, and

the growth of tournaments); C. Morris, "Equestris ordo: Chivalry as a Vocation in the Twelfth Century", in *Religious Motivation: Biographical and Sociological Problems for the Church Historian*, ed. D. Baker, Studies in Church History 15 (Oxford, 1978) 87-89; J. Flori, "La notion de chevalerie dans les chansons de geste du XII^e siècle. Etude historique du vocabulaire", *Le Moyen Age* 81 (1975) 211-44, 407-45.

⁴³ J. Flori, "L'Eglise et la guerre sainte", 6: *On peut même se demander si la croisade, que l'on disait autrefois issue de la notion "chrétienne" de chevalerie, ne serait pas au contraire à l'origine de cette même notion et n'aurait pas contribué pour une large part à l'élaboration de la notion de chevalerie.*

⁴⁴ France, *Victory in the East*.

⁴⁵ Idem, *Western Warfare*, 11. See also M. Brett, "Warfare and Its Restraint in England, 1066-1154", in 'Militia Christi' e crociata nei secoli XI-XIII, Miscellanea del Centro di studi medioevali 13 (Milan, 1992) 129-44.

⁴⁶ J.T. Johnson, "Sources of the Western Just War Tradition", in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. J. Kelsay and J.T. Johnson (New York, 1991) 3-30.

the main arena where a knight might win renown, in principle the war against the infidel did not have to be restrained.⁴⁷

Johnson claims that it was the knightly code of chivalry, more than any other element in medieval culture, that shaped the growing tradition of *ius in bello*.⁴⁸ Although first formulated in the Peace of God councils, the broader development of the idea of noncombatant immunity to include all persons either incapable of bearing arms or not actually involved in so doing is, in his opinion, more directly attributable to the code of chivalry and the self-restraint of the knightly class. This was not a law, but rather a dimly perceptible code of noble conduct on the battlefield.⁴⁹ At some point a denunciation of unseemly deeds that fly in the face of chivalrous behavior seems to emerge and is reflected in literary sources. The question of whether restraint in battle was already an integral part of chivalry or whether this moral sense simply did not exist before the twelfth century is a matter of scholarly debate.

Strickland assumed that when William the Conqueror offered compensation to the defenders of Dover in 1066 and when he protected the citizens of Exeter in 1068 once they had submitted, he acted according to an existing social convention, which viewed this behavior as appropriate.⁵⁰ But in trying to define the customs and mores on which William's conduct was based, Strickland doubts that there existed a 'law of war' – a *ius belli* that could guide him at the end of the eleventh century.⁵¹ Looking for precedents to prove the existence of such a code, Strickland returns to the Battle of Hastings (1066) as described by William of Malmesbury two generations later.⁵² Although a bitterly fought war of conquest where no quarter was given, William the Conqueror reportedly punished a Norman knight who gashed at the dead King Harold's thigh on the battlefield. As punishment for this shameful behavior and for having broken the knightly code of behavior, William stripped this knight

⁴⁷ Cf. Otto of Freising, *The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa*, trans. C.C. Mierow (New York, 1966) 260: "Let no one suppose we wage war at our whim. Since the war is just...let us act now to secure the highest praise of knighthood."

⁴⁸ Johnson, "Western Just War Tradition", 15.

⁴⁹ Stacey, "Age of Chivalry", 27-39.

⁵⁰ Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 4-5; William of Malmesbury, *Gesta regum Anglorum*, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, vol. 90,2 (London, 1889) 303.

of his belt of knighthood.⁵³ Karl Leyser uses the same example to trace the beginning of knighthood.⁵⁴ As if to prove that this conduct was still not commonplace, David Bates also uses the same example to show the Conqueror as a paragon of chivalry.⁵⁵ Even if we assume that this incident really happened as William of Malmesbury described it,⁵⁶ nonetheless any attempt to date the growth of a general moral sense regarding what is honorable behavior remains problematic.

It may well be that William the Conqueror's early chivalrous qualms stemmed from his abhorrence at dishonoring a king by contemptuously mutilating his body, notwithstanding his desire to inherit this king's property. The gap between the event and its description is also crucial. If for the growth of chivalrous codes the twelfth century was the critical period,⁵⁷ William of Malmesbury may well have projected the mores of his own day onto the Conqueror.⁵⁸ In the same way William of Poitiers' panegyric exalts the Conqueror for treating rebels more mercifully than he might have done. He did not kill the rebel William of Arques, because the duke preferred to punish prisoners of war "with exile, imprisonment, or some other penalty which did not cost life, those whom other princes, in accordance with custom or established law (*iuxta ritum siue legum instituta*), put to the sword".⁵⁹ While William of Poitiers praises the Conqueror's behavior, his remarks indicate that killing rebels was the established usage, and that this was the accepted custom of the day.

In addition to the battle of Hastings and its heroic Conqueror, which as we have seen are not reliable as evidence for early chival-

⁵³ Ibid.: *Jacentis femur unus militum gladio proscidit; unde a Willelmo ignominiae notatus, quod rem ignavam et pudendam fecisset, militia pulsus est.*

⁵⁴ See K. Leyser, "Early Medieval Canon Law and the Beginning of Knighthood", in *Institutionen, Kultur und Gesellschaft im Mittelalter: Festschrift für Josef Fleckenstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag*, ed. L. Fenske, W. Rosener and T. Zotz (Sigmaringen, 1984) 549-66.

⁵⁵ See D. Bates, *William the Conqueror* (London, 1989) 94.

⁵⁶ Cf. William's treatment of his enemy's body after the battle and the story that he refused it a decent burial even after he was offered its weight in gold. For the different versions of Harold's burial, see Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 5 n. 18.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Duby, "Les 'jeunes'", 835-46; and n. 42 above.

⁵⁸ Cf. J. Gillingham, "1066 and the Introduction of Chivalry into England", in *Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy*, ed. G. Garnett and J. Hudson (Cambridge, 1994) 31-55.

⁵⁹ William of Poitiers, *Gesta Guillelmi*, ed. Davis and Chibnall, 1:26, pp. 38-39; Gillingham, "Introduction of Chivalry", 31-55.

rous codes of restraint in battle in the West, other sources, particularly Orderic Vitalis' *Ecclesiastical History*, are often used to prove the existence of early chivalrous behavior in the West.⁶⁰ The main example cited is the Battle of the Two Kings at Brémule in 1119.⁶¹ Orderic tells us admiringly that although nine hundred men fought only three were killed:

They were all clad in mail and spared each other on both sides, out of fear of God and fellowship in arms; they were more concerned to capture than to kill the fugitives. As Christian soldiers they did not thirst for the blood of their brothers, but rejoiced in a just victory given by God.⁶²

While Holdsworth sees this description of chivalrous feelings as wishful thinking on Orderic's part he does not contest his description of the facts.⁶³ More than chivalric inhibitions, technical advances in mail production, which made the knights less vulnerable, as well as the proprietorial interests of the fighters, may explain the low number of casualties.

Moreover, another incident Orderic related seems to indicate that the battle of Brémule more resembled a huge tournament than a war: William Crispin tried to kill the English king who was saved by the collar of his hauberk. He was then taken captive by Roger fitz Robert who defended him from being lynched by flinging himself over his body.⁶⁴ Although this concern for the welfare of a prisoner of war seems to prove a beginning of a more chivalrous warfare in the West, the fact that William Crispin was a noble captive, a rich prize, may have played a part. We must also remember that this event occurred twenty-five years after the First Crusade set out, in a period when one can already find similar reluctance to lose a valuable captive by killing him, and when giving quarter had become a common occurrence in the East.

⁶⁰ See Orderic Vitalis, *Ecclesiastical History*, ed. and trans. M. Chibnall (Oxford, 1978) (hereafter: OV). Holdsworth ("Ideas and Reality", 59-78) uses Orderic as the main source for restraint in battle.

⁶¹ M. Chibnall, "Anglo-French Relations in the Work of Orderic Vitalis", in *Documenting the Past: Essays in Medieval History presented to George Peddy Cuttino*, ed. J.S. Hamilton and P.J. Bradley (Woodbridge, 1989) 5-19.

⁶² OV, VI, 12, 18, p. 241.

⁶³ Holdsworth, "Ideas and Reality", 72.

⁶⁴ OV, VI, 12, 18, p. 239.

Orderic Vitalis provides additional contemporary examples that prove that either quarter was not given or that captives were not allowed to ransom themselves, two sides of the same phenomenon. On the other hand, he also conveys an emerging sense of the impropriety of this behavior:

Just as he [King Henry I] was munificent in his reward to his loyal servants, so he was implacable in his enmity to those who broke faith, and scarcely ever pardoned any of known guilt without taking vengeance on their persons or depriving them of their honours and wealth. Guilty men experienced this most wretchedly when they died in his fetters, and could never gain release through kinship or noble birth, nor ransom themselves with money.⁶⁵

In the same tone Orderic tells us that “Robert of Stuteville, William of Ferrieres, and many others were taken prisoner; some of them were pardoned by the king’s [Henry I] grace to enjoy the freedom for which they begged, but others were kept in fetters to the day of their death, as their crimes deserved.”⁶⁶ When writing about Robert, Duke of Normandy, Orderic brands this kind of behavior as cruelty: Robert, duke of Normandy “was so cruel that he preferred tormenting his prisoners to growing rich on fat ransoms offered for their release.”⁶⁷ When William of Poitou, who was supposed to escort a hostage to his father and protect him on the journey, took his charge to the frontiers of his territory instead and imprisoned him for more than a year, he did this “regardless of the law and the dishonour he would bring on himself”.⁶⁸ Apparently there was some incipient convention or law which it was considered dishonorable to disregard.

One striking point in the descriptions of chivalrous behavior in battle both in the West and in the East is the limited scope of these moral restraints: chivalrous laws were solely for knights and were implemented according to rank and social class. The distinction between combatants and noncombatants correlates with the social distinction between knights and infantry. Although the infantry were active combatants, in the knights’ eyes warfare was their own busi-

⁶⁵ OV, VI, 11, 2, p. 19.

⁶⁶ OV, VI, 11, 20, p. 91.

⁶⁷ OV, VI, 11, 3, p. 31.

⁶⁸ OV, VI, 11, 16, p. 77.

ness and theoretically only they were supposed to take part in the game of war. Therefore foot soldiers could expect no postbattle mercy and were often mercilessly killed on the spot. Showing mercy to a captured opponent was profitable if he could ransom himself, and ransom payments were among the most important profits of war, as the crusaders learned from their Muslim enemies with their long tradition of taking captives for ransom. This did not include the infantry who were too poor to be worth the bother and suffered harsh treatment accordingly. The difference is also attributable to the existence of a slave economy in the East; consequently, there even foot soldiers had their value. In the absence of slavery in the West there was no reason to preserve the lives of commoners captured in battle. Thus, armed townsmen and peasants could be and often were massacred at will in the early years of crusader conquest.

In the West chivalric values were closely tied to the self-definition of the knights as a distinct social class.⁶⁹ The rationale for the count of Anjou's decision to free four captives who had composed a song in his honor was predominantly based on solidarity toward members of the same social class: "He has an inhuman heart who has no compassion for those of his own profession. Are we not knights? We therefore owe a special compassion to knights in need."⁷⁰ Humanity and compassion applied to a limited group of warriors, the knights. Thus in the mid-twelfth century the profession of knighthood included the principle of benevolence toward fellow knights. This professional sensitivity for individuals of rank transcended the religious barrier. The same compassion, or mercenary feelings of greed, that motivated the sparing of prisoners' lives in the West, was sometimes shown toward highborn Muslim opponents in the East. The ethical customs of war were made up by the upper echelons of society to protect themselves.

To sum up, it appears that the chivalrous concept of showing mercy to a vanquished enemy was probably not yet part of the common legacy the crusaders brought with them from the West, al-

⁶⁹ M. Switten, "Chevalier in French and Occitan Vernacular Literature", in *The Study of Chivalry: Resources and Approaches*, ed. H. Chickering and T.H. Seiler, (Kalamazoo, 1988) 403-48.

⁷⁰ John of Marmoutier, *Historia Gaufridi ducis Normannorum et comitis Andegavorum*, in *Chroniques des Comtes d'Anjou et des seigneurs d'Amboise*, ed. L. Halphen and R. Poupardin (Paris, 1913) 196: *Inhumani, inquit, cordis est qui sue non compatitur professioni. Si nos milites sumus, militibus debemus compassionem, presertim subactis.*

though this idea was beginning to gain momentum there.⁷¹ Gerald of Wales, William of Tyre's contemporary, is well aware of the new currents in chivalric thought. In 1170 the town of Waterford rebelled against Reimund le Gros and seventy prominent citizens were taken captive. Confronted with the quandary whether to release them for a large ransom or to kill them, Gerald puts in Reimund's mouth an eloquent speech in favor of sparing their lives. It is bestial savagery not to follow victory with pity, he claims. It is nobler to show pity and save their lives.⁷² However, after this eloquent speech, Hervey de Montmaurice advocates killing the prisoners in a no less fiery speech and it is his view that prevails. The prisoners were duly sentenced to death and killed.⁷³

The idea of showing pity for captives figures predominantly in chivalrous literature from the latter half of the twelfth century and seems to have become a social convention quite late. We have also seen the influence of the Church and taken a glance at its involvement in ransoming captives, as well as the Peace of God movement's attempt to prevent lawlessness. But formal written codes are known only from thirteenth-century Spain and from fourteenth-century France. In attempting to discover the roots of the chivalric phenomenon, it is possible that a parallel development took place in the East and the West, or that the crusaders absorbed these mores in the East and transmitted them to western chivalry upon their return. In the case of ethical laws, the crusaders do not seem to have come with a clear set of conventions and customs. The crusaders' restraint practiced in war, if it was learned at all, grew out of the everyday situation in the East and the growth of a social *ordo* of chivalry. We shall see this played out in the next chapter, which studies the second and subsequent waves of crusader activity in the East.

⁷¹ Gillingham ("Introduction of Chivalry", 52) cites Giraldus Cambrensis, *Opera*, ed. J.F. Dimock et al., 8 vols., Rolls Series 21,6 (London, 1868) 220: "In France, knights are held in captivity; here they are decapitated. There they are ransomed; here killed."

⁷² Giraldus Cambrensis, *Opera*, ed. James F. Dimock et al. Rolls Series 21,5 (London, 1867) 250-51.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 252-53.

CHAPTER FOUR

LATER ENCOUNTERS

The search for changes in the Franks' moral behavior in war in the Holy Land must proceed along two axes: restraint in war and responsibility for captives. Both pertain to the moral sphere of conducting war.¹ Thus, in searching for the emergence of moral restraints, we have to investigate the behavior of the Franks in two situations: (1) their behavior toward the enemy in battle, and (2) their responsibility toward their own captives and their willingness to ransom them. I treat the first aspect briefly as such behavioral changes were less noted by the chroniclers, who found massacres of greater interest than preservation of life. On the other hand, as encounters between the adversaries became more frequent, the problems of captivity and ransom, which are our focus here, became more acute. The development of these two codes did not necessarily take place simultaneously. However, a certain interdependence was inevitable. One could hardly expect the enemy to take care of one's captives if one killed his vanquished members at the same time. It is inherently difficult to attempt to draw a steady line of change in moral development. In fact, the line was never straight, but rather complicated by frequent exceptions and regressions. Last but not least, cross-cultural convergence, the meeting with the enemy and his code, evidently exercised some influence too. All of the above, taken together or individually, can explain movement toward more humane behavior.

Behavior in war

It is impossible to date the appearance of a more tolerant attitude toward the enemy on the battlefield. War atrocities and torture of

¹ For the more technical aspects of warfare, see my article "Did Laws of War Exist in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem?" in *De Sion Exhibit Lex et Verbum Domini de Hierusalem: Essays on Medieval Law, Liturgy, and Literature in Honour of Amnon Linder*, ed. Y. Hen (Turnhout, 2001) 81-103.

captives continued to occur sporadically in the second- and third-generation Latin Kingdom. But a slow change in norms is discernible nonetheless. In 1124, after Tyre capitulated to the crusaders, its inhabitants were spared according to the terms of surrender, much to the chagrin of the common soldiers who thereby were deprived of the spoils. The leaders decided to keep the terms and “had only praise for the resolute perseverance of the citizens who, despite the pressure of terrible famine and the scarcity of supplies, had been able to ward off surrender for so long”.²

This was not the first time the Franks decided to spare the vanquished population of a captured city, or to save some inhabitants as captives. Already in 1101, with the taking of Caesarea, there was some system to the slaughter of its civilian inhabitants and a small number, mostly women, were spared.³ Thus, by 1101 the crusaders had learned that some captives were worth taking and keeping for ransom, and that the prospect of personal profit made this preferable to massacre. Some of the coastal cities were not taken by assault but surrendered and their inhabitants were spared. However, admiration for enemy valor after the conquest of Tyre, seeing the enemy’s point of view, seems to set a new tone, a tone of respect for the vanquished enemy. Could this changing conception of the enemy be seen as a process by which the second generation of crusaders learned more from their adversaries than the first?

William of Tyre claimed that war was waged differently and less vigorously between men who hold the same law and faith than between those of diverse opinions and conflicting traditions.⁴ Comparison of the conduct of war in the East and West by no means proves this unequivocally. It was not a foregone conclusion that rules from the West were applicable in the East, in the engagement of a Muslim adversary. We do find agreements, however, made with the enemy and kept in line with the *lex pactorum*. In addition, the chivalrous idea of *diffidatio* – giving a formal defiance before at-

² WT, XIII, 14; trans., 2:21.

³ FC, II, 9, 6.

⁴ WT, XIII, 16, 50-55: *Solet enim in huiusmodi conflictibus odiorum incentivum et inimicitarum formitem dare maiorem sacrilegii et legis contempte dolor. Aliter enim et remissius solet inter consortes eiusdem legis et fidei pugna committi, aliter inter discolos et contradictorias habentes traditiones.*

tacking – was part of normative behavior toward the enemy.⁵ In 1147 King Baldwin III was careful not to break a treaty with Anar of Damascus without prior notice. This example illustrates both phenomena – treaty keeping and defiance:

There was an alliance and a temporary peace between Anar and King Baldwin which had existed also in the time of the king's father. Accordingly it was necessary that the governor be formally notified, in order that he might have a legitimate time, following the *custom of the land*, to assemble an army and make preparations for resistance. Otherwise the king would appear to have entered his territory suddenly and without official notice, which is contrary to the *law of treaties*.⁶

The same regard for customs of warfare emerges from what the chronicler wrote about Frederick Barbarossa: “His imperial majesty attacks no one without formal defiance. He always declares war on his enemies before attacking them. So the emperor sent a messenger with his sealed letter to Saladin.”⁷ This was done not because of any notion of international law, which was still nonexistent,⁸ but as part of the German emperor's chivalrous conduct. The notion of proper behavior in war was, in this case, based both on the ‘customs of the land’ in the East and chivalrous traditions from the West.

Responsibility toward captives

Another aspect of postbattle agreements was the question of captives. Although there is evidence that the crusaders tortured enemy captives and were still reluctant to take responsibility for ransoming

⁵ Gillingham (“Introduction of Chivalry”, 49) claims that *diffidatio* was a new custom in England in 1141.

⁶ WT, XVI, 8, 28-35; trans. 2:147. Unless noted otherwise all emphases are mine – Y.F.

⁷ *Itinerarium peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi*, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series 38, 1 (London, 1864), trans. H.J. Nicholson as *Chronicle of the Third Crusade* (Aldershot, 1997), I, 18, 49. For the military aspects of defiance, see M. Strickland, “Provoking or Avoiding Battle? Challenge, Judicial Duel and Single Combat in Eleventh and Twelfth Century Warfare”, in *Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France* (Stamford, 1998) 317-43.

⁸ W. Ullman, “St. Bernard and the Nascent International Law”, *The Church and the Law in the Earlier Middle Ages* (London, 1975), article 17, pp. 277-87.

their own captives on occasion, here too we can chart changes. In 1134 the city of Banyas was returned to the Franks by treaty with Damascus. The treaty included the return of the prisoners taken when the city fell two years earlier including “all the mercenary soldiers in the city, both knights and foot soldiers”. The wife of the former ruler of the city was among the captives.⁹ This fact may have contributed to the emphasis put on the redemption of captives in the peace treaty. The care for the exchange of captives may, however, also demonstrate a new kind of responsibility shown by the Franks toward their captives, a responsibility that seemed natural to the Damascene side, but was new to the crusaders.¹⁰ Similarly, when King Fulk of Anjou surrendered the castle of Montferrand to Zengi in 1137, as part of the treaty Zengi promised to restore all previously taken captives.¹¹ Apparently the Muslim side knew by that time that the freeing of Latin captives had become a forceful incentive to reach an agreement, although the king’s desperate situation may have contributed equally. When Amalric laid siege to Banyas in 1174 Ibn al-Muqaddam offered to release twenty Frankish knights from captivity when he sued for peace.¹² It seems that the second and third generations of Franks in the Latin Kingdom had by then learned the norms of exchanging captives as part of the accepted mores of war and peace in the East.¹³ As compared to first-generation crusaders, a changed attitude towards the vanquished enemy, and a willingness to consider exchanging captives in order to save their own warriors, is evident.

Exchange of captives was easier to achieve than ransom. It was well grounded in the traditions of relations between Muslims and Christians in the East and did not involve a great layout of money. Paying for the freedom of a captive was harder to accept. Only

⁹ WT, XIV, 17, 23-26; trans., 2:74. *Captis quoque civibus et qui in ea erant stipendiariis utriusque, tam equitum quam peditum, ordinis, uxor predicti nobilis et strenui viri cum aliis transmigrationem passa est captiva.*

¹⁰ WT, XIV, 19.

¹¹ WT, XIV, 29.

¹² Hamilton, *Leper King*, 83.

¹³ But note William of Tyre’s favorable reaction to Bohemond of Antioch’s slaughter of the conquered inhabitants of Kafartab in 1127: “Bohemond spared none found therein, but slew all, regardless of the bribes offered by those who endeavored thus to secure life and safety. Such were the first fruits of his youthful prowess which this noble and distinguished prince offered as proofs of his natural ability” (WT XIII, 21; trans. 2:33-34).

when some of the most prominent leaders of the kingdom became captives did the others consent to negotiate and eventually pay for their ransom. Even the king, Baldwin II, had to wait for sixteen months in Muslim captivity in 1123, and there were serious doubts about his ransom. He had to pay the greater part himself and to give his four-year-old daughter as hostage to obtain his freedom.¹⁴

In our attempt to trace a chronological trend it is illuminating to compare the case of Baldwin with two later kings, also taken captive. Richard the Lionheart (late twelfth century) and Louis IX (mid-thirteenth century) both spent a period in captivity and were ransomed only after paying enormous sums. Neither king, however, lost any luster or prestige because of captivity, and although the sums raised were enormous there was never a question about whose responsibility it was to pay them. It took some time to conduct the diplomatic negotiations and to collect the money for ransom, but it was clearly their subjects' duty.¹⁵ Richard continued to be seen as the Lionheart and Louis IX was warmly welcomed by "all the city of Acre who went to meet the king in a great procession" when he returned from Egyptian captivity in 1250.¹⁶ (See plate 1.) In both cases there was never a question about their subjects paying the ransom.

Baldwin II, on the other hand, was less confident of his fate. His vassals apparently expected him to cover the expenditure himself, and there are serious hints that they resented the need to pay, regarding it as extortion.¹⁷ Apparently the obligation to pay for the

¹⁴ FC, III, 44, 2, 3, p. 771. Cf. WT, XIII, 16; trans., 2:25: "The king paid his ransom with a large sum of money, collected in part from the spoils of the enemy and in part through the generosity of his friends and loyal adherents."

¹⁵ Louis had almost enough money with him to pay for his army's release, but this was money raised by taxation. Richard's ransom was raised by taxation. See William of Newburgh, *Historia rerum Anglicarum*, ed. R. Howlett, Rolls Series 82,1 (London, 1884) 399.

¹⁶ Rothelin continuation of William of Tyre, *L'Estoire de Eracles empereur et la conquête de la terre d'Oltremer* (French translation and continuation of William of Tyre's Chronicle), RHC Occ. II (Paris, 1859), chap. 68 (hereafter: *Rothelin*). English citation from *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century*, trans. J. Shirley (Aldershot, 1999) 105-6.

¹⁷ B.Z. Kedar, "Gerard of Nazareth: A Neglected Twelfth-Century Writer in the Latin East. A Contribution to the Intellectual and Monastic History of the Crusader States", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 37 (1983) 55-77; reprint in *The Franks in the Levant 11th to 14th Centuries* (Aldershot, 1993) article 4; Galbertus Notarius Brugensis, *De multro, traditione, et occisione gloriosi Karoli comitis Flandriarum*, ed. J. Rider, CCCM 131 (Turnhout, 1994), chap. 5, lines 1-11.

ransom of their lord was not yet enforced by law.¹⁸ In the thirteenth century the situation changed in the Latin Kingdom too. The thirteenth-century compilation of *assises* called the *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, when dealing with laws of war, explicitly compelled the king's vassals to contribute to the ransom of their lord, while mentioning no reciprocation on the king's part. The *assise* stipulated that vassals had to contribute one percent of their fiefs toward the ransom of their king, and even sell their fiefs if they were without heirs.¹⁹ The detailed discourse about the conditions necessary for such a sale to take place mirrors the vassals' reluctance to underwrite their lord's ransom, and the need to make it manifestly their duty. This part of the monetary responsibility of a vassal towards his lord was clearly defined. Thus, although textual proofs for the existence of a law of war including payment for the ransom of the lord come from the thirteenth century, we can probably surmise that this obligation developed during the twelfth century as a custom. It does not, however, seem to have been generally accepted during the first generation of the Crusader Kingdom.

The responsibility of the lord toward his vassals was not as clearly defined. What, then, was the fate of vassals, who must have been frequently exposed to the danger of captivity, when taking part in the battles and skirmishes conducted by their lord? As they receive no mention in the laws, we must seek the answer in literary sources. The chroniclers, while they sometimes mention the fact that people were taken captive, seldom bother to tell us about their subsequent fate, as if captivity were the end of the story, as it probably was in many cases. On occasion, we are lucky enough to find the details of a captive's fate in another kind of source.²⁰ One such case is that of the castellan of the Tower of David during the first years of the Latin Kingdom, one Gulfridus, Gunfredus, or Gumfridus.²¹ He was ap-

¹⁸ Cf. J. Richard, "Le financement des croisades", *Pouvoir et gestion* (Toulouse, 1997) 63-71.

¹⁹ *Livre de Jean d'Ibelin*, ed. A. Beugnot, RHC Lois I (Paris, 1843) chaps. 249, 397.

²⁰ A. Palmer, "The History of the Syrian Orthodox in Jerusalem, Part Two: Queen Melisend and the Jacobite Estates", *Oriens Christianus* 76 (1992) 74-94, which includes English translations of the Syrian colophons. The colophons were first published and translated into French by F. Martin, "Les premiers princes croisés et les Syriens jacobites de Jérusalem", *Journal Asiatique*, série 8, vol. 12 (1888) 471-90; vol. 13 (1889) 33-79.

²¹ Palmer calls him Geoffrey. See also *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, trans. A.S. Tritton, which appeared in "The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syriac

parently a prominent man with personal connections to Baldwin I. A Syrian colophon, which tells us about his later whereabouts, claims that he was the king's son-in-law, but as Baldwin apparently had no daughters this seems implausible.²² In 1106 Gunfrid was not only castellan of the Tower of David and probably the owner of two villages near Wadi al-Haramiya,²³ he was also in charge of *castellum Arnolfi*.²⁴ After a victory outside the gate of Jaffa, the Muslim army from Ascalon proceeded to the castle of Arnulf and laid siege to it. Albert of Aachen provides the details:

They terrified the men living there to such an extent that Gunfrid, the guardian and commander of the citadel and Jerusalem tower, who was now also in charge of this fortress of Arnolf, was only just able to save his life, and opened the gate of the fortress to the enemy. When they entered they at once demolished the fortress walls, put people they found to the sword, keeping only Gunfrid alive, whom they took off captive to Ascalon.²⁵

For the next thirty-odd years Gunfrid's name is mentioned only sporadically in charters dealing with his property, usually showing it being distributed or used by others.²⁶ Then he suddenly reappeared 'as out of the grave'. Via the Armenian bishop's intervention, Gunfrid's freedom was obtained from Egyptian jail. Upon his return in 1137 he was hailed as a legendary hero of the First Crusade, an old man belonging to another epoch who had suddenly returned to

Chronicle", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1933) 69-101 who translates Gunfra as Geoffrey.

²² H.E. Mayer, "Études sur l'histoire de Baudouin I^{er} de Jérusalem", in *Mélanges sur l'Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem*, Mémoires de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 5 (Paris, 1984) 10-91. (For his marital problems, see esp. 71-72.)

²³ R. Röhrich, ed., *Regesta regni Hierosolymitani* (Innsbruck, 1893-1904; reprint, New York, 1960) no. 245, p. 62 (hereafter: RRH). The villages were Mezera and Daltim (Mazra'ah ash-Sharqiya and Kh. Taraphin). See also D. Pringle, "Burj-Bardawil and Frankish Settlement North of Ramallah in the Twelfth Century", in *The Frankish Wars and their Influence on Palestine*, Bir-Zeit University's International Academic Conference, ed. K. Athamina and R. Heacock (Bir Zeit, 1994) 51-52.

²⁴ At Yalo. WT (XIV, 8) includes the building of the castle in recounting events for 1132. As it was demolished in 1106 according to AA (X, 14), the building project described by William of Tyre was probably a rebuilding.

²⁵ AA, X, 14 and Edgington's notes ad loc.

²⁶ See RRH, no. 43, p. 8; no. 983, p. 259, and passim; H.E. Mayer, *Bistümer, Klöster und Stifte im Königreich Jerusalem*, Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae Historica 26 (Stuttgart, 1977) 76-78, 268.

claim his property. This claim is the reason for our unexpected glimpse of him through two Syrian Jacobite colophons. According to the story they unfold, two villages, Beth Arif and Adasiyyeh, that belonged to them and that they had rebuilt, were now reconfiscated, as they were part of Gunfrid's former estate.²⁷ Both sides approached the king who was at Beth Guvrin.²⁸ According to the Syrians the king decreed that Gunfrid's former property be returned to him. The Syrians then appealed to Queen Melisend in Jerusalem and Gunfrid was finally advised to accept the sum of 200 gold dinars in lieu of the villages.

We may well share the Syrian writer's astonishment that an important relative of the king spent thirty-three years in prison, and was then ransomed by the Armenian bishop and not by his comrades (most of whom were probably dead in 1137) or by one of three kings who had ruled in the meantime. Only his wife remembered him.²⁹ This enigmatic story reemphasizes the reluctance on the part of the early crusaders to ransom their fellow brothers-in-arms. Gunfrid was not the king's son-in-law, but as castellan of Jerusalem he was probably part of the king's household. He may have been connected to him through Baldwin I's Armenian wife. Perhaps he had married one of the queen's relatives, following in his lord's footsteps by taking a noble Armenian wife. If this were the case it would explain the connection of Gunfrid's faithful wife to the Armenian bishop who eventually liberated him. If valid, this conjecture allows us to construe events thus: King Baldwin I, who repudiated his Armenian wife and later married Queen Adelaide of Sicily,³⁰ was not very keen on ransoming his former relative whose captivity was not a result of heroic fighting, but rather of capitulation. When Gunfrid finally returned to the court of Fulk of Anjou times had changed. Not only was he a veteran First Crusader, he was an acquaintance of the queen's ancestors. Although the king himself probably did not contribute to the ransom and still did not

²⁷ Palmer, "Syrian Orthodox in Jerusalem", 82-94.

²⁸ February 1138, a date that fits well with the building of the fortress at Beth Guvrin.

²⁹ She might be the Ida mentioned in RRH, no. 245, p. 62 as wife of *Gumfredus de turre David*. See Palmer, "Syrian Orthodox in Jerusalem", 79-80, 82-83.

³⁰ FC, II, 51, 3; II, 59, 3. Even Fulcher, the king's chaplain, admitted it was bigamy. See also WT, XI, 1 (trans., 1:461) who finds Baldwin's behavior 'without procedure of law'. For Baldwin's family life, see Mayer, "Etudes sur l'histoire Baudouin I^{er} de Jérusalem", 10-91.

see himself as responsible for the welfare of captives from his army, there did by then already exist a law stipulating that a captive's property be returned to him inviolate upon his return. Even if the queen's sympathies lay with oriental Christians because of her religious upbringing, the king could not let the Syrians keep the property of a returned captive without compensation.³¹ The customs or unwritten laws probably forced the king to return the property of this ransomed captive.

In the same way King Amaury I returned the property of another prominent captive in 1173, namely that of Raymond, Count of Tripoli: "Without making any difficulty, [he] restored to him the territory which had been under his own care during Raymond's absence."³² Territorial custody of absent vassals' property was an integral part of feudal relations in the kingdom and part of the basic faith between vassals and lords.³³ The fact that William of Tyre felt the king's return of territories that had been in his care was worthy of mention may indicate that it was not so easily done. It seems that although the king did not organize the ransom of a prominent vassal in both cases where property was returned, he was nevertheless obliged, by custom if not by law, to return the captive's former fief. But whereas the obligation of the lord to restore a vassal's horse lost in battle is explicitly mentioned in the assises,³⁴ the custom of restoring his territory after captivity can only be inferred.³⁵ Nevertheless, the story of Gunfrid seems to show that already in 1137 custom made the king responsible for a returning captive's patrimony, but not for ransoming him in the first place.

³¹ Both Martin and Palmer (n. 20 above) seem to believe that Melisende's Armenian mother would make her friendly toward Syrian Jacobites. We do not know enough about the relations between the Oriental Christians and the Franks to warrant such a conjecture. Palmer's hypothesis that the queen's intervention was part of the aftermath of the marital and political problems ensuing after Hugh Puiset's rebellion in 1132 seems more plausible. If religious connections were predominant we might have expected the queen to bolster the Armenian bishop's protégé.

³² WT, XX, 28; trans. 2:390.

³³ P. Edbury, "Feudal Obligations in the Latin East", *Byzantion* 47 (1977) 328-56.

³⁴ *Le Livre au Roi*, ed. M. Greilsammer, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 17 (Paris, 1995) chaps. 10-13.

³⁵ *Livre au Roi*, chap. 7. The liegemen were also obliged to come to the assistance of the king when he had contracted a debt for the needs of the country and could not meet its payment. In this case the king first placed certain liegemen as pledges for the debt and then called on all his vassals to contribute to the redemption of their fellow vassals, if necessary selling their fiefs to raise the money (*ibid.*, chap. 8).

Ransom: The prisoner's plight

Evidently, even when ransom became more frequent and became an integral part of negotiations for peace, as we have seen, the economic burden fell on the individual captive who had to finance his freedom. Many captives were freed via payment of ransom, but apparently the problem of raising the money and negotiating for redemption was often seen as the captive knight's private hassle and not as his commanders' responsibility.

Additional examples of the king's failure to contribute to his vassals' ransom come from the aftermath of the battle of Malha (near Lake Hula, 19 June 1157). The king, who had himself 'wisely'³⁶ fled the battlefield, did not contribute toward the ransom of his soldiers. They had to fend for themselves. Even Johannes Gutman, who had been willing to give his horse to save the king's life in 1147,³⁷ had to sell his manor-house Bayt 'Itab near Jerusalem and four other *casalia* to raise 1,400 besants for his ransom.³⁸ Ralph, the vassal of Hugh of Ibelin, had to sell his *casalia* Degerboam and Calia to St. Mary of Josaphat.³⁹ The charter dealing with these transactions is dated 1158 and therefore it may safely be connected to the same battle of Malha and its captives. In 1160 Hugh of Ibelin himself had to sell property to the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, 'compelled by the need of ransom'.⁴⁰ As far as we know, the king's only contribution was to confirm the sales.⁴¹

Walter of Beirut was captured in the early 1160s together with two of his brothers. His mother, Maria, administered the lordship in

³⁶ WT, XVIII, 14. Cf. Ralph Niger, *De re militari et triplica via peregrinationis Ierosolimitane*, ed. L. Schmugge (Berlin, 1977) I, 42, p. 117. In his opinion flight from the enemy (i.e., sin) was preferable to captivity.

³⁷ WT, XVI, 10.

³⁸ RRH, no. 368, p. 97. See R. Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Cambridge, 1998) 161-62.

³⁹ F. Delaborde, *Chartes de Terre Sainte provenant de l'abbaye de Notre Dame de Josaphat* (Paris, 1880), no. 32, p. 78.

⁴⁰ RRH, no. 360, p. 94, dated 1160.

⁴¹ RRH, nos. 360, 368. The king may have helped Bertrand de Blanquefort who appears as a witness in a charter from November 1160 (RRH, no. 355). For the problem of ransom in the military orders, see A. Forey, 'The military orders and the Ransoming of Captives from Islam (Twelfth to Early Fourteenth Centuries)', *Studia Monastica* 33 (1991) 259-79 (reprint, in *The military orders and the Crusades* [Aldershot, 1994], article 6).

his absence and organized the negotiations for her sons' ransom. She paid part of the money and freed her sons but had to render herself hostage for the balance. After his return Walter tried to raise the money to liberate his mother. To his chagrin he found that not only did the king not contribute to the sum, he actually put pressure on Walter to sell his fief, Beirut, to him, and saw to it that nobody dared to lend the ransomed captive any money to pay for his ransom.⁴² The king did not deem himself responsible for the economic straits captivity brought on his vassals.

Only a few cases where the king contributed substantially toward the ransom of a vassal are known in this period. One such event took place in 1173, when Raymond, count of Tripoli, returned after eight years of captivity, having paid eighty thousand gold pieces to secure his liberty.⁴³ The king received him warmly and also helped him generously: "In addition, with royal bounty he gave him large gifts to assist in paying the price of his ransom."⁴⁴ Thus, according to William of Tyre, it was not the king's duty to help his vassals to redeem themselves, but an instance of royal largesse. We have already seen that the king was expected to restore a captive's fief, but in 1173 assisting the captive to pay ransom was still considered 'royal bounty'. Although any attempt to prove a major change in attitude from this example is hazardous, it can perhaps be cited as a further reflection of Frankish adoption of the local eastern norm. Its literary setting – as a sideshow to the main narrative – seems to point to its commonality and widespread distribution. If that is the case, the last quarter of the twelfth century already shows a slow change in dealing with the aftermath of war. Amalric also ransomed another vassal who fell into captivity, Aimery de Lusignan.⁴⁵

⁴² H.E. Mayer, "The Wheel of Fortune: Seignorial Vicissitudes under Kings Fulk and Baldwin III of Jerusalem", *Speculum* 65 (1990) 860-77, esp. 867.

⁴³ Michael the Syrian, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche (1166-1199)*, ed. J-B. Chabot (Paris, 1905) vol. 3, XX, 3, p. 365. According to Abu Shama (*Le livre des deux jardins*, RHC Or. IV, 4 [Paris, 1898] p. 168) he had to acquire 1000 Muslim captives for the exchange. Ibn al-Athir (*Kamil*, 11:419) places the ransom at 150,000 dinars.

⁴⁴ WT, XX, 28; trans. 2:390.

⁴⁵ Philip of Novara, *Le Livre de forme de plait*, RHC Lois I (Paris, 1841) 569-70. Hamilton (*Leper King*, 97) notes that this event was remembered because of the similarity between the protagonists' names – King Amalric the ransomer and Amaury, who later also became king, the ransomed.

It is possible that the example of the Byzantine emperors played a role in the Frankish adoption of new norms. We know of several cases in which Byzantine emperors participated in the ransom of famous Frankish captives according to the Levantine tradition. Already after the First Crusade, Harpin of Bourges, who was taken captive to Cairo, approached Byzantine merchants, using them to convey a message to the emperor who eventually paid for his ransom.⁴⁶ In 1159 Nur-ed-Din freed Frankish prisoners in order to obtain a treaty with Byzantium.⁴⁷ In 1165 Emperor Manuel Comnenus ransomed Bohemond III of Antioch and demanded ecclesiastical concessions in return.⁴⁸ In 1180 Baldwin of Ibelin raised the money for his ransom from Constantinople.⁴⁹ The emperor probably had political reasons for contributing to Baldwin's ransom, which was set at the enormous sum of 150,000 Tyrrhenian dinars.⁵⁰ If he knew that Baldwin was at that time a contender for the dower-princess Sybil's hand and might therefore become king of Jerusalem in the future, it made good political sense to place him in moral, and perhaps even more tangible debt.⁵¹ It is, however, instructive that a noble captive of such importance, a potential relative of the king, had to seek financial help from the Byzantine emperor and could not expect to be ransomed by his lord, the king of Jerusalem, or by his fellow combatants. Whereas Hamilton sees Ernoul's story about Baldwin's being a candidate for Sybil's hand as "couched in the genre of a courtly romance" and "bearing little relation to the known facts" he admits that Baldwin was the preferred candidate of the higher nobility in 1180 and that Saladin was aware of this; thus, he fixed his ransom at an enormous sum.⁵² Hamilton thinks that the Byzantines paid Baldwin's enormous ransom later that year although he was at the time "of no political consequence" and the sum was paid after Manuel Comnenus' death (24 September 1180)

⁴⁶ OV, V, 10, 23, p. 351.

⁴⁷ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 104-5.

⁴⁸ R-J. Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader States, 1096-1204* (Oxford, 1993) 190-91. Bohemond had to install a Greek Orthodox patriarch in Antioch.

⁴⁹ He was taken captive near Sidon in 1179; see WT, XXI, 29.

⁵⁰ WT, XXII, 5; Lilie, *Byzantium and the Crusader State*, 225, 255.

⁵¹ Cf. Hamilton, *Leper King*, 153-54.

⁵² Hamilton, *Leper King*, 152-53; Ernoul, *La Chronique d'Ernoul et Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871) 56-60: The emperor gave his weight in gold as a contribution to his ransom (*ibid.*, 59).

by his nephew Alexius who regarded Baldwin as part of his kingroup because Maria Comnena had in the meantime married Baldwin's brother.⁵³ Such Byzantine benevolence seems to stretch credibility. Even if Baldwin of Ibelin was never seriously considered as a candidate for Sybil's hand his ambitions were known to his contemporaries and he was not considered to be of no political consequence. Hamilton claims that Manuel Comnenus paid Reynald of Châtillon's enormous ransom of 120,000 gold dinars, but his evidence for payment by the Byzantines is mainly conjectural.⁵⁴ It may be no coincidence that the Frankish king who is known to have helped some of his vassals to finance their ransoms was Amalric, the king who had the closest ties to the Byzantine empire.

It seems that while the second and third generations of the Franks in the East had learned to conduct negotiations on behalf of their captives, they still saw captivity as a private quandary and the economic repercussions as the captive's private problem. There were no public funds, whether lay or ecclesiastical, set aside to solve a problem that must have been quite widespread in a fighting society. Prominent Frankish nobles still had to face long years of captivity in Muslim dungeons. The infamous Reynald of Châtillon spent nearly sixteen years in captivity. He had been the ruler of Antioch, but nobody seems to have missed him for all those years. William of Tyre says that his friends paid a large ransom, but if so they seem to have taken their time about it.⁵⁵ The negotiations for Reynald's release were probably connected with those conducted to redeem Joscelin III of Courtenay who was released by his sister, Agnes, the mother of King Baldwin IV. The king's uncle Joscelyn was also imprisoned for a long period (1164-1176). According to Hamilton, the royal treasury contributed to his ransom, but if this was the case it should be seen not as a king ransoming his vassal, rather as a family helping its members.⁵⁶ However, when Reynald finally succeeded in obtaining liberty he was warmly received. After a short period we find him married to one of the richest heiresses in

⁵³ Hamilton, *Leper King*, 160.

⁵⁴ Hamilton, *Leper King*, 112.

⁵⁵ WT, XXI, 11. Cf. Hamilton, *Leper King*, 112.

⁵⁶ Hamilton, *Leper King*, 104. Gumushtekin of Aleppo fixed Joscelyn's ransom at 50,000 dinars, because although landless after the loss of Edessa in 1147 he was the king's uncle.

the Latin Kingdom. This could hardly have happened without the king's approval. Reynald became the prince of Oultre-Jourdain and one of the most influential persons at Guy de Lusignan's court, influential enough to contribute heavily to the kingdom's downfall at Hattin. Although he had lost his former position as prince of Antioch when the city passed to its lawful heir, the king probably compensated him. In the *Siete partidas*, a thirteenth-century Spanish compilation of laws, the immunity of a captive's property was clearly formulated and it had to be returned promptly upon the captive's release.⁵⁷ In the Latin Kingdom the written law did not yet exist, but seems to have been in the process of forming.

In the Latin Kingdom the watershed seems to have been the Battle of Hattin, 1187. We have traced above steady movement towards Eastern norms that probably stemmed from meetings between the sides, yet captives were not a main consideration in crusader politics before 1187. The Battle of Hattin made the Frankish king, Guy de Lusignan, along with the greater part of the nobility, captive. Notwithstanding Imad ad-Din's graphic descriptions of the bodies of the fallen strewn on the battlefield,⁵⁸ many if not most of the nobility were not killed, but taken captive. Even if Imad-ad-Din's conjecture that 100,000 Franks were taken captive is exaggerated,⁵⁹ the great number of captives was a most pressing problem for the crusaders who tried to save the Latin Kingdom. They were forced to take responsibility and solve the problem, as individual captives clearly could not handle the situation on their own. Some organized solution was needed. Initially, the Franks did not have enough Muslim captives to exchange for their brothers-in-arms and therefore the negotiations and ransom had to be organized on a nonindividual basis. Letters written to Europe after the battle, asking for assistance, mention the prominent captives and the need to help them. The first disaster mentioned in the letter was, how-

⁵⁷ *Siete partidas*, 2: 29: 4-5.

⁵⁸ F. Gabrieli, trans., *Arab Historians of the Crusades* (London, 1969) 135.

⁵⁹ 'Imad-ad-Din al-Isfahâni, *Kitâb al-Fath al qussî fi' l-fath al-qudsî*, trans. into French by H. Massé as *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 10 (Paris, 1972) 38. Twelve thousand as the number of captives appears in various Latin sources and seems more plausible. Note, however, that the number 12,000 was also mentioned as the number of captives after Louis IX's defeat at Mansurah, and may be a topical number.

ever, the loss of the True Cross at Hattin.⁶⁰ (See plate 2.) The pope reacted almost immediately, both with diplomatic letters written to the Muslim rulers and by trying to rally European forces to help *Outremer* in its plight. In letters addressed to the Sultan, especially the later letters of Innocent III, the need to release the Christian captives features prominently.⁶¹ The foundation soon after Hattin of the Trinitarian Order to ransom captives, making ransom a charity in the frontline of Christian welfare, was no accident. The order fulfilled a need that had always been there, but never so urgently needed as after Hattin.⁶²

Further evidence for the change in attitude toward captives after the Battle of Hattin comes from the liturgy. A prayer for the release of captives had been formulated already in the early centuries of Christianity, but it was not a regular part of the liturgy. After Hattin, in the votive *missae* said for the liturgical commemoration of the destruction of Latin Jerusalem, a prayer for captives was part of the weekly program of daily masses celebrated in Westminster Abbey: *pro pace, et pro deliberatione terrae Jerusalem et Christianorum captivorum qui in vinculis Saracenorum detinebantur*.⁶³ According to Roger of Hoveden, the Jerusalem liturgy containing prayers for peace, for the liberation of Jerusalem, and for the Christian captives detained in Saracen fetters were recited by order of the pope and the cardinals and reflect universal, not local liturgy.⁶⁴ In 1188 Clement III made the prayers part of a liturgy for the Holy Land.⁶⁵

⁶⁰ B.Z. Kedar, "Ein Hilferuf aus Jerusalem vom September 1187", *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 38 (1982) 112-22.

⁶¹ J. Gilchrist, "The Lord's War as the Proving Ground of Faith: Pope Innocent III and the Propagation of Violence (1198-1216)", in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth Century Syria*, ed. M. Shatzmiller (Leiden, 1993) 65-83. See Register 16.37, the letter to the Egyptian sultan requesting the return of the Holy Land and the release of Christian captives, which would result in a cessation of hostilities between Muslims and Christians (PL 216, col. 832A; Potthast, *Regesta pontificum Romanorum, 1198-1304* [Reprint, Berlin, 1957] no. 4719).

⁶² G. Cipollone, "Les Trinitaires: fondation du XII siècle pour les captifs et pour les pauvres", in *Fondations et oeuvres charitables au Moyen Age*, ed. J. Dufour and H. Platelle (Paris, 1999) 75-87.

⁶³ A. Linder, "Deus Venerunt Gentes: Psalm 78 (79) in the Liturgical Commemoration of the Destruction of Latin Jerusalem", *Medieval Studies in Honour of Avrom Saltman*, Bar Ilan Studies in History 4 (1995) 147.

⁶⁴ Benedict of Peterborough, *The Chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II and Richard I*, (=Roger of Hoveden, *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*), ed. W. Stubbs Rolls Series, vol. 49,2 (London, 1867) 53; A. Linder, "Deus Venerunt Gentes", 148.

⁶⁵ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 366-67.

The pope also urged the Christians in *Outremer* to work strenuously for the redemption of captives. He approached the Italian communes and the Military Orders, the two large organized entities whose economic resources could enable them to contribute large sums toward the ransom of captives. These vigorous efforts to promote the release of captives using international connections and diplomacy were a new phenomenon. The pope's identification of the captive with Christ, who became, in his letters, *quasi captivus*, probably contributed to the alteration in how captivity was seen both in the Latin East and in the West.⁶⁶ After Hattin the plight of captives shifted from an individual to a national or even international predicament.⁶⁷

On the other side of the battlefield, Saladin's biographers and propagandists exalted his chivalrous behavior toward prisoners of war, both his own and the enemy's. His benevolent behavior during the conquest of Jerusalem, letting most of the inhabitants go free or ransom themselves made a great impression on both contemporary and later historians. The leading modern historian Jean Richard correctly points out that this was partly due to Balian d'Ibelin's threat to murder all the Muslim captives in Jerusalem as well as to demolish Muslim holy places.⁶⁸ But the detailed descriptions of Saladin's mercy show that it was also part of the image that he purportedly wanted to imprint on his contemporaries, whether Christian or Muslim. The conquest of Jerusalem was an important historical event of which both sides were well aware. Though the victory at Hattin was more decisive from the military point of view, the conquest of Jerusalem was the crowning victory of Jihad.⁶⁹ Saladin was intent upon showing the difference between the barbaric conquest in 1099 and his own humane behavior. On other occasions, Saladin did not shrink from killing captives when he found it expedient, as when he ordered al-Adil to execute Christian captives in February 1183 because they knew the Red Sea routes, but it was

⁶⁶ Ibid., 356-63.

⁶⁷ For Hattin as a watershed, see J. Richard, "Les prisonniers et leur rachat au cours des croisades", in *Fondations et oeuvres charitables au Moyen Age*, ed. J. Dufour and H. Platelle (Paris, 1999) 69-70.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 70.

⁶⁹ For a description of Saladin's conquest of Jerusalem, see Anonymous Chronicle (*Anonymi auctoris chronicon ad A.C. 1234 pertinens*, trans. A. Abouna, *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* 354, *Scriptores Syri* 154, vol. 2 [Louvain, 1974]).

clearly *bon ton* to behave in a chivalrous way.⁷⁰ Notwithstanding his sometimes cruel behavior this propaganda succeeded and Saladin was and is seen as a virtuous ruler and conqueror. Both Christian and Muslim chroniclers admired him for his behavior and this may also indicate a change in mores on the Frankish side.

Franks vs. newcomers

In what I have now depicted as a positive progression in Frankish thinking and moral behavior there are two glaring exceptions, both from the period of the Third Crusade, after the Battle of Hattin. One is the incident of Conrad of Monferrat's refusal to save his elderly father whom Saladin attempted to employ in order to force him to surrender Tyre. Conrad refused to give even a stone from Tyre to free his father and his answer to Saladin's offer was: "Tie him to a stake and I shall be the first to shoot at him. For he is too old and is hardly worth anything."⁷¹ The second is the appalling story of Richard I's butchery of 2,700 defenseless Muslim captives outside Acre before the Third Crusade set out to reconquer the coast. The reason given was that Saladin failed to adhere to his part of their agreement in time.

The first case appears to be a return to the norms of the First Crusade. When the people of Arsuf tied the hostage Gerard d'Avesnes to a mast to stop the crusaders from shooting at them, he tearfully asked Godfrey of Bouillon for mercy and received a flat refusal. Godfrey claimed that even if Gerard had been his own blood brother he would have sacrificed his life to further the conquest of the city.⁷² The chronicler did not criticize this set of priorities. In telling the story of Conrad of Monferrat, the later narrator mentions Saladin's disgust at Conrad's behavior, but also seems to show

⁷⁰ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 232. For other cases when Saladin executed prisoners of war, see Y. Lev, "Treatment of Prisoners of War during the Fatimid-Ayyubid Wars with the Crusaders," in *Tolerance and Intolerance: Social Conflict in the Age of the Crusade*, ed. J.M. Powell and M. Gervers (Syracuse, in press).

⁷¹ *La continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, ed. M.R. Morgan, Documents relatifs à l'histoire des croisades 14 (Paris, 1982). Citation from *The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade*, trans. P.W. Edbury (Aldershot, 1996) 53-54.

⁷² AA, VII, 2.

a grudging admiration for his steadfastness and ruthless fervor for the crusader cause:

Leaving no stone unturned he [Saladin] also produced the marquis' father, who was his prisoner, captured in an earlier battle. He was confident that the son, stirred by filial affection, would give up the city in return for his father's release. So first he offered to surrender him, then he tried to destroy him; he tried various approaches. But he was completely mistaken: for the marquis could not be moved. He laughed at the offers, jeered at the threats, and whenever Saladin paraded his father in chains to arouse his compassion, the marquis at once snatched up a crossbow and fired at his father; letting his aim wander, but as if intending to shoot him. When the sultan sent messengers with repeated threats that his father would be killed, the marquis retorted that he wholeheartedly desired this to happen, for then that wicked man would have a good end after all his shameful deeds and he would be found worthy of having a martyr as his father.⁷³

The negotiations were not about the exchange of prisoners or the ransom sum needed. Saladin, like the Seljuqid emirs of the First Crusade, wanted to use the captives to obtain the surrender of strongholds (Tyre) as he did using the commander of Beaufort to make the garrison surrender, or when he negotiated the capitulation of Ascalon with Guy de Lusignan in exchange for the latter's freedom. The only hope of building a new crusader kingdom after Hattin was a flat refusal to any such proposals. But only a newcomer from abroad, a crusader as opposed to a Frank, whose spirit had not been crushed by the disastrous defeat, was capable of reacting as ruthlessly as Conrad did. As it happened, Tyre remained in Christian hands and became the kernel of the new kingdom and the marquis was later returned.

The second exception to the more humane treatment of captives that we have noted in the Latin Kingdom was Richard's butchery of defenseless Muslim captives before embarking on the reconquest of the coast. The delay in the Latin offensive to conquer the coast was partially attributable to the problem of these Muslim captives. Richard could neither leave such a large number in Acre without an

⁷³ *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, I, 9; trans., p. 40. For a discussion of the variant versions of this episode, see P. W. Edbury, "The Lyon *Eracles* and the Old French Continuations of William of Tyre", in *Montjoie: Studies in Crusade History in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayer*, ed. B.Z. Kedar, J. Riley-Smith, and R. Hiestand (Aldershot, 1997) 147. The Lyon *Eracles* is the only MS to claim that Conrad did in fact shoot at his father.

army to guard them, nor could he burden the expedition by taking them with him. Notwithstanding the strategic reasons he may have had for his deed, Richard's cold-blooded execution of 2,700 captives, leaving only the nobles alive for mercenary reasons, does not fit his image as a chivalrous knight. The narrators of Richard's terrible butchery, both Ambroise and the anonymous pilgrim, try to exonerate him of any guilt. According to them Saladin was the one who showed indifference toward his hostages by failing to keep the terms of surrender, suffering the hostages to perish with no succor. He was the one who "behaved himself as a false and dishonorable man when he delivered his own men to death and accordingly lost his renown which had stood so high in the courts all over the world".⁷⁴ The anonymous pilgrim claimed that Richard waited an extra three weeks after the expiry of the time limit fixed by the Saracens to see "whether the treaty-maker would infringe his own treaty".⁷⁵ In other words, the chronicler tried to emphasize Saladin's responsibility for Richard's deed, placing the blame on him for not keeping his word.

Richard on the other hand wanted "to abate the haughtiness of the Turks, to root up their religion, and to avenge Christendom".⁷⁶ The *Itinerarium* even makes this deed divinely ordained: "Perhaps this was through God's dispensation so that something more satisfactory should come about."⁷⁷ Richard killed the prisoners only after holding council and the council decided that they would slay the greater part of the Saracens and keep those most noble for future ransom. "And thus on them was vengeance done/For blows and bolts of arbalest./For this be the Creator blessed."⁷⁸ The *Itinerarium* adds as an afterthought:

It ought to be known that countless Christians had already died in the army. The army had remained at enormous loss and expense to capture the city of Acre for two winters plus a summer down to the

⁷⁴ Ambroise, *L'Estoire de la Guerre Sainte par Ambroise: Histoire en vers de la troisième croisade*, ed. G. Paris (Paris, 1897), lines 5493-5500; trans. by E.N. Stone as "The History of the Holy War", in *Three Old French Chronicles of the Crusades* (Seattle, 1939), chap. 35, p. 78.

⁷⁵ *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, IV, 2; trans., p. 227.

⁷⁶ Ambroise, *L'Estoire*, lines 5534-5536; Stone trans., chap. 35, p. 78.

⁷⁷ *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, IV, 2; trans., p. 227.

⁷⁸ Ambroise, *L'Estoire*, lines 5540-5543; translation cited from M.J. Hubert and J.L. La Monte, *The Crusade of Richard Lion-Heart by Ambroise* (New York, 1976) 228.

mid-autumn when the Turks were beheaded as described above. In the eyes of God and humanity the Turks certainly deserved their fate because of their destruction of churches and slaying of people.⁷⁹

To the modern reader the contemporary narrators seem a bit anxious to find logical reasons to exonerate Richard. It seems to me that the writers felt uneasy about this blatant break with chivalrous mores. Other chroniclers were less exculpatory, and one even stated overtly that this was a barbarous deed.⁸⁰ Roger of Hoveden tried to change the facts and claimed that Saladin was the first to kill captives, two days before Richard, who only retaliated.⁸¹ In other words, in the late twelfth century the norms in Europe also seem to have changed, making the killing of captives not a source of pride. As a means of restricting war atrocities this was surely not enough, but blatant unrestricted brutality did at least discomfort the narrators. Incidentally, lately a modern historian has followed in Ambroise's footsteps and tried to exonerate Richard, claiming it took a Lionheart's moral courage to massacre the prisoners:

Richard's decision to massacre his prisoners, though eternally controversial, was a military one, requiring the greatest moral courage. The crusade could have ended at Acre, a victim of its own success, if Richard had employed a large part of his army to guard the Muslim garrison. It took a lionheart's courage to risk the opprobrium even of his own side. Likewise, Saladin's killing of the Templar and Hospitallers prisoners after his victory at Hattin had revealed that for all his famed generosity of spirit he possessed the same kind of moral courage as his Frankish adversary in pursuit of victory in the holy war.

The moral courage needed to kill defenseless captives is in my opinion open to debate.⁸²

To sum up: the gradual change towards a *jus in bello* – restraint on the actual prosecution of war – in the twelfth-century Frankish

⁷⁹ *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, IV, 6; trans., p. 232.

⁸⁰ *Quellen zur Geschichte der Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I*, ed. A. Chroust, MGH: *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum nova series* 5 (Berlin, 1928) 99.

⁸¹ Roger of Hoveden, *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, *Rolls Series* 51,3 (London, 1870) 124-27.

⁸² Regan, *Lionhearts*. xxiv. For a more balanced treatment of Richard, see J. Gillingham, *Richard I* (New Haven, 1999); R.V. Turner and R.R. Heiser, *The Reign of Richard Lionheart: Ruler of the Angevin Empire, 1189-99* (Harlow, 2000).

Levant seems to prove the maxim of Usamah ibn Munqidh: "Everyone who is a fresh emigrant from the Frankish land is ruder in character than those who have been acclimatized and have held long association with the Moslems."⁸³ The Franks did learn some new norms in the Levant.

In writing about the emergence of a law of war in Norman England, Matthew Strickland claimed that laws of war and chivalry were invented and influenced by the Franks in Europe in the twelfth century. If this is indeed the case, is it possible to trace a further process, one that affected the crusaders in the Levantine milieu and had a longer lasting effect? Did the new mores and norms absorbed in the East filter through to European society upon these crusaders' return, finding their reflection in the rules of war emerging and formulated in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries? If this indeed can be proven then the influence of the adversarial encounters in the Frankish Levant had a more far-reaching impact than hitherto thought.

Chivalrous ethics in war

The *Rothelin* continuation of William of Tyre shows that the thirteenth-century concept of captivity differed significantly from the twelfth-century one. The continuation clearly differs from William of Tyre's original contempt toward captives as weaklings.⁸⁴ When the chronicler describes the capitulation of the garrison of the Tower of David in 1239 he emphasizes that they had no choice but to surrender:

The defenders understood the position and knew that if the Saracens took the tower by assault there would be no quarter given, they would all of them be killed, not one would escape. They knew they had no means of defense, nothing to drink, nothing to eat, and that very soon they would be taken by storm or starved out and all put to the sword. They accepted the Saracens' offer, left the castle, threw all their goods out of it and the Saracens kept their word faithfully and had them taken to safety.⁸⁵

⁸³ Usamah, *Memoirs*, 163.

⁸⁴ See chapter 9.

⁸⁵ *Rothelin*, chap. 21. English translation of excerpts in *Crusader Syria in the Thirteenth Century* by J. Shirley (Aldershot, 1999) 40.

The villain of the story is Emperor Frederick II's deputy who had not provided enough men and victuals to defend the tower, and the vanquished garrison is in no way blamed for surrendering. In the same way, the chronicler severely criticizes the raiders of the count of Bar's expedition in 1239 for their mistaken strategic decisions, but not for becoming captives. On the contrary, the *Rothelin* continuation describes them as foolhardy, but chivalrous and brave, giving 'mighty blows' and doing 'great deeds'.⁸⁶ The discussion between the crusaders and the local Franks following the defeat of their comrades is typical: their first reaction was to try to release the captives by force. When this proved impossible the Templars and Hospitallers advised against pursuing the Saracens, because the pressure might drive them to kill the Christian captives they had taken. Such solicitude for the welfare of the captives, making them a strategic factor that had to be considered when planning an assault, was unusual in the twelfth century. After lengthy discussion the army agreed upon withdrawal, without rescuing the captives. In any event, the problem of the captives featured prominently in the military discussions between the sides. One crusader song shows the same sentiment:

Young gentlemen, poor vavassors,
 Not one of them is to blame
 This long delay is hard on men
 Who've left their lands in pawn.
 The great lords show no kindness, give
 No sort of help or aid
 To such when all their money's gone.
 These don't deserve to die!
 If ever they come home again,
 Who'll blame them? None but fools!
 Imprisoned lords, all over France
 Her people pray for you!⁸⁷

The song was written by a noble captive, so its compassion for captives is understandable. But the fact that the chronicler chose to in-

⁸⁶ *Rothelin*, chap. 28; trans., p. 50.

⁸⁷ *Rothelin*, chap. 31; trans., p. 55.

clude it in his narrative makes it representative of the current feelings toward captives.

The army gathered to fortify Ascalon in 1240 tried in vain to make plans to liberate the captives of Gaza by force,⁸⁸ and resented the efforts made by Theobald of Navarre to contract a peace treaty with Egypt. (See plate 3.) When he proceeded with the negotiations and signed a treaty with Egypt, the chronicler saw the promise to liberate the captives as his most important achievement. The exchange of prisoners took place on 13 April 1241 after the English prince Richard of Cornwall had also intervened and signed a treaty. In all the diplomatic negotiations, both with Damascus and with Egypt from 1239 to 1241, the need to redeem captives was a main concern. The intensive search for the count of Bar, accompanied by diverse rumors about the details of his death, again highlights the deep concern for captives and the strong feeling of responsibility for their fate.⁸⁹ The disastrous battle of Forbie (1244) was a colossal defeat for the Frankish armies. Their losses were enormous: 312 out of 348 Templars, 325 out of 351 Hospitallers, 397 out of 400 Teutonic knights. The patriarch of Jerusalem who reported the defeat estimated that 16,000 Franks, knights, and sergeants had been killed or captured.⁹⁰ He did not give an exact number of captives as this was probably not known at the time, but *Outremer* was again faced with an urgent need to deal with the problem of captivity.

In conclusion, the development of a deeper sense of responsibility for one's captives did not take place in isolation from relations with the enemy. Notwithstanding the Third Crusade's bloody encounters and their aftermath, chroniclers from both sides show a grudging respect for the enemy. Muslim chroniclers describe Richard as a chivalrous fighter and a great king and later Latin chroniclers show great respect and even admiration for Saladin. Ambroise expresses his admiration for his enemies, saying that had they not been unbelievers he would have said that no better men were born.⁹¹ Half a century later, Joinville cites aphorisms in Saladin's name, as if he was

⁸⁸ *Rothelin*, chaps. 33-35.

⁸⁹ *Rothelin*, chap. 35.

⁹⁰ J. Richard, *Saint Louis: Crusader King of France*, trans. J. Birell (Cambridge, 1999) 97.

⁹¹ Ambroise, *L'Estoire de la guerre sainte*, line 5069.

a great authority.⁹² Reciprocal respect is also proven by diplomatic gestures in between the battles, keeping a line of diplomatic communications open between the enemies with almost constant negotiations between the camps.

Nor did these connections include only the leaders of the army who, in fact, never met personally in spite of their frequent negotiations through mediators. Beha ed-Din tells a typical story about restraint in battle accepted by both belligerents. During the siege of Acre, Beha ed-Din says, the young boys were bored and wanted to take part in the fighting. A combat was arranged, a kind of tournament, between boys from both sides. When one of them won he was told by the elder spectators how to behave toward his opponent, namely to take him captive for ransom. By then, giving quarter and holding for ransom had become the accepted norm, a rule that one could teach to children and which was in principle binding on both sides.⁹³ By the end of the twelfth century it seems that both sides had accepted this as a basic law of war. Both this playful combat and its outcome could hardly have happened three generations earlier. Although it is hard to date precisely when in the twelfth century this change took place, during the Third Crusade it seems that both adversaries accepted chivalrous codes of ethics.

Louis IX – Saint, crusader, and knight

Half a century after the Third Crusade we find ransom of captives a priority on Louis IX's agenda. Depicted as the ideal crusader and received as such by the local inhabitants in the Holy Land upon returning from Damietta, when Louis arrived at Acre in 1250 he was in fact a vanquished military leader who had accomplished very little. (See plate 4.) One of his most endearing acts, even before personal efforts to fortify the coastal cities of Acre, Caesarea, and Jaffa

⁹² Jean sire de Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis: Credo et Lettre à Louis X*, ed. and trans. Natalis de Wailly (Paris, 1874), chap. LXVI, 330, p. 180: *ce n'estoit pas bien fait; car c'estoit contre les enseignemens Salehadin, qui dit que l'on à mangier de son pain et de son sel*: "It was a very wrong thing to do, because it was contrary to the teaching of Saladin, who has said you shall never kill a man once you have shared your bread and salt with him" (English trans., M.R.B. Shaw, *Joinville and Villehardouin: Chronicles of the Crusades* [Harmondsworth, 1963], II, 9, p. 245).

⁹³ Beha ed-Din, *Life of Saladin*, XII, pp. 161-62.

with his own funds, was his great concern for the captives of his army as well as those of former expeditions still languishing in Egyptian prisons. The great fiasco of the Egyptian crusades, both in 1217 and in 1250, left many captives in Muslim hands. The need to ransom himself as well as the captives from his army kept Louis IX in the East longer than he would have liked, but he was very reluctant to leave without solving the captive problem that he clearly saw as his responsibility. Joinville, his biographer and friend, tells us that accompanying the king in the crusader army was the head of the Trinitarian Order, a military order especially dedicated to the ransom of captives established a decade after Hattin, as noted earlier.⁹⁴ By then it was probably deemed necessary to bring a skilled, organized redeemer with a crusading army leaving Europe. The Seventh Crusade, notwithstanding its sad ending, was well prepared for this eventuality. It was probably the best-organized crusade ever to leave Europe.⁹⁵

Thus, in contrast with the First Crusade, on the eve of the Seventh, captivity was taken into account. But the number of captives and the scope of activities needed for ransoming them were both more than could have been expected. The king had to force the Templars, who had also joined the army in Egypt, to open their coffers containing private crusaders' deposits and to contribute money for ransom. Joinville viewed this as the right thing to do. He clearly assumed that the responsibility for ransoming the captives in Egypt was general and no longer the captive's private quandary. Matthew Paris, who wrote extensively about Louis' crusade, received his information from the Master of the Temple in Scotland. According to his dossier the ransom of the king of France amounted to 40,000 pounds, and the number of those killed was 60,000, of whom 20,000 were from the French army. Matthew claims that the grim facts were kept secret from Lady Blanche, the king's mother, and the whole baronage of France for a long time, lest in desperation they refuse to consent to the ransom.⁹⁶

Joinville tells another story. The king purchased his own freedom in return for the city of Damietta, which he had formerly captured,

⁹⁴ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, LXXV, 380, p. 206 and passim.

⁹⁵ W.C. Jordan, *Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade* (Princeton, 1979) 65-104.

⁹⁶ Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, Rolls Series 57,6 (London, 1882) 521 n. 1; A. Macquarrie, *Scotland and the Crusades, 1096-1560* (Edinburgh, 1985).

and negotiated the release of all the captives for a huge sum – 400,000 *livres tournois* – of which half was paid immediately. The captives were the main problem of the aftermath of the crusade, both in France and in the Holy Land. Louis declined to sign a treaty with Damascus against Egypt because of the captives still left there. When the Egyptians wanted to negotiate a treaty with him, they sent two hundred captive knights back to Acre.⁹⁷ According to Joinville, Louis' decision to remain in the Holy Land for two years after the defeat in Egypt was attributable to his feelings of responsibility toward the captives and the need to see the treaty with the Muslim sultan implemented.

Responsibility for one's captives was not the only trait that had changed in crusader thought, according to Joinville. More than once he emphasized the respect King Louis had for the enemy and the honorable way in which he conducted the negotiations: "This upright king, moreover, loved truth so well that, as I shall show you later, he would never consent to lie to the Saracens with regard to any covenant he made with them."⁹⁸ When he heard that one of his nobles, Philip of Nemours, had managed to cheat the Muslims of 10,000 *livres* when weighing the ransom money, he demanded full repayment of this sum. This was part of the king's saintly character and may accordingly be deemed unusual, but if upright behavior toward the Saracens was considered worth elaborating on, a change had taken place.⁹⁹ Thus Louis combined in his person two long-known ideals of kingship; he was a saint, or at least Joinville wrote his book expressly to achieve sanctification for his king and friend, and he was an ideal knight. Ransoming captives had for centuries been a significant characteristic of saintly leaders, especially bishops, such as Anskar, Caesarius of Arles, and Adalbert of Prague. In the mid-thirteenth century it was also seen as chivalrous behavior. We can safely say that by then chivalry was tantamount not only to military leadership and physical valor, but also to a new morality of largesse and pity for the weak and undefended, a secular morality just as important and binding as the religious one. In

⁹⁷ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, XCI, 466, p. 255.

⁹⁸ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, III, 21, p. 12; Shaw trans., I, 1, p. 167.

⁹⁹ Louis expected the Saracens to behave accordingly and sent the friar Raoul to admonish the emir Faress-ed-Din Octay for not keeping the treaty (Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, 79).

fact the knights probably saw this as part of religious morality, as knighthood and Christianity were closely linked. Louis was both a chivalrous knight and a saint and because of that he could afford to be a final and unqualified failure as a crusader¹⁰⁰ and still be remembered and revered as a hero. The chivalrous characteristics were no longer first and foremost valor and courage, although Louis is shown to have lacked neither, but also a moral code of behavior toward one's peers, whether friend or foe.

Franks and Mamluks – A reversal of roles

With the ascent of the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt the Franks faced a new reality. Baybars' reign (1260-77) can be seen as the waning of the Latin Kingdom, although it was not until fifteen years later that his successors finally expelled the Franks from the Holy Land. It was not, however, only a reversal of fates, with the Franks losing one stronghold after the other to Baybars' military expeditions, but as if they were playing a game where the rules had suddenly been changed. The Franks expected Baybars to make war according to the chivalrous rules that were now accepted conventions on both sides. Whereas the Mamluks kept up a pretence of legal peace treaties between the belligerent sides, assiduously scrutinizing each document for any loopholes or irregularities on the Frankish part, they did in fact keep the truces only when it suited them and then usually for a price.¹⁰¹ The diplomatic conventions were preserved; at the same time the Franks were always accused of not having fulfilled some clause. Increasing Frankish submissiveness was both a result of their precarious military situation and a total misunderstanding of their enemy who used calculated cruelty as a strategic means and broke his word, completely disregarding the rules of chivalry. The exchange of captives, the formal excuse for a Muslim to desist from Jihad and make a truce at all, was a clause in almost all of the treaties, but as the situation deteriorated the Franks had very little to offer and many captives to ransom. Baybars' emblem, a leopard or lion toying with its victim, a little mouse, typifies the

¹⁰⁰ Jordan, *Louis IX*, 65.

¹⁰¹ J. Riley-Smith, "Peace never established: The Case of the Kingdom of Jerusalem", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, no. 28 (1978) 87-102.

way he saw his relations with his enemies.¹⁰² Baybars not only broke his word when dealing with unbelievers, this was almost a consistent component of his policy. But he always made a point of blaming the other side. For example, when luring his adversary, the Ayyubid ruler of Kerak into meeting him at Bayt Shean, he invented a story of alleged treason by al-Mughith before having him arrested and executed, thereby breaking his solemn oath of safety given a year before.¹⁰³

Truce negotiations in 1261 to 1263 were the first encounter in which the question of captives was crucial. An exchange of captives was included, but the Templars refused to give up their captives who were skilled craftsmen in exchange for their coreligionists who were apparently worth less. Baybars claimed that he had brought the captives to Nablus to effect the treaty and that he had to bring his army because of the Franks' breach of truce. The second grievance was surely false, as the army was brought in case it would be needed to campaign against al-Mughith.¹⁰⁴ When force proved unnecessary Baybars promptly used the troops accumulated to attack and burn the Church of the Annunciation in Nazareth, and the church in Cabul, and to demolish the fortress monastery on Mount Tabor. He then attacked Acre and razed the fortified mill at Doc. The conclusion of a truce, which Baybars negotiated with each of the Frankish entities separately – the military orders, the bailli, and the Italian communes – did not ensure that order and security would prevail throughout the territories to which it applied.¹⁰⁵

In 1265, under the cover of a hunting expedition, Baybars laid siege to Caesarea and razed the city to the ground. His policy of rebuilding inland fortifications and demolishing coastal ones could have given the Franks some indication as to his real goals, namely to end Frankish existence on the littoral once and for all and eliminate any foothold for future crusades from Europe. After razing Caesarea he received a diplomatic delegation from the Franks asking for peace, and without any chivalrous defiance he secretly prepared to

¹⁰² P. Thorau, *The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century*, trans. P.M. Holt (London, 1992).

¹⁰³ Thorau, *Lion of Egypt*, 135-38.

¹⁰⁴ Thorau, *Lion of Egypt*, 143-45; P.M. Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy (1260-1290)* (Leiden, 1995) 12-14.

¹⁰⁵ Holt, *Mamluk Diplomacy*, 13.

attack nearby Arsuf. The garrison capitulated on 30 April 1265 and was led into captivity. The captives of Arsuf were paraded in Cairo with broken crosses around their necks and forced to carry their banners reversed.¹⁰⁶ The conquest of Safed from the Templars took place in 1266 after a long and difficult siege. Whether the castle's capitulation was due to the treason of the Armenian Leo or to Baybars' promise to spare the defenders' lives, no promises were kept. Baybars beheaded 1,500 Christian prisoners on a hillock opposite the castle, allegedly the place where the Templars had executed Muslim prisoners.¹⁰⁷ When a Templar delegation from Sidon and an Armenian delegation came to ask for a truce in 1267, they were shown the heads of the fallen warriors that Baybars had put on stakes to decorate the walls of Safed.¹⁰⁸ Baybars succeeded in intimidating and humiliating the Franks who were constantly accused of breaking the truces and led to believe that they had brought the cruel retributions upon themselves. All the negotiations for truces started with the Franks bringing Muslim captives with them as a token of goodwill, and a clause regarding redemption of captives was usually included in the treaty.

Some of the places not yet conquered by force submitted in order to attain a truce. One such diplomatic encounter (7 July 1268) between Baybars' emissaries and King Hugh of Cyprus and Jerusalem illustrates the atmosphere: the emissaries were sent to Acre with a gift of twenty of the prisoners from Antioch and strict instructions not to sit below the Frankish king. When the discussion about the ratification of the clause became heated the king threatened Shafī' b. Ali with his troops who were positioned behind him. The latter's reaction was: "Have I a safeconduct?" He said to him, 'Yes.' I said, 'Let the king know that in Khizanat al-bunud, which is a prison in the sultan's realm in Cairo, there are Frankish prisoners more in number than these.'¹⁰⁹ The answer was undoubtedly calculated as

¹⁰⁶ Thorau, *Lion of Egypt*, 162.

¹⁰⁷ Thorau, *Lion of Egypt*, 168-71; Ibn al-Furat, *Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-muluk*, trans. U. Lyons and M.C. Lyons as *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Ta'rikh al-duwal wa'l-Muluk of Ibn al-Furat* (Cambridge, 1971) 1:128-29; 2:101-2.

¹⁰⁸ *Les Gestes des Chéprois: Recueil de chroniques françaises écrites en orient*, ed. G. Raynaud, Publications de la Société de l'Orient Latin 5 (Geneva, 1887) pt. 3, par. 350, pp. 182-83.

¹⁰⁹ Holt, *Mamluk Diplomacy*, 70-71; Ibn al-Furat, *Ta'rikh*, in Lyons and Lyons, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders*, 2:129-30.

an insult to the Frankish king, showing that he had in fact no choice but to ratify the treaty and that the cessation of hostilities was in Baybars' hands. But the answer has yet other implications. The safe-conduct of an emissary was part of the long established rules in encounters between the enemies. If violated, the prisoners in Cairo could pay for this infringement with their lives. In other words, the Franks had to abide by the rules of exchanging captives, but this by no means guaranteed that Baybars would adhere to the same rules. The treaties signed continuously until half a year before the final fall of Acre in 1291, each treaty including clauses more detrimental than the last to the shrinking kingdom, show that the Franks did not believe until the end that the Mamluks truly wanted to get rid of them. Mercantile relations continued undisturbed, including the sale of war material to the Mamluks. Despite Mamluk policy of razing every coastal city they conquered – from which we might have expected the Franks to understand that Baybars' ultimate goal was to annihilate the Latin Kingdom – the Franks apparently continued to believe that due to their economic importance to the Mamluks they would be therefore be left in peace.

By these means Baybars maintained the appearance of a warrior of Jihad fighting a religious war. Thus in 1266 the emir Fahr al-Din b. Julban ransomed many Muslim prisoners, including women and children from Christian captivity, with money derived from a waqf in Damascus devoted to that end, although Baybars could probably have obtained their release by treaty.¹¹⁰ This action of the waqf, the religious institution of charity here connected with the war, was used by Baybars for propaganda aims.¹¹¹ Similarly, almost every treaty included some fine or punishment for wrongs committed against Muslims as if they were the weaker and aggrieved party. The crusaders' fate may have been sealed, but the toying of the lion of Egypt with the mouse was facilitated by the mouse's failure to understand the shift in rules.

Frankish behavior at the end of the Latin Kingdom is illustrative of their absorption of the norms of mutual responsibility. In 1290, the Franks refused to hand over to the Mamluks Italian crusaders

¹¹⁰ Thorau, *Lion of Egypt*, 166.

¹¹¹ For the importance of waqfs in Muslim tradition of ransoming captives, see S.H. Abdel Wahab, "Captives Waqf in Syria and Egypt (491-589 H./ 1097-1193)" in *Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 559-70.

who had killed Muslims in a riot in Acre. Qalawun, Baybars' heir, and his son al-Ashraf Khalil were by then set on wiping out the last remnants of the Latin Kingdom. Their refusal might have made no difference; even if they had complied, Qalawun would probably have found another *casus belli*. It seems that in 1290 the Kingdom of Acre was doomed. But it still remains true that the last strains of Frankish existence on the littoral of the Holy Land were of solidarity and responsibility toward their coreligionists, unruly and unworthy as they may have been. Unlike Godfrey of Bouillon and Conrad of Montfort, who were willing to sacrifice their vassal and parent respectively, at the end of the Latin Kingdom the Franks were not willing to sacrifice the lives of individuals to save the city. Their refusal was the beginning of the heroic last stand at Acre in 1291 and a spectacular example of chivalric ethics put into force – perhaps to their exponents' detriment.

Conclusion

Restraint in war and the ransom of captives were not rules that came naturally to the crusaders. They had to be learned as part of the evolving mores of chivalry. The development of moral sensitivity toward the vanquished enemy and responsibility for fellow combatants occurred in Europe and in the Latin East almost simultaneously and it is therefore difficult to determine who influenced whom.¹¹² The encounter with laws of war regulated in the Muslim East probably played a major part in this development and may have contributed to changes in European chivalry as well. But the growth of such rules, which culminated in the laws of war formulated in Spain in the thirteenth century and in France in the fourteenth century, never proceeded in a straight line. The outcome for the captive may also have depended on who had the upper hand.

¹¹² For contemporary treaties in Spain, see R.I. Burns and P.E. Chevedden, *Negotiating Cultures: Bilingual Surrender Treaties in Muslim-Crusader Spain under James the Conqueror* (Leiden, 1999).

CHAPTER FIVE

LIFE IN CAPTIVITY

If we have charted changes in the behavior of the Franks as a result of their encounter with Muslim behavior in war and especially its aftermath, it remains to see what happened to the individual captive from the moment he surrendered. Hitherto I have claimed that there was a marked difference between the Muslim and crusader traditions regarding ransom of captives, especially in their early encounters, in part because of differences in the economic substructure of their societies and the different place of slavery in each, and in part because of an inherent tradition of Muslim lay charity that the Franks had to learn from their enemies. When we come to the actual conditions in captivity, however, any such gap between the enemies is not discernible. Extreme acts of cruelty and generous acts of humanity are documented on both sides and it is impossible to infer that a particular mode of behavior toward captives was more prevalent among Muslim captors than among their Christian counterparts. We may perhaps say that the Seljuqid princes of northern Syria seem to have been more brutal than the Egyptian Fatimids, but such differences may be accidental. If both sides sometimes demonstrated either cruelty or tolerance on occasion, this was probably more attributable to the personalities of the captors and the specific circumstances of captivity than to any religious or 'national' tradition.

With regard to individual captives, we must distinguish between commoners and nobility. The former remain nameless and were often employed as artisans or craftsmen; of their ultimate fate little is known. The case is different for members of the nobility taken captive. Among them we find instances of prolonged captivity, and some more detail regarding their fate. But above and beyond the individual captive, his moment of surrender, his captor's reaction, and the conditions of his daily life, captives served a societal role, particularly to convey propaganda messages to their own and the opposing camp. Thus there are two sides to the captive phenomenon: an individual level – the personal story of individual captives – and

a societal one in which captives played an important role in public spectacle. This broad division will structure the discussion that follows. How captives found their way 'out of captivity' and the treatment of women in captivity are the subjects of separate chapters.

The individual captive and his fate

There are very few extant descriptions of life in captivity written by the protagonists themselves. Christian and Muslim chroniclers alike who themselves did not experience captivity and therefore did not know much about everyday life on the other side extrapolated the captive experience according to what they knew from their own camp. In two instances, we are lucky to have firsthand accounts written by victims themselves. These are the very detailed descriptions by two Christian captives: that of Walter the Chancellor in the wake of the *Ager Sanguinis* in 1119, and that of Joinville from 1249. The pictures they convey are, however, conflicting: Walter lives under the trauma of dreadful atrocities which he witnessed, whereas Joinville, although describing the massacre of sick and wounded captives, has many kind words to say about his personal captor who twice saved his life and cared for him. While he describes the fear of death, the suffering, and the seemingly senseless cruelty toward other captives, his own personal story is one of compassionate and comparatively good treatment. A third description is found in the Hospitaller Roger of Stanegrave's comments about his prolonged imprisonment when he tried to raise the money for his ransom in 1318.¹

Life or death in captivity was determined at three central junctures: (1) the moment of submission, (2) the captor's initial reaction which usually set the tone for the rest of the period, and (3) daily conditions.

¹ British Library, Cotton MS Otho D V. I hope to publish his report elsewhere, although the manuscript is almost illegible. For Roger of Stanegrave who was in captivity for twenty years, see Forey, "The Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives", 263, 279.

Falling captive

During a battle or conquest of a city the moment of transition from enemy warrior to captive had to be clear to both sides. The captive surrendered in order to save his life and had to signal clearly that he no longer constituted a military threat. This was accomplished by giving his right hand to the captor, a sign apparently recognized by both sides from the time of their very first encounters. At the Battle of Arsuf in 1101 Egyptian soldiers explained the rule to the crusaders thus:

Conrad, indeed, peerless in courage and strength, inflicted extraordinary slaughter on the Saracens with his sword, until all who were there marvelled and feared; they kept well away from him and held back their hands, asking him to desist from the horrible massacre and to clasp their right hands in return for his life, and then he would be surrendered to the king of Egypt, for they felt sure that once the king's anger had been appeased so famous and wonderful a knight would find favour in his eyes and after a period in fetters he would be awarded prizes. This was done. Arpin likewise was captured and his life was saved.... All the rest, with Stephen and the other Stephen, highest princes, were beheaded in that place.²

The conditions of surrender as well as the symbolic gesture needed to implement them were clearly spelled out by the Muslim warriors to the crusader leader, while the alternative, death on the spot, was also amply demonstrated. How this was accomplished in the heat of battle, with no common language, is not explained. It would seem, however, that both sides must have shared some sort of sign language or a common law of warfare intelligible to both. Extending the right hand as a gesture of surrender is well attested in medieval Europe.³

The initial postbattle encounter

The first encounter between captor and captive was a critical moment, setting the stage for their future interrelationship. At times the

² AA, IX, 6. See also AA, X, 14, 22, and 29.

³ A. Nöding, "Min Sicherheit si din". Kriegsgefangenschaft im christlichen Mittelalter", in *In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. R. Overmans (Köln, 1999) 99-117.

captor reacted violently, killing or hurting his prisoner as a retributory act. Although defenseless and no longer constituting a threat, the captor's first reaction toward the prisoner of war was often to vent the furor and rage of the battle on the captive. The hapless victim was perceived as representative of the hated adversary, and all the energy accumulated to win the battle was discharged upon him. This type of emotional response might also result in sadistic, senseless torture.

A similar phenomenon may be attested in the broader context of the behavior of an entire army. The same raging, seemingly mindless reaction sometimes characterized the behavior of conquerors storming a besieged city. If negotiations for peaceful surrender of a city failed, the inhabitants, combatants and noncombatants alike, could expect no postconquest mercy. All the energy, hatred, and suffering of the conquering army were visited upon the conquered city, as we have seen in the cases of Antioch, Ma'arrat al-Nu'man, and Jerusalem. These atrocities were not perceived as excessive cruelty by the Christian chroniclers. The unrestrained massacre of the inhabitants of a conquered city was no more than was to be expected when a liberating crusader army succeeded in cleansing the Holy City of its defiling elements, the infidel enemy.⁴

There was a difference between the immediate postbattle reaction and that after the initial rage or intoxication of victory abated. Abu Shama alone reported, for example, that Saladin wanted to kill all captives after the Battle of Hattin. When his emirs refused to surrender their captives because of greed, he bought each Templar or Hospitaller for 50 dinars and then had them executed.⁵ This was not an act of rage, but rather a cold-blooded calculated reaction to the military orders' importance as a main and permanent force in the Latin Kingdom.⁶

⁴ France, *Victory in the East*, 355-57.

⁵ Abu-Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, RHC Or. IV, p. 277; Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, 11:538.

⁶ It seems that Abu Shama misunderstood his sources. Both Imad ad-Din and Ibn al-Athir claimed that Saladin was interested only in members of the military orders, for whom he paid and then executed. Though the numbers vary between one to two hundred, this is very far from thousands. Cf. Imad ad-Din, in Gabrieli, *Arab Historians*, 138; Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, 11:538.

The prisoner's dilemma

But to return to the individual captive and his fate. In some cases, it was the captive himself who determined his fate. A more rational reaction than instant slaughter on the captor's part was to evaluate the worth of his human booty before mishandling him. If the captor concluded that the prisoner was worthless, the practical result might not differ from the already noted case of an initial emotional reaction of rage. A captor might also come to a calculated, rational decision that it was more expedient to kill or hurt the captive than to pay for his upkeep and transport until such time and place that he could receive payment for him, whether on the slave market or for ransom. Nonetheless, the possibility of monetary gain could potentially restrain the captor's instinctive cruelty. In the East it was customary for the individual prisoner to set his own worth, on the assumption that the captive was the best judge of his own ransom price. Imad ad-Din and Beha ed-Din both describe the registration of and evaluation of prisoners immediately after battle.⁷ This task of the chancery was also noted by Joinville.⁸ El Nouiri el-Kindy (d. 1332) describes a diwan of captives responsible for registering captives.⁹ Obviously, in this setting it was likely that the prisoner himself set his price.

Defining his own price put the captive in a quandary which I call the 'prisoner's dilemma', using the term from game theory in a somewhat different sense. The captive had to persuade his captor that he was a highborn, valuable person quickly: in fact immediately upon losing his freedom, in order to save life and limb. Either extreme, setting a price that was too high or too low, endangered the captive. If at a later stage the evaluation proved to be unfounded the captor might react violently. This is illustrated by the case of Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam al-Ansari, a Muslim scholar captured by the Crusaders in Jerusalem in 1099. The Crusaders' expectations were that he would fetch a thousand dinars. When nobody was

⁷ Imad ad-Din, *Kitâb*, in Massé, *Conquête de la Syrie*, 28-29; Beha ed-Din, *Life of Saladin*, chap. 89, p. 231.

⁸ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, 65.

⁹ Abdel Wahab, "Captives Waqf in Syria and Egypt (491-589 H./ 1097-1193 A.D.)", in *Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 564.

willing to pay this price, this scholar was killed,¹⁰ although we know from Geniza documents that at the same time Jewish captives were ransomed for less than 33.3 dinars each.¹¹ Raising high expectations was a dangerous path to tread. Faced with this paradoxical dilemma the prisoner had to act quickly and rationally to save his life. Thus Joinville let his men tell the captors that he was the king's cousin, taking a calculated risk that they might discover this was not true and kill him, but also knowing that in the meantime this disinformation had probably saved his life and that of his retainers.¹²

The tense situation of leaving the fate of the captive in his own hands sometimes led to torture, not as vengeance or an outlet for anger, but rather as a cold-blooded, calculated deed aimed at tilting the balance of terror in the captor's favor. One potential objective served by torturing captives was to persuade them to raise their own price. Thus when Baldwin d'Ibelin's captor threatened to torture him if he did not raise his price and promptly started to extract his teeth one by one, this was to induce him to promise a higher ransom.¹³ Captives were kept in sordid conditions, subjected to hunger and thirst, heat and cold, as a means of placing psychological as well as physical pressure on them, to make them understand that they should 'upgrade' their valuation of their worth. (The price-fixing mechanism is treated in detail in chapter six.)

This type of 'functional torture' is documented in the case of King Louis IX's captivity in Egypt in 1250. The Saracens threatened the king with torture on a special machine, the *barnacle*, in order to persuade him to give up castles in the Holy Land in exchange for his freedom. Joinville provides a graphic description of the instrument and the way it worked, so the *barnacle* was probably shown to the king to make the threat of torture tangible:

This instrument is made of two pliable pieces of wood, notched at the edges with interlocking teeth, and fastened together at both ends with stout strips of ox-hide. When the Saracens wish to subject anyone to this torture, they lay him down on his side and put his legs between the teeth. Then they get a man to sit down on top of the *barnacle*; and

¹⁰ Mujir al-Din wrote about the fate of Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam al-Ansari. Cited by Hiyari, "Crusader Jerusalem", 138.

¹¹ Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, 5:374-79.

¹² Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, 64-65.

¹³ Ernoul, *Chronique*, 56.

as a result not half a foot of bone remains uncrushed. Moreover – to do the very worst they can – at the end of three days, when the legs have become inflamed, they put the swollen limbs back into the *bernicle*, and crush the bones all over again.

Joinville expresses no indignation either at the machine or the threats to his king. Apparently devious machines of torture were not unfamiliar to a mid-thirteenth-century French knight. He rather gave voice to his pride in his steadfast master who was not moved by the prospect of torture and answered that: “he was their prisoner, and they could do with him as they pleased”.¹⁴ Only after the captors were persuaded that the king would not give in, “and they could not prevail over our good king with threats”, did negotiations for ransom start in earnest.¹⁵

Prolonged captivity

Violence toward captives, cruel and inventive as it may have been, was after all a transient situation. Torture, even seemingly senseless torture, was used to attain some goal, whether punishment, information, or simply to enhance the ransom price. Once what could be achieved was clarified, there was no further need for torture. The exceptions were the cases of martyrdom or pure sadism (which may often seem the same, although it is not always clear who the sadist is – the perpetrator of the alleged deed or the hagiographer who lovingly doted on every detail of the prolonged execution). But even public torture was transient, although it often resulted in death.

What was captivity like after the first problematic encounter had been settled and the captive’s life spared and his value determined? In trying to elucidate the details of everyday life in captivity, a

¹⁴ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, chap. 341, pp. 185–86: *Bernicles est li plus griez tourmens que l’on puisse souffrir; et sont dui tison ploiant, endentei ou chief; et entrent li uns en l’autre, et sont lié à fors croies de buef ou chief. Et quant il weulent mettre les gens dedans, si les couchent sous leur costez et leur mettent les jambes parmi les chevilles dedans; et puis si font asseoir un home sur les tisons; don’t il advient ainsi qu’il ne demourra jà demi pié entier de os qu’il ne soit touz debrisiés et pour son enflées, si remettent les jambes enflées dedans les bernicles, et rebrisent tout derechief. A ces menaces leur respondi li roys que il estoit leur prisonniers, et que il pouoient faire de li leur volentei.* English translation cited from Shaw, chap. 10, p. 249.

¹⁵ Ibid.

theme the chroniclers did not dwell on willingly, what strikes one first is the prolonged term of captivity. We may assume that many if not most captives died without being ransomed, but those who were liberated had often been incarcerated for very long periods, years if not decades. This seems to oppose the best interests of the captor who had to feed the captive in the meantime and would surely have wanted to capitalize on his asset as soon as possible. But the fact is that the captives we hear about, usually the noble and rich who were worth keeping for ransom, had to face lengthy imprisonment. One extreme example is the thirty-year term of captivity served by the count of Dampierre in Aleppo.¹⁶ Another is the lot of Muslim prisoners in Egypt taken when Amaury laid siege to Bilbeis in 1158. He took the prisoners outside the walls, divided them in two groups, and released those who were in his lot "in return for God's grace who let me conquer Egypt as I have no doubt he will". The remainder were held by the army in captivity and many perished during forty years of captivity. A small group was ransomed by Saladin forty years later out of the revenues of Bilbeis.¹⁷

Lengthy imprisonment also brought other problems in its wake. Captives were often moved from one jail to another in order to impede plans for escape or deliverance by force. That in itself was a source of distress, as the change in location emphasized the captive's lack of personal security. Having to face new, unknown conditions was an added burden.¹⁸ A tenth-century Muslim captive in Byzantine captivity describes how the captives were transferred every month by lot to another *patrikios* and received different treatment from each.¹⁹ Bohemond was moved several times by his Seljuqid captors and was interned in Kastamuni in Northern Anatolia. In 1240, when Amalric of Monfort lied to his captor, the Egyptian sultan, in order to protect his comrades, he was punished by being transferred to the castle of Maubech.²⁰

¹⁶ A. de Barthélémy, "Chartes de départ et de retour des comtes de Dampierre-en-Astenois IV^e et V^e croisades", *Archives de l'Orient Latin* 2 (1884) 184-207.

¹⁷ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 137, cited by Richard, "Les prisonniers et leur rachat," 73.

¹⁸ See Nöding, "Min Sicherheit si din", about Richard the Lionhearts' many relocations while in captivity.

¹⁹ The *adab* of Qubath ibn Razin the Lakhmide told by Tanukhi. See Canard, "Les aventures d'un prisonnier Arabe", 51-72.

²⁰ Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, 4:79.

When imprisoned in a castle, the important captives were often placed in the lower parts of the tower, the donjon, to facilitate surveillance. The very tedium and physical discomfort of medieval dungeons make it difficult to understand how the prisoners survived for such long periods. Ibn Wasil describes the pit at Ba‘lbakk: “It was dark and there was no difference between night and day there. Each day the prisoner was given a little bread and salad.”²¹ Usamah mentions a son of a shaykh kept in the donjon of Beth Guvrin, shut up in solitary confinement for a year until a trapdoor was opened and another captive lowered to his cell.²² The archeological excavations at Beth Guvrin have not located this prison, but any of the dark, damp lower stories of the towers could fit the description. At Kerak the guides point out the prison in one of the dark lower tunnels, but there are no proofs for this identification. Hugh Kennedy describes the prison at Saône: “About 5 m above the bottom of the great trench, excavated into the rock, there is a prison, a windowless cavern whose roof is supported by a single pillar.”²³ On one of the walls there is an inscribed cross, which Kennedy identifies as the graffito of a captive, perhaps even the father of Guillaume de Queivillers. In 1227 Guillaume paid the Hospitallers to attempt to free his father; unfortunately, the father died before he could be ransomed.²⁴ Examples of prisoner-carved graffiti are known from Europe, during the period of the Hundred Years’ War.²⁵

In thirteenth-century Acre there must have been many prisoners of war. In the list compounded by Marsilio Zorzi in 1244 defining Venetian property in Acre, which includes rents and income from this property, the Venetian *bailli* mentions the tower “in which captives were detained”.²⁶ Captives were evidently part of the mercantile dealings the Italian communes transacted in Acre. In the large

²¹ Hillenbrand, *Islamic Perspectives*, 555.

²² Usamah, *Memoirs*, 109-10.

²³ H. Kennedy, *Crusader Castles* (Cambridge, 1994) 96.

²⁴ J. Delaville le Roulx, *Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de Saint-Jean de Jérusalem, 1100-1310* (Paris, 1894-1906) 2:363-64, no. 1861: *ubi de liberacione tractaremus, contigit patrem meum carni debitum solvere; qui, si paulo plus vixisset, procul dubio ipsius magistri foret auxilio liberatus.*

²⁵ E.R. Waara, “The Treatment and Disposition of Prisoners of War during the Hundred Years War” (Ph.D. diss., Wayne State University, 1977) 184-88.

²⁶ *Inferius est volta, ubi captivi detruduntur.* See O. Berggötz, *Der Bericht des Marsilio Zorzi* (Frankfurt, 1992) 177. For Venetian privileges in Acre, see D. Jacoby, “The

Hospitaller compound excavated in Acre archeologists have identified a medium sized hall as the prison. (See plate 5.) This room, excavated into the rock, is partly underground, without any windows and only a few slits and air holes to prevent suffocation. On the walls there are recessed holes to which the prisoners' chains were attached. (See plate 6.) Although this semi-underground room situated near the entrance street to the Hospitaller compound seems gloomy enough, it probably offered better conditions than the underground prison (*inferius est volta*) in the Venetian tower. Most likely this was because by the military orders used the captives as slave labor for their building and fortification projects and they therefore had to be kept in tolerable conditions so as not to impair their value as a labor force. These prisoners may have taken part in the huge building projects carried out at the site, which are now coming to light via archeological excavations in Acre.²⁷

Work force

Captives, when not immediately sold into slavery, were often reduced to forced labor. In principle this applied only to lowborn captives, but the distinction was not always preserved. Respect for chivalric rank was also prominent in medieval Muslim society and noble captives usually received preferential treatment. This was partly because of their financial value in case of ransom, but was also deeply rooted in the social concepts of chivalric society. According to Orderic Vitalis, King Baldwin II and Jocelyn of Courtenay were not asked to perform any tasks while in Balak's captivity, whereas all the other captives had to carry water and toil like beasts of burden.²⁸ Did this exemption include the lesser nobility or were only the two leaders excluded?

Judging from the various descriptions, both literary and historical, many captives were employed as forced laborers. According to the chanson *Les Chétifs* most Christian captives had to carry stones,

Venetian Privileges in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: Twelfth and Thirteenth-Century Interpretations and Implementation", in *Montjoie*, ed. Kedar, Riley-Smith, and Hiestand, 155-75.

²⁷ I wish to thank Eliezer Stern of the Israel Antiquities Authority who showed me the prison and allowed me to photograph it.

²⁸ OV, VI, 11, 26, p. 113.

wood, and water and worked under strict surveillance, sometimes with iron chains forged to their feet.²⁹ According to Ibn Jubayr, Muslim captives were treated in the same way:

Among the misfortunes that one who visits their land will see are the Muslim prisoners walking in shackles and put to painful labour like slaves. In like condition are the Muslim women prisoners, their legs in iron rings. Hearts are rent for them, but compassion avails them nothing.³⁰

Captives also assisted in building castles, for example the castle at Jacob's Ford (Chastellet), which was conquered before its completion. This may be the reason for the large number of captives whom Saladin found and freed when he conquered and demolished the castle in 1179. They were probably captives employed as masons. According to the chronicler Abu Shama the hundred Muslim captives who were freed by Saladin at Chastellet had chains on their legs. The chains were then reused for the Christian captives who were not massacred.³¹

The hagiography of the martyrdom of Saint Thiemo gives us a glimpse into the value of captives as skilled workers. According to the *Vita Altera* the bishop was asked what craft he had mastered, and when he replied that he was a goldsmith his captor was overjoyed.³² In other words, captives were put to work as a source of income and exploited according to their skills; work was not a punishment or means of torture. The case of Thiemo did end in torture and martyrdom, but that was because he did not fulfil his captor's expectations, being an architect of souls and not a real mason. Religious rank did not seem to help captives. The archbishop of Edessa, who was taken captive in 1103, was put in chains and his Turkish captors loaded him down with tools and utensils as if he were a beast of burden.³³ The Templar Gerard de Châtillon "was incessantly carrying stones on his shoulders for building the walls of the sultan".³⁴

²⁹ *Les Chetifs*, lines 459-462, 630-631.

³⁰ Ibn Jubayr, *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr*, trans. R.J.C. Broadhurst (London, 1952) 322.

³¹ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 208 citing a letter from al-Fahdil. Most of the 700 Christian captives were massacred. See *ibid.*, p. 205.

³² *Passio sancti Thiemonis altera*, RHC Occ. V (Paris, 1895) 217-23; Richard, "Les prisonniers et leur rachat", 63-73.

³³ FC, II, 27, 9.

³⁴ Forey, "Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives", 279.

An *exemplum* from a fifteenth-century manuscript tells the story of a Western bishop who was taken captive by the Saracens and was set to work as a shepherd for his captor.³⁵ After many years Frankish delegates looking for captives heard him singing a French song and inquired who he was. When he told them his story they offered to pay for his ransom. The captive refused, saying that he had never known such peace of mind as a bishop, and promised to pray for them. Whereas the *exemplum*'s aim is to emphasize the bishop's saintly behavior, at the same time it also shows him doing manual labor for his captor.

Literary descriptions of forced labor by captives are substantiated by historical sources. Tudebode triumphantly tells us that Muslim captives were used to carry timber for the siege machines during the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 "and thus the Christians disconcerted the enemy with their own men".³⁶ Another example of large-scale use of captives comes from Safed, where two hundred Templars guarded and utilized a thousand Muslim prisoners.³⁷ In peacetime this castle was manned by a garrison of 1,650 of whom 400 were slaves.³⁸ The importance of captives as skilled workers is seen from the Templars' refusal to exchange them in negotiations with Baybars in 1263.³⁹ In 1176-77 Saladin fortified Cairo and Fustat and built the citadel using Frankish prisoners of war.⁴⁰ But due to demographic reasons the Franks were probably more dependent on the slave labor of captives than their Muslim enemies.⁴¹

The Persian poet Sa'di writes that when he was taken prisoner by the Franks ca. 1221 he was put to work digging a ditch (moat?)

³⁵ BL Add. 273336, fol. 70v-71r cited by K. Ciggaar, "Glimpses of Life in Outremer in *Exempla* and *Miracula*", in *East and West in the Crusader States: Context, Contacts, Confrontations*, ed. K. Ciggaar and H. Teule (Leuven, 1999) 150.

³⁶ Tudebode, *Historia*, XI; trans., pp. 116-17: "Fifty or sixty captive Saracens bore the timbers on their shoulders."

³⁷ R.S. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260* (Albany, 1977) 267, cited in B.Z. Kedar, "Some New Sources on Palestinian Muslims before and during the Crusades", in *Die Kreuzfahrerstaaten als multikulturelle Gesellschaft*, ed. H.E. Mayer and E. Müller-Luckner (Munich, 1997) 140.

³⁸ R.B.C. Huyghens, ed., *De constructione castri Saphet* (Amsterdam, 1981) 38.

³⁹ See chap. 4, near n. 101.

⁴⁰ M.C. Lyons and D.E.P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War* (Cambridge, 1982) 113.

⁴¹ Hillenbrand, *Islamic Perspectives*, 552.

together with Jews in Tripoli.⁴² He mentioned the Jewish presence in the work force as a literary means of further emphasizing the demeaning aspects of his situation. Treatment of captives probably did not differ according to religion, unless the prompt reaction of Jewish ransomers led to their higher negotiability and consequently to better treatment.⁴³

Apparently, in a society where skilled labor was in demand, useful captives would be valued accordingly. Thus Usamah tells us about the sergeant who was appraised at an exorbitant price because of his looks and physical strength. Apparently the captor deemed him to be worth more as a worker than his military rank and income would normally command.⁴⁴ As manual labor was deemed demeaning we seldom hear about this aspect of life in captivity, unless it is contrasted with later deliverance.

Close captor-captive relations

Not all captives were necessarily employed as forced labor. Despite the lack of explicit information, we can assume that slaves were used for domestic chores as well, as the cases of captive concubines or even wives may prove.⁴⁵ For the chroniclers these situations had no heroic aura, thus they were overlooked. They find their place in literary works, however. We shall later examine the literary motif of the captor's daughter falling in love with the captive hero and helping him to achieve freedom.⁴⁶ Such stories, legendary as they may have been, seem to point to a more friendly and domestic rela-

⁴² Kedar, "New Sources on Palestinian Muslims", 129-40.

⁴³ It is possible that the presence of an Arabic letter in the Geniza written by a Muslim captive reflects his belief that he had a better chance of redemption by Jews. See C. Cahen, "Une lettre d'un prisonnier musulman des Francs de Syrie", in *Etudes de Civilisation Médiévale (IX-XII siècles): Melanges offerts à Edmond-René Labande* (Poitiers, 1974) 83-87.

⁴⁴ Usamah, *Memoirs*, 104: "Among those assembled in the large tent of Bursuq ibn-Bursuq in order to set for themselves a price for their liberty [after the battle of Kafartab, 1145], I recognized that same man who had set out with his spear against the Turk. He, who was a sergeant [*sarjandi*], stood up and said, 'How much do ye want from me?' They said, 'We demand six hundred dinars.' He pooh-poohed them, saying, 'I am a sergeant. My stipend is two dinars a month. Wherefrom can I get you six hundred dinars?'"

⁴⁵ The subject of sexual harassment in captivity will be dealt with in chapter 7.

⁴⁶ See chapter 9.

tionship between captor and captive. In prolonged captivity conditions may have been better than the ones described above.

Then there is the question of the fate of captive children. Both sides kept children who were converted and raised in captivity, often refusing to allow them to be ransomed or exchanged. Some of the turcoples serving in the crusader army were of Muslim descent;⁴⁷ conversely, the Mamluks were converted slaves, often of Christian ancestry. In 1099, a letter from the Geniza tells us, the Jews of Alexandria ransomed many captives from Jerusalem. The crusaders refused to release a young boy, the son of the Tustari (a famous and probably quite wealthy Karaite family) because they wanted to convert him as he was of priestly descent. Although the sincerity of captive converts was much distrusted, a young child was an easy target. Forced conversion of Jewish children by the crusaders is well attested in Europe too.⁴⁸

In the treaties between the Mamluks and the Franks, converted captives were usually not included in the exchanges, on the assumption that they would remain in their adopted society. Baybars, who could afford to bend the rules, demanded the return of a little girl who had been abducted and converted. When Philip of Monfort refused, Baybars used this as a *casus belli*.⁴⁹ By and large, most converted children grew up in their new surroundings and became part of the captor's society.

Did captivity lead to a better knowledge of the enemy's culture? If so, this was seldom admitted. It may be relevant to point out that many of the interpreters and diplomatic delegates used to negotiate treaties were former captives who had learned Arabic or French in captivity. In a recent article Hussein Attiya claimed that polyglots were more frequent than hitherto thought in Frankish society. But most of his examples are of interpreters.⁵⁰ A society familiar with

⁴⁷ Cf. Y. Harari, "The Military Role of the Frankish Turcoples: A Reassessment", *Mediterranean Historical Review* 12 (1997) 75-116 where he claims that the turcoples were mainly of Frankish descent.

⁴⁸ A. Kleinberg, "Depriving Parents of the Consolation of Children: Two Legal *Consilia* on the Baptism of Jewish Children", in *De Sion Exhibit Lex et Verbum Domini de Hierusalem*, ed. Hen, 129-30.

⁴⁹ Ibn al-Furat, *Ta'rikh*, trans. Lyons and Lyons, *Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders*, 1:133.

⁵⁰ H.M. Attiya, "Knowledge of Arabic in the Crusader States in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries", *Journal of Medieval History* 25 (1999) 203-13.

the enemy's language would not need translators at every meeting. This positive result of captivity was not emphasized as it might raise suspicions as to the degree of captive-captor intimacy.

Hugh Garnier, lord of Caesarea from 1154-1164, may serve as an example. After his capture by the Muslims at the Battle of El-Babein (January 1167), Nur ed-Din's general Shirkuh wanted him to act as his envoy. Hugh, who had formerly been employed as a diplomat by King Amalric, used his 'good sense and discretion' and chose another prisoner, Arnulf of Turbessel, for the dishonorable job of bringing peace offers to the king. According to William of Tyre, he was afraid it might be thought "that he was more interested in obtaining his own liberty than concerned for the public welfare". When the treaty had been accepted Hugh "put the final touches to it and brought the matter to a satisfactory conclusion".⁵¹ He had learned Arabic in captivity, as had Raymond III of Tripoli and Reynald of Châtillon who allegedly held a conversation with Saladin before he was executed. If this conversation was held in Arabic, it is instructive to note that Reynald's knowledge was not stressed, just as we know nothing about the linguistic proficiency of other high-ranking captives such as Baldwin II (16 months in captivity) and Bohemond. Is it plausible that they spent such long periods in enemy hands without learning their language? It may be that former captives were reluctant to exhibit their proficiency with the enemy culture so as not to arouse their comrades' suspicion. We know of at least two cases in which a translator was regarded with mistrust by his comrades – Louis IX's mediator and Reynald of Sidon. Such language skills seem not to be a source of pride, although translators were surely very much in demand. Evidently, it was *bon ton* not to know Arabic. If that was indeed the case, it seems that the reason lay in the circumstances under which the language was acquired.

Torturing captives: A societal message

A captive is by definition defenseless. From the moment he gives his right hand to the captor as a sign of surrender he is defeated. Now

⁵¹ WT, XIX, 30. For Hugh's background and connections in the Latin Kingdom, see C.K. Slack, "Royal Familiares in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1187", *Viator* 22 (1991) 35-36.

totally in his enemy's power, from the military point of view, violence towards him is uncalled for. Force is no longer necessary and, from the point of view of modern international law, even cruel. Inflicting pain on a defenseless enemy seems to serve no logical purpose.⁵² However, during the Crusader-Muslim wars in the Holy Land torture is often documented, to the point that it merits attention.

Medieval chroniclers recount various episodes in which captives were tortured. From their descriptions, we can elicit what was in their eyes cruelty and what was acceptable, normative behavior. Since the appearance of Elaine Scarry's seminal book, *Pain in the Body*, torture and violence have been analyzed structurally as a language used to communicate between captor and captive.⁵³ It seems, however, that medieval violence differed in some respects. Scarry assumes that captives were tortured in clandestine circumstances, whereas most medieval torture was a public phenomenon.

In general, we can divide the purposes served by torture into a public function, which mainly served propaganda aims, and a practical function, such as to gain useful information about enemy defenses, less frequently attested. One important function torture served was to aggrandize the victory. Captives were paraded publicly in chains, or might be tied to a stake as a target for children's arrows,⁵⁴ as means of providing a public spectacle for the triumphant society. Chaining the humiliated vanquished together and dragging them through the streets of the city was, despite its cruelty, not really aimed at the captive. Rather, the target was the spectators, the members of the victor's society. The captives became a living triumphal arch testifying to the victor's greatness. The worse their humiliation, the greater the victory of the triumphant ruler.

This kind of torture belongs to the realm of public spectacle.⁵⁵ It was more widespread on the Muslim side, perhaps an eastern

⁵² See P. DuBois, *Torture and Truth* (New York, 1991) for an examination of the link between torture and information-gathering in the Greek period. See also E. Peters, *Torture* (New York, 1985).

⁵³ E. Scarry, *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World* (Oxford, 1985).

⁵⁴ This was apparently a well-known sport. For the fate of Gervaise of Bazoches who was killed that way see below. In *Les Chétifs*, lines 352-356, children's random shooting at captives is mentioned as a typical means of vengeance.

⁵⁵ M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* (New York, 1979) 7-10.

remnant of Roman imperial spectacles as the same phenomenon is attested in Constantinople. It was graphic and gruesome and meant to be so. I agree with Scarry that inflicting pain was a way to translate the prisoner's objectified attributes of pain into the insignia of power,⁵⁶ but in our period it was not confined to a closed room, but purposely made public.

Public torture symbolically penalized the enemy as a whole. It symbolized the victory over the demonic enemy and contrasted his impotence with the mighty victor's ability to inflict suffering and pain upon an individual captive's body. At the same time the public spectacle of torture served as entertainment for the masses. A similar phenomenon is attested in the context of medieval penal torture or executions.⁵⁷ The spectators enjoyed this spectacle because they could identify with the human pain and take sadistic pleasure in the horrific sights. Michel Foucault aptly summed up this function of spectacle in his study *Discipline and Punish*:

Torture forms part of a ritual. It is an element in the liturgy of punishment and meets two demands. It must mark the victim; it is intended, either by the scar it leaves on the body, or by the spectacle that accompanies it, to brand the victim with infamy...public torture and execution must be spectacular, it must be seen by all almost as its triumph. The very excess of the violence employed is one of the elements of its glory: the fact that the guilty man should moan and cry out under the blows is not a shameful side-effect, it is the very ceremonial of justice being expressed in all its force.⁵⁸

Torture has additional aspects – one of which was to terrorize the enemy via vicious treatment of captives. It may seem difficult to find an explanation for tearing babies apart or roasting them over fire, yet according to Matthew of Edessa and Anna Comnena both the crusaders and the sadistic emir Il-Ghazi enacted this deed.⁵⁹

Many had their eyes taken out, their hands severed, their noses cut, their testicles sliced off, or died tied to a cross; even children were treated harshly out of hatred for their parents. These innumerable

⁵⁶ Scarry, *Body in Pain*, 58-59.

⁵⁷ J. Huizinga, *The Waning of the Middle Ages* (London, 1927) 3-4, 15-16.

⁵⁸ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 34.

⁵⁹ Matthew of Edessa (*The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa*, ed. A.E. Dostourian [Lanham, 1993] 82, p. 226) reports: "He [Il-Ghazi] inexorably massacred everyone and even had a tremendous number of children roasted over fire" (describing the fate of the captives from Tell-Bashir in 1120-21).

and unspeakable tortures had only one aim and purpose – to seize the treasures (the Armenians possessed)... . We would like to write (further) about their many malicious deeds, but dare not, since we are under their authority (and power).⁶⁰

In the Armenian Matthew's eyes, torturing Armenian captives was of course worse than Il-Ghazi's torture of the crusaders, and he uses stronger language accordingly. But he also seems to have expected his coreligionists to behave in a more Christian fashion, and therefore saw their actions as perfidious. In both cases terror was used to impose one's will on the enemy and weaken the resistance of occupied populations via fear.

According to Matthew, in this case greed too motivated torture: the horrendous atrocities the crusaders committed would not only terrorize the vanquished Armenians but would also make them more willing to part with their riches in order to save their lives. Although an accepted part of conquest, torture was apparently nothing to be proud of and had better not be mentioned too loudly in chronicling events. Matthew's fear of dwelling on the crusaders' misdeeds is also attributable to his being subject to their authority. Although it might be efficient propaganda, evidently the crusaders did not want their use of terror to be preserved for posterity.

Torture as a means of frightening the enemy into submission was cited by Guibert of Nogent as the rationale behind the deeds of the Damascenes in 1101. They tied Gervaise of Bazoches to a tree, shot arrows at him and sawed the crown off his head and made the rest into a goblet for their emir. The aim was to 'frighten our men'.⁶¹ We know from other sources that in this case the torture was also a reaction to earlier failed negotiations for ransom. When approached with the offer of Gervaise's life in exchange for some important

⁶⁰ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, 74, p. 221. Cf. Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena*, trans. E.R.A. Sewter (Harmondsworth, 1969), X, 311: "Some Normans...acting with horrible cruelty to the whole population, they cut in pieces some of the babies, impaled others on wooden spits and roasted them over fire."

⁶¹ "This praiseworthy man was immediately seized, tied as they say, to a tree that stood in the middle of a field, and was torn by a hail of arrows from all sides. The crown was then sawed from his head, and the rest was made into the form of a cup, as though to hold drinks for the King of Damascus, by whose orders these acts had been done *to frighten our men*. By dying to preserve the confession of his faith, this knight made himself a martyr who would be known for ages to come." Guibert de Nogent, *Dei Gesta per Francos*, VII, 46, 2142-2160; trans., p. 165.

cities the Crusaders had conquered, King Baldwin I flatly refused.⁶² The Muslims may have felt that the prisoner had to be killed in a spectacular, horrendous way to show the people of Damascus that this was not a diplomatic failure, but a military victory, and perhaps also to terrify the Latins and make them easier to negotiate with.

The same spectacular fate as that of Gervaise – being killed as a martyr and then having his skull made into a drinking vessel to be used by the drunken victor – is related in detail about another Christian noble captive, Robert fitzFulk the Leper, who was killed by Il-Ghazi in 1119 after refusing to apostasize.⁶³ It seems that the martyrdom of important Christian captives is linked to the topos of the ‘unholy grail’ made of their skulls to show off the Muslim rulers’ victory. The same mode of execution and torture may of course have been used twice in twenty years in the vicinity of Damascus, or may even have been a special way to treat important captives. But it seems more likely that this horror story of northern Muslim princes’ barbarity resounded in different Christian chronicles, becoming a literary metaphor for cruelty and martyrdom.

Walter the Chancellor, himself a captive, spares no details in writing about the fate of his fellow captives in 1119:

Some of them were hanged by ropes from a post, with their heads turned downwards, their feet upwards, and exposed to constant blows of arrows as the stuff of dreadful slaughter. Some were buried up to the groin, some up to the navel and some up to the chin in a pit in the ground, as the hands of the wicked ones brandished spears, and they underwent for Christ the end of a life full of sorrow. Several of them, indeed, were thrown with every single limb cut off into the squares and districts, as a spectacle of wonderful justice for the passers-by, and the more the infidels’ drunkenness raged, the more the perversity of their tortures increased.⁶⁴


Walter the Chancellor’s preoccupation with the details of torture, dedicating some ten percent of his book on the Antiochene War to this topic, is very unusual for crusader chronicles. As noted, Walter

⁶² AA, X, 56, 57.

⁶³ Walter the Chancellor, *Bella Antiochena*, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Innsbruck, 1896) II, 14.

⁶⁴ Walter the Chancellor, *Bella Antiochena*, II, 15. Citation from *Walter the Chancellor’s The Antiochene Wars*, trans. and annotated by T. Asbridge and S. Edgington (Aldershot, 1999) 163-64.

10. qui tande. su. dieru accepit
 bello campo ista dies memorat



Maltreatment of prisoners (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 44v).

himself participated in the events he reported and was among the captives. Being an eyewitness and one of the terrorized victims himself, the need to recount the horrors of fright and uncertainty is understandable. He is unique in telling the story from the captive's side, but the methods he describes are not:

At length the others besides these, soldiers of both battles, as many nobles as others, bound painfully tightly, were brought before the infidel in his exuberance from horrific drinking, onto the pavement where they were mocked by the bystanders and afflicted by insults and fears, and driven by many cuffs and goads of affliction, disfigured by the plucking of the beards and hair, embarrassed by their shameful nakedness, their teeth chattered, their bowels trembled and they gaped heavenwards; in place of heaven, on earth nothing was more certain for them than the threatening blows of the swords, and they were tormented in mind and body.⁶⁵

Not until Joinville's frank admission of his feelings of humiliation and fright when captured together with King Louis IX in Egypt in 1250 is the desperate situation of the captive described so graphically. The physical reaction of fear is also emphasized by Imad ad-Din in describing the trembling king Guy de Lusignan after Hattin, who was frightened by the execution of the Master of the Templars in his presence.⁶⁶ In the latter case, the helplessness of a vanquished king was even more humiliating than the other captives' fright.

Unfortunately, very few of the details described by Walter are unmatched in other cases. What is special here is the discourse, the way this chronicler finds the torturing of captives a subject worthy of writing about in detail. Thus Walter described Il-Ghazi giving the qadi of Damascus a sword, inviting him to kill captives with his own hands. The same scene is depicted by Beha ed-Din in 1187 when Saladin, who had a reputation for being merciful to captives, urged his clergy to do the same. However, when Saladin's young

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Imad ad-Din, *Kitâb*, in Gabrieli, *Arab Historians*, 134. Cf. Beha ed-Din, *Life of Saladin*, 40-41: "I was present one day when a Frank prisoner was brought before him. The man was in such a state of excitement that his terror was visible in every feature. The interpreter asked him the cause of his fear, and God put the following answer in the mouth of the unfortunate fellow: 'Before I saw his face I was greatly afraid, but now that I am in the presence (of the prince) and can see him, I am certain that he will do me no harm.' The Sultan, moved by these words, gave him his life and sent him away free."

children wanted to participate in the orgy of killing they were not allowed to do so in order not to spoil their character.

The Sultan's younger son asked his permission to kill these prisoners, which he forbade them to do. As they had made their request through me, I begged him to tell me the reason for his refusal, and he replied: "They shall not become accustomed in their youth to the shedding of blood and laugh at it, for they as yet know no difference between a Muslem and an infidel."⁶⁷

Beha ed-Din admired this restraint as a sign of remarkable piety and educational sensitivity.⁶⁸ Apparently allowing unskilled civilians to dispatch a helpless captive was not an unusual means of torture for entertainment. We find the same behavior on the opposing side: during the Third Crusade the crusaders let women kill the captives, and they, although unaccomplished with the sword, completed their task.⁶⁹ In this case, too, humiliation of the enemy was probably the aim, as nothing was gained by having an enemy killed by an unskilled executioner, except to prolong his suffering and probably to entertain the spectators.

Another sort of functional violence involved disabling the captive and sending him back to his former camp, useless. This would then reduce the enemy's efficiency. The most usual way was to blind the captive. The deed was not aimed at the victim himself, although of course he was the primary sufferer. The aim was to convey a message to the enemy. Thus Richard the Lionheart captured fifteen French knights in 1198, and to avenge some act of cruelty, ordered fourteen of them to have both eyes put out, the last being allowed to retain one eye, so that he could guide them all back to the French army. Philip Augustus then retaliated by blinding fifteen of his English prisoners.⁷⁰ In February 1183, some of the Franks sent by Reynald of Châtillon to attack along the coast of Hidjaz were captured. Saladin ordered that "there should not remain among them either an eye capable of seeing nor a single man capable of indicating or even knowing the route from this sea."⁷¹

⁶⁷ Beha ed-Din, *Life of Saladin*, chap. 95, p. 239.

⁶⁸ "Observe the prince's humanity, his wisdom and moderation!" Ibid.

⁶⁹ *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, XXXIV; trans., p. 89.

⁷⁰ Roger of Hoveden, cited by P. Reid, *Prisoner of War* (London, 1984) 23.

⁷¹ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 232.

Usamah ibn Munqidh described similar treatment meted out to a Muslim noble named Hasanun:

They [the Franks] took him prisoner and inflicted on him all varieties of torture. They even wanted to put out his left eye. But Tancred (may Allah's curse be upon him) said to them: "Rather put out his right eye, so when he carries his shield his left eye will be covered, and he will be no more able to see anything."⁷²

The cold impersonal tone used here stands in contrast to the fact that in this case the captor knew the captive personally from a former encounter and had bestowed on him a robe of honor.⁷³ In the same way former friendship did not save Robert the Leper from the violence of his captor Il-Ghazi. Paradoxically, this kind of torture was not personal, it was part of the conduct of war, and former relationships had no bearing on its outcome. In Scarry's words one could say that the aim was to deconstruct the warrior.

It remains to discuss the less well attested practical function served by torture. Violence against captives in order to obtain information was normal procedure in warfare. Captives were tortured to tell the truth, whether they knew it or not. This functional sort of violence, although undoubtedly very widespread, is less dwelled upon by the chroniclers. Occasionally it receives laconic mention on the sidelines of the main story.⁷⁴ Apparently considered necessary, this type of violence was seen as an unimportant technical detail. Only when torture used for other aims also delivered intelligence did the chroniclers deem it worthy of mention. For example, there is the case of a woman the crusaders tortured in Tripoli in order to make her reveal where her money was hidden. She imparted important military information instead.⁷⁵ In other words, by contemporary standards, torture to obtain information was not considered cruel.

⁷² Usamah, *Memoirs*, 95. Hasanun was ransomed for 1,000 dinars and a black horse.

⁷³ Usamah (*ibid.*) claims that he had also promised him safety if he would become his captive, but admits that Hasanun may have misunderstood him as "these people speak nothing but Frankish".

⁷⁴ AA, VI, 14; Tudebode, *Historia*, XII, trans., p.121: "The Christians pursued and seized many captives who *reluctantly* related complete news on battle plans, location of the enemy, size of their forces, and where they planned to fight."

⁷⁵ AA, XI, 14.

et meritis aut potius q[uod] pro vulgo reputat: in
 esca[m] q[ua]m pro diuicio dabant. n[on] formosis uesciebant.
 sed eas clamantes et euilantes in multitudie cohitum
 suffocabant. Quos q[ui] usq[ue] ad exanimat[i]o[n]em oppri-
 mebant. et eand[em] abscessis eaz[um] parit[er] q[uam] magistra-
 tib[us] pro deliciis resubabant: ipsi uirgineis corpori-
 bus laucius epulabantur. Hidentib[us] uicium ip[s]o[rum]
 speculatorib[us] etiam promontoriu[m] summat: duae



Hephandi tartari ut tartari
 humanis carnibus uescunt.

et mutius deceptio[n]ib[us] et senectus: tunc co[n]sue[n]t.
 Principia sua[m] t[er]ru[m]: Nos uocant. et tunc colit
 teporib[us] solēpnitates eoz[um]. Aulcas q[ua]dā p[er]iclas.
 si tūc iuu. quales. Et ip[s]e se soles: omnia credūt e[ss]e
 creata. In excedendo senectam q[uod] rebelles nulli esse
 credunt p[er]m. Habūt a[n]t p[er]ectora dura et robora.
 facies macras. et pallidas. Scapulas rigidas et et cas.
 Hasos distortos et breues. A[n]t p[er]emne uita et a



Qui tartarorum qui sunt pa-
 uissimum cum desit ueritas
 pabula frondib[us] et foliis inuon-
 et corticib[us] arbor[um] sunt gremi.

What then did the crusaders consider cruel? In his forthcoming book, *Perceptions of Cruelty in Medieval Europe*, Daniel Baraz views the Mongols' use of torture on captives as the ultimate example of cruelty in Western literature, backed by Eastern and Muslim chroniclers. Chroniclers like Matthew Paris were thoroughly shocked and frightened by the Mongols' systematic use of violence against captives. Matthew Paris even added pictorial illustration to his literary descriptions of Mongol atrocities.⁷⁶

There is, however, very little new in this illustration: one sees someone roasting people (children?) over a fire, and another clearly eating human legs which hints at cannibalism, someone shooting arrows at a human target, and a naked woman tied to a tree – obviously some form of sexual harassment.⁷⁷ Despite Matthew's righteous disgust at Mongol conduct, his illustration can serve as an apt depiction of the behavior of almost any medieval army in the Latin East. His horror was caused by the number of atrocities and their systematic implementation. The fact that the Mongols came as a new and fierce conqueror into a territory where frontier warfare had been going on for almost a century, a type of warfare by then supposedly governed by established rules of war, further exacerbated his repugnance. Even if the rules were not always kept, there were incipient restraints on excessive cruelty in the Latin East in the second half of the thirteenth century. This equilibrium was upset by the invasions of the Mongols who were seen as the ultimate 'other'. In this case however, the 'other' was the one who inflicted torture and suffering, and the inability to stand against him made him seem the ultimate example of senseless cruelty.

Thus, we have seen that the captive's lot was not an easy one. Many, if not most, captives died in captivity, either because of the initial hardships involved or because of the harsh conditions of life in captivity. Noble captives sometimes benefited from preferential treatment because of their potential value to the captor; on the other hand, they sometimes spent long periods in captivity as a result. Captives also found themselves used as a pool for forced labor. Perhaps the greatest danger for a captive lay in the use of torture –

⁷⁶ Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 166r.

⁷⁷ For sexual harassment in captivity, see chapter 7.

both as a propaganda tool to aggrandize the victory and to frighten the adversary. There do seem to have been cases of better treatment afforded to captives, especially in the case of women and children who were expected to give up their former identity and start a new life. By and large the chronicles do not find it necessary to describe the cases where a good relationship between captor and captive pertained; we can only guess at their existence. In the main, the outlook for a captive was a gloomy one. The ways in which the captive might attempt to bring his captivity to an end are the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

THE WAY OUT OF CAPTIVITY

Naturally, the captive's first thought was how to end his captivity. In his monumental book on captivity and ransom Giulio Cipollone enumerates four different means by which a Christian captive could attain freedom from captivity: (1) apostasy to Islam which gave immediate liberty, but was in effect a loss of identity; (2) flight, which although dangerous, was sometimes worth the risk of death or punishment instead of resigning oneself to the life of a captive; (3) liberation by force, which involved a third party; and (4) ransom or exchange of captives as part of a peace treaty.¹ These options can be divided into two categories: those in the captive's control – flight and apostasy, and those in the hands of external forces – rescue and ransom. Before moving on to its central topic, ransom, this chapter first treats the other options. Unlike Cipollone, I begin with flight and rescue, which I see as related in their active nature. Apostasy and ransom speak more of the captive's despair. Each option will be considered from the individual captive's point of view as well as that of his original society, as a means of elucidating the different outlooks in the combatant societies.

Flight and rescue

Flight was a tempting but very dangerous way to end captivity.² In fact, outside help was usually required for a captive to contemplate and implement such a plan. Therefore flight was very often combined with military rescue expeditions, and Cipollone's options two and three were often conjoined. We have already seen that in the early period of the Crusades the active solution to the captive's quandary, whether individual or societal, was seen as the only per-

¹ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 223.

² In Spain the price of a failed escape was usually the loss of a nose or an eye. See J.W. Brodman, *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain* (Philadelphia, 1986) 6.

missible one. If a captive could flee, that was ideal, or else there was great willingness to try to free him by force. Apostasy or ransom were then not considered viable solutions, and if the other two options were unfeasible the captive had no choice but to wait for death.

Both crusader and Muslim societies shared admiration of heroic acts. Latin and Arabic sources reveal a love of stories of heroic fugitives. The chroniclers on both sides portrayed flight as the captive's victory over his captor, a contest of wits where the weaker character triumphed. These stories had a strong element of suspense and were therefore the ideal material for a narrative. A miraculous story was even better.

The chronicler Fulcher of Chartres describes the escape of the archbishop of Edessa in a hero-worshipping tone, introducing a strong element of divine assistance:

Moreover God aided the archbishop of Edessa, who was then in chains.... With the help of a very valiant knight who devotedly risked his life, and by the will of God, the archbishop was snatched from the hands of the Turks by an act of wondrous daring. For the knight did not hold his life more precious than self [i.e., the knight did not hold mortal life more precious than his soul].³

Similarly, despite its outcome for his fellow prisoners, the story of Joscelyn of Courtenay's escape from captivity is afforded favorable treatment by three chroniclers. William of Tyre relishes the story of Joscelyn's escape from the prison of Kharput in 1122, and Fulcher says that although the narrative is long it is blessed with divine intervention and adorned with miracles, in other words an edifying tale worth repeating.⁴ Although all the other prisoners, except King Baldwin and his nephew Waleran, paid with their lives for Joscelyn's flight, it is described as an heroic event by both chroniclers. Fifty Armenian friends (or vassals) of Joscelyn entered the fortress disguised as monks and merchants. Once inside the fortress they produced arms from beneath their garments and overpowered the garrison.⁵

³ FC, II, 27, 9; trans., p. 179.

⁴ WT XII, 17; FC, II, 24, 1-13.

⁵ ...*Quinquaginta enim ex eis, qui robustiores videbantur, fide interposita et mutuis obligati iuramentis apud se constituunt ut, illuc euntes, predictos viros magnificos quocumque periculo liberare contendant. Habitu ergo se simulant monachos, sicas sub laxis vestibis portantes, ad*

Joscelyn escaped and while fleeing was helped by a local peasant and underwent many bold adventures.⁶ The Armenians, who were hanged, flayed, sawn asunder, and subjected to other inventive tortures, were praised by the chronicler as heroes who would surely get their reward in heaven.⁷ Not a word criticizing Joscelyn's jeopardization of his men and fellow-prisoners was uttered. Even Matthew of Edessa, who described how the captor Balik slaughtered all the prisoners, about sixty-five men plus eighty beautiful women, by hurling them down from the summit of the fortress, does not criticize Joscelyn's decision to flee.⁸

The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle relates a different aspect of Joscelyn's release, providing a much more sympathetic portrayal based on the fact that no financial loss was incurred because of the hostages' escape:

A ransom of 12,000 was fixed for Joscelyn and twelve respected men of his friends were given as hostages. He was set free to collect his ransom and work for Baldwin, but while he was doing this, the twelve hostages broke through the wall where they were imprisoned and fled. Thus Joscelyn and his friends were freed without any expense.⁹

It seems that this sigh of relief at not having had to pay any expenses played an important role in making the fugitive captive a hero.

These heroes often made votive offerings upon achieving their freedom, emphasizing the semimiraculous nature of their release. When Joscelyn returned from his captivity he "made an offering of the two fetters he had carried with him, hanging them reverently in memory of his captivity and the glory of his liberation. One was of iron, the other of silver."¹⁰ Bohemond too, even though ransomed from captiv-

predictum tendunt opidum de negociis monasteriorum acturi aliquid, simulant verbo et gemitu et faciei modificatione se a quibusdam vim iniuriamque passos....(alii dicunt eos quasi mercatores, vilium mercium portitores, opidum ingressos). Admittuntur tandem, et municipium ingressi exerunt gladios et occurrentes sibi perimunt universos (WT, XII, 18, 8-21).

⁶ FC, III, 23-25.

⁷ *Predictos autem Armenios, viros strenuos et fideles, qui ut regem et dominum suum a vinculis solverent tantis se exposuerant periculis, variis affecit cruciatibus: alios enim vivos decorari fecit, alios serra dividi per medium, alios viventes sepeliri, alios pueris suis quasi signum ad sagittandum tradi. Qui etsi coram illis tormenta passi sunt, spes tamen illorum immortalitate plena est et in paucis temptati in multis bene disponentur (WT, XII, 19, 35-41).*

⁸ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, III, 90, p. 230.

⁹ *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, ed. Tritton, 80-81.

¹⁰ FC, III, 24, 14.

ity, made a pilgrimage to Saint Leonard of Noblac and offered his thanks for the supposedly glorious end to his captivity. This type of thanksgiving fitted feats of chivalry and heroic flights, but not shameful ransom.

The Muslims, for their part, thought along parallel lines. Usamah ibn Munqidh tells two detailed stories about successful fugitives. One was about a captive from Beit Guvrin, the son of the governor of Sinai, who was helped to freedom by a Bedouin who dug a tunnel for his escape, and the other tells of captives who fled with the aid of local Muslims after Usamah had tried to ransom them. In these anecdotes, as in the Christian chronicles, the fugitives outwitted their captors and were helped by the loyalty and daring of their friends. In Usamah's anecdotes, the captives' flight was only the second option, employed after negotiations for their ransom had failed. In the same hero-worshipping tone Usamah describes the flight of the vizier al-Afdal Ridwan al-Walakhshi who escaped from the prison near the palace in Cairo by digging a hole fourteen cubits long with an iron nail.¹¹ All fugitives were undoubtedly seen as successful heroes.¹²

Interestingly, Jewish society frowned upon flight as an option for the captive, primarily because of its potential to worsen conditions for fellow, and even subsequent generations of, captives. The Talmud states: "Captives should not be helped to escape, as a precaution for the general good. Rabban Shimon b. Gamliel says: as a precaution for the good of the captives."¹³ So, even if a prisoner ran away, he was not automatically seen as a hero, but as someone who may have jeopardized others' chances for life. The aim was to save as many lives as possible, and foolhardy heroism was frowned upon in Jewish society.

The difference in outlook between Jews on the one hand and the Christians and Muslims on the other may be attributed to the fact that Jewish society, unlike the others, was not a fighting society. Moreover, different types of sources have been preserved for each. The fighting societies, crusader and Muslim, wrote chronicles, in

¹¹ Usamah, *Memoirs*, 58.

¹² *Ibid.*, 109-12.

¹³ Mishnah *Gittin* 4:6; cf. Babylonian Talmud, *Gittin* 45a which relates that R. 'Ilsh did not want to escape until he was sure that his fellow prisoners did not want to return home and he would not jeopardize their chances for freedom.

which adventure played a major role. The more hair-raising the stories, the better. The Jewish sources are either legal or personal – letters, for example. We know about Jewish captives who escaped successfully, as in the sad case of a girl from Frankfurt whose fiancé refused to marry her after she escaped in 1241. His refusal to marry her was based on suspicions raised about her sexual behavior during captivity.¹⁴ For Jews, flight was not seen as a realistic way to solve captivity, and as they usually had no military backing, probably rightly so. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the possibility of obtaining freedom by force or by treaty did not exist for Jews. As they had no sovereign or military body, they almost never had the option of exchanging captives as part of a treaty, or of freeing prisoners by force. Christian or Muslim captives, on the other hand, could hope for assistance from their mother societies who might either help them to flee or use external force to free them.

Liberation by force

Military expeditions in order to free captives were seen as an exemplar of a just war. The outstanding example is the failed expedition of 1101, in which a large army attempted to free Bohemond from Danishmend's captivity. Thousands of men plunged into foreign territory with little advance planning and were butchered by the Turks. This crusade is commonly viewed as a waste of human resources that might have changed the fate of the Latin Kingdom had its members settled in the Holy Land instead,¹⁵ especially as Bohemond was later ransomed. In retrospect, the effort to free him by force seems unnecessary if not wasteful, although at the time it may have appeared to be the only solution. We have seen that, at a later date, in the thirteenth century, when ransom had become a more established solution, the Frankish army thought twice before embarking on a military expedition to liberate captives and took the possibility that such action might cause the captives more harm

¹⁴ G.I. Blidstein, "The Personal Status of Apostate and Ransomed Women in Medieval Jewish Law" (Hebrew), *Shenaton Ha-Mishpat Ha-Ivri, Annual of the Institute for Research in Jewish Law* 3-4 (1976-77) 75-93.

¹⁵ J. Prawer, *Histoire du Royaume Latin de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1969) 281-82.

than good into account.¹⁶ However, we must note that captives were often liberated as a result of conquest of a city or of a successful battle. Although commanders might use the slogan of liberating captives to exhort their soldiers to fight, it was usually a byproduct of victory and not the main strategic goal.

On the other hand, a besieged enemy might use the captives they held as a means of putting pressure on their opponent. That is what Balian d'Ibelin did in 1187 when he negotiated with Saladin for terms of surrender in Jerusalem and threatened to kill Muslim prisoners held in the city. In this case we may again cite a change in attitude: whereas during the first generations the Franks believed in using force, later captives were used as a diplomatic ploy in the encounters between the enemies. Nonetheless, in the cases both of force and of diplomacy, it was society that took the initiative. In this context, the decisions were totally out of the individual captive's hands and he had no say in their determination. He was a pawn between the adversaries, and even an important captive could not determine the moves. This differed radically from the case of the convert, who must be regarded as making an individual decision, perhaps motivated by despair at ever achieving freedom by flight, rescue, or ransom.

Conversion

The feeling of helplessness, of total dependence on forces out of his control might lead a captive to resort to desperate measures in order to save his life or to better his situation, namely conversion.¹⁷ But was conversion really a way out of captivity?

Both Christianity and Islam ruled that a converted captive had to be set free, so at least in theory a renegade was supposed to leave captivity immediately as a free man. In reality, however, this did not always happen. In the thirteenth century, Jacques de Vitry, the bishop of Acre, attributed motives of greed to the Frankish masters'

¹⁶ *Rothelin*, chap. 29, p. 51.

¹⁷ A letter found in the Geniza (T-S 10 J 5, fol. 6, l. 35) dated summer 1100 mentions some captives who converted to Christianity as they despaired of being ransomed by their brethren.

failure to grant their Saracen slaves baptism.¹⁸ We do indeed find Franks hesitating to allow their slaves to convert. In the chapter of the Hospitallers held in 1262 they passed a resolution that no bailli of the order might convert a slave without explicit permission from the Master of the Order,¹⁹ which may indicate that more Muslim slaves asked for baptism than the crusaders were willing to free. Undoubtedly the economic loss incurred by freeing a converted slave was an important factor in this resolution, but suspicion as to the convert's sincerity certainly played an important role. In the final event, the Franks were forced to compromise, as seen from the assises. The need to test a convert's sincerity may explain their stipulation that a Muslim slave who fled to another place in the kingdom and asked to be converted should be returned to his former master. On the other hand, a Muslim fugitive who escaped to the realm of Islam and then returned of his free will and asked for baptism was to be received and liberated.²⁰ Such cases must have been rare, as in Muslim law conversion to another religion was punishable by death.²¹ Crossing religious lines was considered synonymous with the crime of high treason.²² The choice between loss of life and loss of religious identity was not an easy one.

¹⁸ Jacques de Vitry, *Lettres de Jacques de Vitry (1160/1170-1240), évêque de Saint-Jean d'Acre*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Leiden, 1960) 87-88.

¹⁹ Resolution #49: *Statutum est quod baylivus nec quisquam frater alius nullum sclavum baptizari faciat sine magistri licencia speciali* (Delaville, *Cartulaire*, 3:43-54, no. 3039: Statuts promulgués par le chapitre général de l'ordre sous le magistère d'Hugues Revel). The French version of the *statuts* does not include this sentence, just the title *Dou bapties des esclaves*.

²⁰ *Assises de Jérusalem*, ed. M. Beugnot, RHC Lois I (Paris, 1841); *Assises de la Haute Cour*, "Livre de Jean d'Ibelin", chap. 255, p. 191; B.Z. Kedar, *Crusade and Mission* (Princeton, 1984) 78.

²¹ E. Peters and G.J.J. de Vries, "Apostasy in Islam", *Die Welt des Islam* 17 (1976-77) 1-25. Apostasy is *riddah* 'turning away', the *murtadd*. The punishment is death. Women are 'kept in hostage instead' and should be beaten every three days.

²² A.A. An-Na'im, "The Islamic Law of Apostasy and Its Modern Applicability: A Case from the Sudan", *Religion* 16 (1986) 197-224. The Qur'an (4:90, 5:59, 16:108) condemns apostasy in unequivocal terms, but the punishment is based on the Sunna: "Whosoever changes his religion, kill him." Traditional Islamic schools of jurisprudence are unanimous in holding that apostasy is punishable by death, although they differ on such questions as to whether to execute the sentence immediately or grant the apostate a few days' reprieve in order to allow him time to reconsider his position. There is also disagreement on whether a female apostate is to be killed or merely imprisoned until she returns to the faith. This is because she does not pose a threat to the Islamic state and is considered submissive to her husband and therefore not fully responsible.

We must bear in mind that in the conflict between Christianity and Islam in the Holy Land, between Crusade and Jihad, conversion of the enemy was not seen as the main objective. Both sides viewed conversion to their flock as a triumph and apostasy as a defeat, but the main victories and defeats took place on the battlefield. Religious victories were a byproduct, and many thought wars and force the most efficient way to achieve conversion.²³ Despite religious propaganda on both sides, conversion of the enemy was seldom the fighter's primary goal. The crusading knight or Mamluk warrior had more to gain if the enemy persisted in his loyalty to his former religion. Therefore they often offered the enemy conversion in a less than inviting way. Muslim law forced the warrior to propose conversion to Islam before killing a captive. This was done, but often en masse and in a perfunctory manner that made the proposal a mere prelude to execution.²⁴ The captive, in that situation, was expected to refuse and nobody had much respect for those who succumbed and converted under duress.

Conversion was seen as treason. For example, Saladin had the converted Muslim captives he found at Jacob's Ford (Chastellet) executed together with the turcoples who had actively helped the enemy.²⁵ Louis IX, himself a captive in Egypt, refused to speak to a man who brought him food in captivity, once he learned that he was a renegade to Islam. As Joinville, Louis' biographer, told his captor at Mansurah when informed by him that his men had renounced their faith: "just as lightly as they had left our side they would leave his, if but given time or opportunity". The Muslim admiral seconded this negative concept of conversion and cited an aphorism in Saladin's name: "One never saw a bad Christian become a good Saracen, nor a bad Saracen become a good Christian."²⁶ According to Joinville, the renegade whom Louis rebuffed knew in his heart

²³ Kedar, *Crusade and Mission*, 57-74 and passim; idem, "Multidirectional Conversion in the Frankish Levant", in *Varieties of Religious Conversion in the Middle Ages*, ed. J. Muldoon (Gainesville, 1997) 190-99.

²⁴ See, for example, the execution of captives in Egypt 1250, where Joinville describes the division of the captives into two groups, those who were killed and those who decided on apostasy (*Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, 66).

²⁵ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 205. See also M. Barber, "Frontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem", in *The Crusades and Their Sources: Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*, ed. J. France and W.G. Zajac (Aldershot, 1998) 9-22.

²⁶ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, 9; Shaw trans., p. 246.

that no law was so good as the Christian, “but an I come over to your side, I fear the poverty in which I shall be, and the reproach. Every day they will say to me ‘Behold the renegade!’”²⁷ (*Véez ci le renoié*).

Thus both sides shared a mistrust of converts. In 1108 during an alliance between Baldwin of Edessa and Jawali of Mosul, a renegade from Islam served as governor of Saruj. Jawali’s men beat him up because he spoke against his former religion – and Baldwin the Christian had him executed, saying: “This man is of no use either to you or to us.”²⁸ Even though the governor had converted to Christianity Baldwin had nothing but contempt for him. From a Muslim source, however, we learn that Baldwin’s army included many converts from Islam – two thousand cavalry and two thousand infantry.²⁹ If this was indeed the case, these forces were probably the result of mass conversion. Although the above-cited story of the governor appears to indicate Baldwin’s mistrust of conversion, this apparently did not extend to the captives he probably forced to convert in order to benefit from their services as mercenaries.

Notwithstanding this basic mistrust of the convert’s sincerity, both sides viewed conversion of captives to the enemy’s faith as a loss of prestige, and tried to effect their return. Thus Abu Shama writes that when the crusaders laid siege to Damascus in 1136 they promised the Damascenes that if they let the apostate Christians from the city return to the crusader camp they would leave the city in peace. The leaders of Damascus acquiesced and the Franks succeeded in persuading some of the converts to Islam to return to the Christian faith. This shamed the Muslims greatly.³⁰

Abu-Shama also describes the Muslim reaction to the reputed temporary conversion of Mughir a-Din, the ruler of Damascus who lost the city to Nur e-Din in 1150:

You succumbed to a harsh situation, you made a treaty with the Franks and converted. I would not be astonished if you converted to Judaism one day. Even after you took off the cross that you had

²⁷ Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, II, 77; Evans trans., 118.

²⁸ Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, 10:462; translation cited from Gabrieli, *Arab Historians*, 22.

²⁹ Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, 10:461.

³⁰ Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*; Ephrat and Kabha, “Intensified Religious Fidelity”, 49-64.

the Christians in the city...fearing that through the king's imprudence this detestable deed might actually be accomplished, they wrote an anonymous letter (*sine certi auctoris titulo*), explaining the plan in detail and sent it by means of an arrow into our army. The letter chanced to fall into the hands of the king. He was greatly affected by it and justly so. He at once called his principal nobles and conferred with them.... The guilty man was summoned before them; he confessed his crime and was sentenced by the princes (*principes*) to be hanged.³⁶

Could it be that the 'principal nobles' who resented the king's intimate friend had a hand in the composition of this letter? That would explain neatly how a letter ostensibly shot by arrow from the enemy camp happened to fall precisely into the hands of the king. Apparently the nobles felt that their suspicions would not suffice to convince the 'imprudent' king, whose homosexual relationship with the convert made him oblivious to the truth. They may have deemed it expedient to use different tactics to get rid of an upstart. The need for a judicial court, composed of the same nobles, shows that Baldwin the convert had attained a high status and could not be executed without due process.³⁷

According to another account,³⁸ the same King Baldwin raised other baptized Saracens to high positions. A royal servant, sur-named Machomus, was a former captive who had converted. In 1112 he was in charge of the affairs of the king in Jerusalem, while Baldwin led a military expedition elsewhere. This time the choice was prudent as the convert's knowledge of Arabic enabled him to expose a Saracen plot to conquer the city and help his patron. The two baptized *familiares* in Baldwin's court were presumably of noble descent in their former life, and were afforded a chance to continue their careers at the highest possible level. The convening of the Council of Nablus in 1120 not long after Baldwin's death by the church prelates and the nobility 'to raise the standard of morals' may be related to Baldwin's liaisons with these converts.³⁹ The Council of Nablus outlawed homosexual liaisons and established

³⁶ Ibid., translation based on Babcock, 1:488.

³⁷ On Baldwin's homosexuality, see Mayer, "Baudouin I^{er} roi de Jérusalem", *Nouvelle Biographie Nationale*, vol. 3 (Brussels, 1994) 24; idem, "Etudes sur l'histoire de Baudouin I^{er} de Jérusalem", 10-91.

³⁸ Guibert de Nogent, *Dei Gesta per Francos*, Appendix 1, 357-58, lines 83-110.

³⁹ WT, XII, 13.

conversion. It includes not only apostasy, but also affiliation – commitment to full involvement with an institution or community of faith – as well as the final stage of institutional transition.⁴³ Conversion out of sincere religious conviction seems to have been a rarity in the Latin Kingdom.

Usamah ibn Munqidh relates the story of the Christian artisan Ra'ul who was taken captive together with his mother and sister and brought to Shayzar. In his telling of the tale there emerges a sense of personal affront at how circumstances evolved:

[He] accepted Islam, and his conversion was genuine, judging by what he showed in the practice of prayer and fasting. He learned the art of working marble from a stonecutter who had paved the home of my father. After staying with us for a long time my father gave him as wife a woman who belonged to a pious family, and paid all necessary expenses for his wedding and home. His wife bore him two sons. The boys grew up. When they were five or six years old, their father, young Ra'ul, who was very happy at having them, took them with their mother and everything that his house contained and... joined the Franks in Afamiyah, where he and his children became Christians, after having practiced Islam with its prayers and faith. May Allah therefore purify the world from such people!"⁴⁴

Usamah clearly sees marriage as a critical stage of integration into the new society. It is both a means and an end. Marriage may be the reason for conversion, whether forced or voluntary. It also supposedly bestowed the final stamp of respectability, as if the spouse guaranteed the new convert's sincerity, his or her intention to stay in his new society.

A curious proof that this opinion was shared by the Christian side of the religious divide can be found in the missionary ideas for a crusade formulated by Pierre Dubois in a pamphlet which appeared in 1306. Dubois proposed that trained Catholic girls be given in marriage to Muslim chiefs and encouraged to lead them toward baptism. This proposal might seem risky, as it was of course possible that the plan would miscarry and lead to the bride's apostasy. It shows belief in marriage as a way to secure religious adherence. Pierre Dubois not only trusted the ability of the young ladies,

⁴³ L.R. Rambo, *Understanding Religious Conversion* (New Haven, 1993) 13.

⁴⁴ Usamah, *Memoirs*, 160.

he also thought they would have a strong incentive to succeed, as embracing Christianity would make their new spouses monogamous. In other words, the plan presumed social superiority, not just belief in religious superiority.⁴⁵

Although Usamah's purpose in telling the story of Ra'ul and other anecdotes is to demonstrate the improbability of social conversion, he in fact provides a description of full social integration. The disappointing renegade Ra'ul was supplied with both a profession and a wife. We do not know what his former background was, but one could at least say that he received a fair chance to find a place in his new society. Usamah also relates the – to him disappointing – story of the lady of Ja'bar who preferred being the wife of a Christian shoemaker to the status of mother of the lord of Ja'bar. In her case as well, conversion and marriage led to a significant step up the social ladder. She may also be seen, contrary to Usamah's intentions, as a case of social integration, as the counterpart of the story of the convert Baldwin. In both instances the captives underwent a similar process: forced conversion, a speedy social ascent through personal ties with the ruler, and finally reversion to their original faith and society. In both cases the receiving society and its ruling elite were disappointed and shocked at the treason, which also affirmed their preconceptions as to the unreliability of such personal ties to royal circles. It seems, however, that although both crusaders and fighters of Jihad offered conversion as the best way out of captivity it was not an easy step to take and many captives did not see conversion as a valid solution to their problems.

Jewish society shared Muslim and Christian society's suspicion of returning apostates. However, Jewish society did accept those who returned to its fold. Jewish law viewed women taken captive (but who did not convert) as having been raped and obligated their husbands to ransom them and take them back. In a case where such a woman apostasized her husband was under no such obligation. Jewish law distinguished between rape, which was involuntary, and apostasy, seen as consensual and also as involving the sphere of sexual relations.⁴⁶ In other words, the apostate's return to his or her

⁴⁵ Petrus de Bosco, *De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*, ed. J. Bongars, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, 2:336; Kedar, *Crusade and Mission*, 201.

⁴⁶ M.A. Friedman, "The Ransom Clause of the Jewish Marriage Contract", in *Gratz College Anniversary Volume*, vol. 1, ed. I. D. Passow (Philadelphia, 1971) 63-69; Blidstein, "Apostate and Ransomed Women", 35-116.

tis creceat paci et tuncge consensim' subscepe. Queli
 cet i pmo aduentu nro difficil' fieri apparebat.
 comendabil' est ta zae sce subsidio fructuosa. Qm
 pauperibz et pgnantibz leta est et secun. mediocibz

Creunt fianci a saracenis mil. erati.



Release of French prisoners by Saracens (Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS 16, fol. 149r).

former society was strewn with obstacles, as was full integration into his or her adopted society.

Ransom and exchange of captives

Once the captive had exhausted the options of flight, rescue, or conversion, what remained was the hope of being ransomed. We have already noted that ransom of captives was at first seen by the Franks as a last resort, probably because it necessitated negotiations between the belligerent sides. They had to be prepared to use diplomatic tools and not just force, a difficult concept for warriors fighting a holy war. As the Franks had more and more peaceful encounters with their enemies, they internalized ransom or exchange of captives as a normative solution.

It seems to me that as the norms of ransom were gradually absorbed from Muslim society, many of the technical details involved were configured by existing oriental conventions. This influence is especially clear in the role and status of the mediators, and in the setting of prices for ransom. So too the mixing of captive exchanges with ransom employed when faced with an uneven number of captives. These encounters were conducted at the highest level and the individual captive played little part in negotiating his release or exchange. Thus, they represent societal rather than individual involvement in the process of ransom.

Mediators

Highly respected envoys from each side usually conducted negotiations for the release of captives. They required, and usually received, a safe-conduct that enabled them to enter the enemy court and negotiate with its leaders. When an important personality was taken captive, envoys were sometimes allowed to visit him in captivity, presumably to discuss his terms of ransom, but also to some extent to ensure that the captive was receiving proper treatment. These negotiations for the ransom of captives were often the first and sometimes the only encounter between the enemies away from the battlefield. On the Muslim side we know that this led to the development of highly qualified and trusted diplo-

mats,⁴⁷ and it is probable that there was a similar development in the Frankish camp.⁴⁸ The mediator was an important man and his name was often mentioned. Thus the Anonymous Syriac Chronicle maintains that the lord of Qal'at Ja'bar on the Euphrates, a renowned man and a good mediator, was the one who fixed Baldwin's ransom. When the Hospitallers were remunerated for helping with the attempt to ransom Guillaume de Queivillers' father in 1227 they were thanked for their part as mediators, although the ransom effort itself did not materialize.

Mediators often implemented diplomatic gestures involving captives as part of truces or peace treaties. Bringing captives as a present to the ruler was a customary prelude to negotiations for peace in the East. Thus Godfrey received Gerard d'Avesnes as a diplomatic present when Ascalon wanted a truce,⁴⁹ and Baldwin of Edessa brought his ally Jawali Muslim prisoners in order to clinch their pact of cooperation.⁵⁰ Every overture of the Franks to Baybars to prolong or renew a truce was initiated by returning a number of prisoners.⁵¹ Thus prisoners were kept and used as negotiating cards in diplomatic peace processes and to ease the messenger's reception in the enemy camp. Inherent in these processes was a strong economic element, that is, the setting of the captives' price, a negotiable subject, especially in the case of highborn captives.

Prices

The ransom process involved evaluating a person and paying his price. In a society where slavery was accepted, setting a price for a human being was a question of market value, not a moral quandary. At the lowest level, to make ransom worthwhile, it had to be more than the person in question's price on the slave market.

⁴⁷ See chapter 2 above. For the Mamluk diplomats, see Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*.

⁴⁸ For Roger the Barneville, see chapter 1 above.

⁴⁹ AA, VII, 15.

⁵⁰ Ibn al-Athir, *Kamil*, 10:462.

⁵¹ Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, passim.

Naturally, this value fluctuated according to the market. After Hattin, when thousands were sold into slavery, prices slumped, and the price of ransom was almost certainly affected. In the East there apparently existed a kind of minimum price for a 'regular' captive, namely infantry, civilians, and non-noble captives: 33 1/3 dinars. Early testimony to this price comes from Muqaddasi's tenth-century description of the ransoming of Muslim captives from their Byzantine captors. The price quoted there is three for a hundred dinars.⁵²

A similar price was still in effect in the twelfth century. In 1140 Usamah paid forty-three dinars for a young man and an old worthless one was thrown in for good measure by the dealer.⁵³ This brings us to approximately the same price. The Jews, whose captives were usually civilians and who had no other options available to free their captives, were conversant with the prices. Three letters from the Geniza quote a price of 33.3 dinars for Byzantine Jewish captives taken by Muslim pirates in the eleventh century.⁵⁴ Another famous letter describing the ransoming of Jewish captives after the crusader conquest in 1099 mentions the same price.⁵⁵ In the twelfth century the prominent poet and philosopher Rabbi Judah Halevi was busy dispatching letters to raise 32 dinars to ransom a captive, in addition to the 1.3 dinars he had himself contributed. He took it for granted that the addressees were familiar with this price. Thus the price seems to have remained stable over three centuries.

It would be rash, however, to assume that this was the price always paid. In 1099 the Jews of Jerusalem were ransomed for less than the regular price, because the crusaders were not aware of the going rate. Prices were also affected by the number of captives and their captors' haste to unload them. When the prices of slaves dropped, one could probably strike a bargain in ransom too. But the stability of the minimum price seems to point to a steady flow of money and prisoners, continuing the accepted convention in the East.

In literary sources ten dinars is quoted as a ridiculously low price for a captive, paid only under special circumstances. That was the

⁵² Muqaddasi, *The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions*, trans. B.A. Collins, 162.

⁵³ Usamah, *Memoirs*, 110, 111.

⁵⁴ MS. Cambridge; T-S 13 J 14; T-S 13 J 34. See Mann, *Jews in Egypt*, 86-87, 344-45, 349; Goitein, *Mediterranean Society*, 2:137.

⁵⁵ MS Cambridge, T-S 10 J 5, fol. 6, lines 55-56.

price the enamored merchant from Acre paid for his love, after he had been willing to pay five hundred dinars to spend the night with her.⁵⁶ The poet Sa'di was ransomed for ten dinars, but his ransom later paid a hundred dinars for him to marry his daughter, and in the poet's eyes this became an even greater captivity.⁵⁷ In Jerusalem in 1187 and at the siege of Saône the price of a male was ten dinars, of a woman half that amount.

Higher up the social scale the price was set by negotiation. This started by noting the captive's name and rank in order to determine his value, a procedure in which the information given often represented a gamble for the captive's life.⁵⁸ The evaluation could be determined as part of a prisoner exchange, as in the case of compensation for homicide, as Baybars put it: "For a knight...a knight..., for a foot-soldier a foot-soldier..., for a turcopole a turcopole."⁵⁹ This implies the existence of a regulated table of values in line with which every individual could determine how much he was worth according to rank, in this case equated with military rank. In medieval society military rank often coincided with socioeconomic status.

In trying to construct such a table of values one must, however, take several problems into consideration: (1) the changing value of money over the period under consideration, (2) the discrepancy between the sum requested and the actual payment, and (3) haggling over prices that could delay ransom of individuals.

In trying to determine the amount of money demanded for the ransom of a particular individual, we must take into account the changing value of money during the two hundred years of encounters between enemies. A Tyrhennian dinar, a Saracen besant, a French écu, livres Tournois, and Byzantine besants all had different values and the exchange rate between them was not always the same. Basically, in quoting these currencies we are speaking about the weight of silver and gold pieces, but these could be counted by number (the cheapest way to pay), by weight, or by testing the real content of precious metal (the most expensive way). Metcalf has

⁵⁶ Ibn Hijja al-Hamawi, *Thamarat al-awraq* (Cairo, 1971) 236-39. See chapter 7.

⁵⁷ Kedar, "New Sources on Palestinian Muslims", 140.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Matthew Paris, *Chronica Majora*, 4:79; Abu Shama, *Livre des deux jardins*, 199. See chap. 5, nn. 7-8.

⁵⁹ Holt, *Early Mamluk Diplomacy*, p. 41, no. 30. See also *ibid.*, p. 10.

compared the alloy of the different coins circulating in the Near East during the period of the Crusades and he claims that the exchange rate was four besants to three dinars.⁶⁰ The besants minted by Baldwin II were worth three-quarters of a Muslim dinar.

Although the exchange rate must have been well known, the chroniclers often cite the same sums in different currency, for example, 100,000 besants or dinars or dahekans as a king's ransom.⁶¹ This enormous sum must be regarded as the *topos* of a 'king's ransom' and therefore as the asking price.⁶² It was nonetheless not necessarily the sum really paid, but rather the number the chroniclers remembered. In 1194 Richard I of England, taken captive on his way home from the Third Crusade, was ransomed for 100,000 Cologne silver marks.⁶³ Similarly, it seems that a price for a knight was a thousand besants, that of an important noble, a magnate, or baron ten thousand, and that a prince might fetch twenty thousand. The price asked for the Northern princes of Antioch and Edessa, Bohemond and Baldwin, equaled that of a king and rightly so, as the economic value of their territories was not inferior to that of the Latin Kingdom.

But even if a kind of tariff existed for certain captives, this was not always followed. In the context of the behavior of the first generation of crusaders I noted the story of Shaykh 'Abd al-Salam al-Ansari who was among the captives taken in Jerusalem in 1099. To recall: upon learning that he was a prominent scholar, the Christians spared his life and he was taken to different places in Palestine. The ransom price asked was a thousand dinars. When nobody paid this sum, he was killed.⁶⁴ Two years later in Caesarea 'a very old priest'

⁶⁰ D.M. Metcalf, "Islamic, Byzantine, and Latin Influences in the Iconography of Crusader Coins and Seals", in *East and West in the Crusader States*, ed. K. Ciggaar and H. Teule (Leuven, 1999) 167.

⁶¹ For the exchange rates of the besant and dinar, see P. Spufford, *Handbook of Medieval Exchange* (London, 1986) 294-300; E. Ashtor, *Histoire des prix et des salaires dans l'Orient médiéval* (Paris, 1969) 239-46.

⁶² Although it seems that the sum asked for Baldwin of Ibelin and partly paid by the Byzantine emperor, namely 150,000 Tyrhennian dinars, was equivalent to 100,000 dinars – a royal ransom.

⁶³ According to P. Spufford (*Money and its Use in Medieval Europe* [Cambridge, 1988] 390) this amounted to 23 tons of silver. An additional 50,000 marks were asked for, but less than a fifth were actually paid.

⁶⁴ Hiyari, "Crusader Jerusalem", 138. Mujir al-Din al-Hanbali, (1:299) cited by Dajani-Shakeel, "Natives and Franks in Palestine", 164 tells the same story about

100,000 philips to prevent Bohemond's release.⁷⁶ The same type of offer was made by Philip Augustus to Richard the Lionheart's captor – at times, not to release a prominent captive could be worth more to a captor than a ransom.⁷⁷ Bohemond, who heard that the offer led to strained relations with Kilij Arslan, offered his captor Danishmend half the Byzantine offer and an alliance with him and finally paid even less – 100,000 besants.⁷⁸ Orderic's claim that Bohemond's offer was the same sum as Alexius', makes more sense, and philips were probably equivalent to besants.⁷⁹ Ralph of Caen also quotes a sum of 100,000 besants raised by Baldwin, Patriarch Bernard, and the people of Antioch.⁸⁰ Orderic Vitalis mentions 100,000 gold coins as the sum asked for Bohemond, but tells only about the alliance with Danishmend and refrains from describing any humiliating sum paid.⁸¹ In the final analysis, we are unable to determine how much was in fact paid for Bohemond's ransom, but it was obviously a royal amount.

Interestingly, the eastern sources, both Arabic and Syriac, provide more detail regarding the prices paid for ransom than the western ones. For example, in listing the prices for three prominent individuals – fifty thousand, eighty thousand, and 120,000 respectively – Michael the Syrian's prices seem less typological than those found in western sources.⁸² Once again, this may reflect the more longstanding tradition of ransom and prisoner exchanges in the Eastern milieu.

As seen from the table below, initial prices quoted were *topoi*, but the protagonists probably knew exactly for what sums to ask and for what they would be willing to settle. Lately Jean Flori⁸³ and Bernard Bachrach⁸⁴ have claimed that although the numbers of soldiers or participant crusaders were clearly typological, they should not be

⁷⁶ OV, V, 10, 24, p. 355.

⁷⁷ Orderic (OV, V, 10, 24, pp. 354-56) maintains that the emperor offered 100,000 gold pieces.

⁷⁸ AA, IX, 33-36.

⁷⁹ See OV, V, 10, 20, p. 334 n. 3.

⁸⁰ Ralph of Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, 709.

⁸¹ OV, V, 10, 24, pp. 354-56.

⁸² Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. 3, XX, 3, p. 365.

⁸³ J. Flori, "Un problème de méthodologie: La valeur des nombres chez les chroniqueurs du Moyen Age", in *Croisade et chevalerie*, 319-43.

⁸⁴ B.S. Bachrach, "The Siege of Antioch: A Study in Military Demography", *War in History* 6 (1999) 127-46.

dismissed as mere fantasy. Military leaders knew how many mouths they had to feed and how many warriors they could deploy. Even if the numbers are inexact, they ought to be taken into account. Flori proved, however, that in reports of numbers of soldiers there was a clear preference for multiples of one, two, and three, thus we find amounts such as 1,000, 20,000, or 300,000, and not 6,000, 80,000, or 900,000, for example. The same can be said of the prices. I would argue that the sums were probably well known to the protagonists. But, as we have seen, the actual payment was not necessarily the sum initially requested. (See table 2, pp. 156-59.)

In any event, the sums needed for ransom were probably crippling. Whether a lord or a simple foot soldier, the captive had to pay all he had and sometimes more for his freedom. When captivity became a frequent occurrence the need for institutional help became pressing. None of the ways out of captivity was easy, but for the captive ransom was the safest. It meant, however, that captivity did not end with the return home, as the need to raise and repay the money would continue to hang over the returning freedman.

The way out of captivity did not end with procuring the money for ransom. The captive also had to return home safely and become reintegrated into his former surroundings. This was not always easy. We shall see in the next chapter the special plight of returning women who had to struggle with the aspersions cast on their sexual purity after having been in captivity. Not only women found it hard to return to normal life and cast off their past in captivity. Innocent III, whose concern for the fate of captives we have noted, made his stand on this issue too and considered the measures necessary to ensure the spiritual and corporal welfare of returning captives.⁸⁵ An extreme case is the penitence Innocent III laid upon the returning captive Robert at Subiaco in 1203.⁸⁶ Robert confessed that due to severe famine he had been forced to kill his daughter and his wife while in captivity. Although he did eat his daughter, he found him-

⁸⁵ B. Bolton, "Perhaps You Do not Know? Innocent III's Approach to the Release of Captives", in *Liberazione dei captivi*, ed. Cipollone, 457-63.

⁸⁶ Innocent III, *Die Register Innocenz' Band 5. Pontifikatsjahr 1202/3*, ed. O. Hageneder et al. (Vienna, 1993) 79, 155-58; Cipollone, "Appendice Documentaria", in *Cattività*, no. 34, pp. 520-21; M. Vasilescu, "Even More Special Sons?: The Importance of the Order of the Holy Trinity to Pope Innocent III", in *Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 721-23.

self unable to consume the cooked flesh of his wife. Innocent imposed on him a strict penitential regime: he was to subsist on bread and water for three days a week, to travel barefoot, and to carry a penitent's staff. He was to give no thought for the morrow and accept food for one day only, never spend more than two nights in one place, and last and most pertinently never to remarry. After three years of severe penance he was to return to the pope and ask forgiveness. While Innocent saw his sins as very severe, the penitential system was geared to enable the released captive to continue his life and enable him to live with the ghosts of his past. Innocent ends his letter in a conciliatory tone: *Vos ergo, fratres et filii, misero misericordiam impendentes, in neccesitatibus aperiatis ei viscera caritatis* (whoever sees this letter is to open his heart to the wretched man waiting for pity and to show him charity). Another case referred to Innocent was that of the returning captive Palmerius of Picciati who had spent several years wandering around Europe after his release from captivity in Tunis. Upon returning home he found that his former wife had remarried. He then appealed to the pope.⁸⁷ Palmerius, who had spent part of this time as a troubadour under the name Melioratus, had apparently found it difficult to return to normal life. The varied needs – both physical rehabilitation and spiritual and social reintegration – made the return less than happy in many cases.

Notwithstanding their initial hesitation, we have seen that not only did the Franks adopt the technical aspects of ransom as practiced in the East, but also that ransom of captives became an accepted part of their engagement with their Muslim adversaries. The development of institutional solutions to this problem, which reflects a radical change in Frankish thinking, will be treated in a later chapter. First, however, comes the story of the less-celebrated but probably more numerous female captives.

⁸⁷ C.R. Cheney and M.G. Cheney, "A Draft Decretal of Pope Innocent III on a Case of Identity", in *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 41 (1961) 37-47. Cited by Bolton, "Innocent III's Approach", 463.

TABLE 2
Prominent Captives and Their Prices

<i>Captive</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Price</i>	<i>Exchange</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Bohemond	1100-1104	100,000 dahekans 10,000 paid by Kogh Vasil		Matthew of Edessa, III, 14, p. 191
	1102	100,000 dinars	Yaghi Siyan's daughter	Ibn al-Athir, <i>Kamil</i> , 10:345
	1104		Alliance with Danishmend	AA, IX, 35-36
Baldwin of Edessa (later Badwin II)	1104	15,000 besants	Or noble lady	AA, IX, 46
	1104 (Chekermush)	35 (000) dinars	+ 160 Muslim prisoners	Ibn al-Athir, 10:256-57
	1108 (Jawali)	Unknown sum	+ 160 Muslim prisoners	Ibn al-Athir, 10:461
	1104-1108	70,000 mikhilate dinars; 25,000 actually paid		<i>Anonymous Syriac Chronicle</i> , 81
As King Baldwin II	1124	100,000 besants	Daughter as hostage	FC, III, 44, 2, 3, p. 771; WT, XIII, 16

<i>Captive</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Price</i>	<i>Exchange</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Joscelyn	1108	12,000 dinars	+12 hostages	<i>Anonymous Syriac Chronicle</i> , 80-81
Hasanun		20,000 dinars	Hostage for Baldwin	<i>Anonymous Syriac Chronicle</i> , 81-82
		1,000 dinars	+ black horse	Usamah, <i>Memoirs</i> , 95
Mother and two sons of Shams ad-Daula	c. 1098	3,000 besants = 1,000 each	Possibly connected to Guynemer of Boulogne. William of Montpellier was the captor.	AA, V, 24
45 noble prisoners	1100	50,000 besants = 1,111 each		AA, VII, 53
Seignor of Ramle and Nablus	1136	1,000 gold pieces	+ 1,000 captives	Cipollone, <i>Cattività</i> , 319
Nasr ibn Abbas	1154	60,000 dinars	Ransomed by the Templars	WT, XVIII, 9
Dhya ed-Din, brother, and companions	1177	60,000 or 70,000 dinars	+ many Christian prisoners	Abu Shama, 185-87

<i>Captive</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Price</i>	<i>Exchange</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Dhya ed-Din	1177	Exchanged for Baldwin d'Ibeli = 150,000 Tyrhennian dinars		Abu Shama, 199
Baldwin d'Ibelin	1179-1180	150,000 Tyrhennian dinars Weight in gold		WT, XXII, 5; Ernoul, 59
Raymond III of Tripoli	1174	37,000 besants from the Hospitaliers 80,000 dahekans 150,000 Tyrhennian dinars	+ money given by the king + 1,000 captives	Delaville, <i>Cartulaire</i> , 1:648-49; WT, XX, 28 Michael the Syrian, vol. 3, XX, 3, p. 365; Abu Shama, 168 Ibn al-Athir, 11:419
Joscelyn III	1173	50,000 dahekans		Michael the Syrian, vol. 3, XX, 3, p. 365
Countess' son	1179	55,000 Tyrhennian dinars		Abu Shama, 199-200
Reynald of Châtillon	1161-1176	120,000 dahekans		Michael the Syrian, vol. 3, XX, 3, p. 365

CHAPTER SEVEN

WEAK AND VIOLATED? THE EXPERIENCE OF WOMEN

If up to this point we have concentrated on what appear to be the mainly male participants in the Crusades and the Latin Kingdom, it remains to tell the women's story. Apart from what James Brundage so aptly called the *militia cubiculi* – the feudal service in the nuptial chamber that women rendered via marriage,¹ and the help women extended during siege warfare,² female crusaders have been seen as virtually nonexistent.³ Maurice Purcell declared that there was no such creature – a woman crusader – until the thirteenth century and then only briefly.⁴ Yet there is one part of crusader history in which women seem numerically dominant: the sphere of captivity. Women were often the first and sometimes the only captives taken on both the Muslim and the Christian sides.⁵ For this reason, their experience of captivity and their need for ransom would seem to be central to the history of warfare in the Latin East, even if their military contribution was negligible.

This centrality, however, is not reflected in the written record. As the chroniclers were all male, the place of women in their narratives of captivity is marginal at best. Unless it fitted a wider, predominantly male discourse the women's story was considered unimpor-

¹ J.A. Brundage, "Marriage Law in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem", in *Outremer*, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer and R.C. Smail (Jerusalem, 1982) 271.

² See K. Caspi, "Women Warriors during the Crusades and the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem", (M.A. thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 2000) 57-64 (Hebrew); see also her article by this name in *Gendering the Crusades*, ed. S.B. Edgington and S. Lambert (Wales University Press, forthcoming); and H.J. Nicholson, "Women on the Third Crusade", *Journal of Medieval History* 23 (1997) 335-49; S. Lambert, "Heroines and Saracens", *Medieval World* 1 (1991) 3-9.

³ For the importance of noncombatants in sieges, see Rogers, *Latin Siege Warfare*, 8-9, 52, 61.

⁴ M. Purcell, "Women Crusaders; A Temporary Canonical Aberration?" in *Principalities, Powers and Estates: Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Government and Society*, ed. L.O. Frappell (Adelaide, 1980) 57-64.

⁵ E.g., AA, I, 12; I, 21; IV, 45; VII, 40; VIII, 19.

tant. In the literary chanson *Les Chétifs* all the captives – the heroes of the story – are men, and in the *Chanson d'Antioche*, although depicted as warriors, women often appear only as comic relief.⁶ Yet in their descriptions of warfare both Christian and Muslim chronicles often use the formula: “all the men were killed and the women and children were taken captive”. Did this reflect the facts or was it a literary topos influenced by biblical precedents?⁷ Is it possible to establish whether women were really the majority of captives?

Falling captive

Having no reliable statistics for number and gender of captives, we have to investigate the different arenas that may lead to captivity and search for the place of women in them, namely, the battlefield, sieges and conquests of cities, and raids into enemy territory.

Most medieval wars were not decided on the battlefield. After the First Crusade with its famous battles and the three Battles of Ramle, sieges and skirmishes were the rule. Pitched battles were few and risky. Furthermore, women were not supposed to be on the battlefield. If we assume that they did not usually fight, women would then not be on the spot at the end of a battle, nor a considerable part of the booty taken afterward. However, during the expeditions called Crusades there were famous battles in which the line between soldiers and civilians was hardly easy to draw. The camp where the noncombatants remained might be only several meters from the battlefield. In case of defeat, women were exposed to enemy fury even if they took no part in the actual fighting. This was true not only for the First Crusade when many women accompanied their husbands on the way to the Holy Land, but even at a later date. Benjamin Z. Kedar has shown that in Louis IX's crusade the galley's passenger list included many women.⁸ It is well known that

⁶ S.B. Edgington, “‘Sont çou ore les fems que jo voi la venir?’ Women in the *Chanson d'Antioche*”, in *Gendering the Crusades*, ed. Edgington and Lambert (Wales University Press, forthcoming). I would like to thank Dr. Edgington for her generosity in allowing me to read her paper before publication.

⁷ Num. 31:9; Deut. 21:10-17; 1 Sam. 30:3.

⁸ B.Z. Kedar, “The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship 1250: Towards the History of the Popular Element on the Seventh Crusade”, *Studi Medievali* 13 (1972) 272-75.

when Louis IX was taken captive at Mansura, his wife was giving birth in Damietta, not far from the battle line.

Women were certainly exposed to the danger of captivity when a city was taken by storm, as in Caesarea in 1101 when “very few of the male sex were left alive. But a great many of the women were spared.”⁹ Thus, while we do not know of women taken captive after the Muslim victory at the Battle of Hattin, the conquest of Frankish cities and strongholds in the wake of the battle swelled the number of female captives.¹⁰

The same situation applied to raids made explicitly for booty and captives. Raids into hostile territory to take hostages and slaves were normal procedure both in Muslim and Christian warfare: here women were valuable trophies and loomed large in the number of captives. In a frontier society where people of different religions lived in proximity and the border between their spheres of domination changed continuously, as in thirteenth-century Palestine, the danger of captivity for women became pressing. As captives were not taken only as a result of great, heroic battles, the danger was just as real for civilians travelling in a caravan, or inhabitants besieged in their city by the enemy.¹¹ The sum of captives from battles, conquests, and skirmishes seems to point to the predominance of women.

Sometimes women were abandoned to their fate by their men and taken prisoner. Thus in 1126 Aqsunqur al-Bursuqi captured some women and their children, while the men of the besieged town fled: “The men of the besieged town had with much difficulty and danger escaped the hand of the enemy. They had chosen to seek safety alone rather than be caught in the wretched bonds of captivity with their wives and children.”¹² This may seem a far cry from chivalrous ideals, but it also provides evidence that captivity was a more usual event for women. Perhaps the men thought they would be able to ransom their wives later. In any event, in this case, as in the instances where men were killed and women spared and

⁹ FC, II, 9, 6.

¹⁰ Cf. Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani's description of the female captives of Sepphoris and Nazareth, in Gabrieli, *Arab Historians*, 163.

¹¹ Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 1-6; Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 301-2, 312-13, and passim.

¹² WT, XIII, 20; trans., 2:31-32.

taken captive, the outcome was captivity for women only. Nor were the Franks the sole warriors to leave their wives undefended and run away. After the battle at Antioch the Turks behaved no differently: "Those Turks who had swift and good horses escaped, but the stragglers were abandoned to the Franks."¹³ As Fulcher of Chartres goes on to say, in the tents outside Antioch the crusaders found women left behind while the men ran away, so apparently many of the 'stragglers' were women.¹⁴ In 1101, when the crusaders lost the battle at Paphlagonia, they likewise left the undefended women together with the rest of the spoils of war to be taken by the Turks:

So great a fear took possession of them all that not one of the princes remained who was not despairing of life and planning escape, great and small, noble and lesser men.... Moreover the Christians left their tents and all their equipment with all their wagons, with their delicate and beloved wives, with all the goods which are needed by so many nobles and so great an army.... The Turks... cruelly attacked the very noble women and eminent matrons, as many Gauls as Lombards, seized them wickedly and held them in fetters, sending over a thousand into barbarous lands where the language was unknown, they plundered them like dumb animals and sent them into perpetual exile into the land of Khorasan as if they were in a cage or prison.¹⁵

Even if this report is exaggerated, there must have been a large number of women taken captive, of whose fate we have no inkling. They were not heard of later in the narrative, and apparently were never ransomed.

The predominance of female captives in the Latin Kingdom may be corroborated by a comparison between the laws of the Latin Kingdom and parallel sources. Joshua Prawer has shown that the late-twelfth-century *Assise* on confiscation¹⁶ and the thirteenth-century *Assise* on disinheritance bear many close resemblances to Roman Law and to the twelfth-century Provençal code *Lo Codi*.¹⁷ In

¹³ FC, I, 23, 5; trans., p. 106.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ AA, VIII, 18-19.

¹⁶ *Livre au Roi*, chap. 16, pp. 177-84.

¹⁷ J. Prawer, "Roman Law and Crusader Legislation: The *Assises* on Confiscation and Disinheritance", in *Crusader Institutions* (Oxford, 1980) 431-68.

tortured for the fun of it,¹⁹ or killed because this was considered expedient or part of a strategy of terror.²⁰ Torture was sometimes used to make the captive raise his price. In this respect women fared no better than men. In Tripoli the Franks tortured a woman severely to extract money, and were lucky enough to obtain important intelligence from her instead.²¹ The only reason we are told about this apparently not unusual case is because of its unexpected outcome. Torturing a female captive out of greed would not be a fact worthy of mention in and of itself, and gender was no shield against the atrocities of war.

As civilians, women were at a disadvantage from the outset. As a rule, they were noncombatants, and usually lower down the social scale than men. We have a clear case of this economic evaluation in the terms of capitulation offered by Saladin to the inhabitants of Jerusalem in 1187: a woman's freedom could be bought for half the price of a man, and a child's for a tenth.²² This meant that whereas it was often cheaper to ransom a wife or daughter than a male relative, the incentive for the captor to keep women alive was weaker as they were worth less. If women survived in spite of their lower market value, it must have been for reasons not deriving from the importance of their rank, but rather connected to their gender. Thus, when Fulcher of Chartres explains why the Muslim women of Caesarea were spared he ventures to suggest "they could always be used to turn the hand mills" as a reason.²³ But he then goes on to describe how the captured women were bought and sold among the captors according to different criteria: "the comely and the ugly". It is not at all clear why the women needed to be handsome in order to turn the hand mills and what difference their looks would make if that was really the reason they were spared.

According to the Latin chroniclers, the Muslims made no secret of the importance of gender when choosing whom they would take captive. While rank and price were important, a woman's

¹⁹ Walter the Chancellor, *Bella Antiochena*, II, 7; Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 100, 312-13.

²⁰ *Gesta Francorum*, II, 8, p. 15; X, 30, p. 73.

²¹ AA, XI, 14.

²² *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr*, 69: *einsi que l'on conteit ii femes por i home, et x enfans por un home, qui d'aage ne sereient*. Cf. Beha ed-Din, *Life of Saladin*, 120.

²³ See n. 9 above.

attractiveness was decisive. Thus, already at Civetot, “they put them all to the sword, regardless of age. They took away only young girls and nuns, whose faces and figures seemed to be pleasing to their eyes.”²⁴ According to Albert of Aachen, the women were quick to learn the lesson that beauty might save their lives, and at the next encounter, at the battle of Dorylaeum, they acted accordingly:

Stunned and terrified by the cruelty of this most hideous killings, girls who were delicate and very nobly born were hastening to get themselves dressed up, they were offering themselves to the Turks so that at least, roused and appeased by love of their beautiful appearance, the Turks might learn to pity their prisoners.²⁵

Nor was this criterion for survival used only on the battlefield. After the conquest of Antioch a knight called Folbert of Bullon was caught in a raid on his way to Edessa together with his wife and his retinue:

He was overcome there and beheaded with the rest after putting up no great resistance. His wife, because she was greatly pleasing to their eyes on account of her beautiful face, was taken prisoner and led away into the fortress of Hasarth. The prince and lord of the fortress ordered her to be treated honourably while he found out if she might be worth some great sum of money in ransom.²⁶

This captive’s beauty was undoubtedly decisive, but this did not mean that her rank had no importance. While her looks probably saved her life, her rank was the determining factor for how she was treated in captivity, as it did not make sense to maltreat a valuable lady and thus diminish her value. In this case the beautiful captive was given to one of the leading Muslim warriors instead of wages and she became his wife. An attractive woman had far better chances of survival than an old or ugly one and apparently also better chances of survival than a male of the same rank.

²⁴ AA, I, 21. There is no doubt about the aim as Albert adds: “and beardless and attractive young men”.

²⁵ AA, II, 39.

²⁶ AA, V, 5.

Captivity

What was the fate of women in captivity? Was there more concern for female captives than for male prisoners? Was any priority given to setting women free because of the more severe hardships awaiting them in captivity, or was the possibility of losing her freedom just one of the facts a woman in a fighting society had to live with?

The sexual abuse of female captives was more or less taken for granted. Women were raped during the conquest of a city as a matter of course, and this was considered a normal part of warfare.²⁷ Usually, even after the rumble of war quieted, the capture of a woman had clear sexual undertones. Imad ad-Din al-Isfahani, Saladin's secretary and chronicler, described the fair women taken captive in Nazareth and Sepphoris. He used almost the same words to describe the female captives of Jerusalem, making no secret of the importance of gender:

Women and children together came to 8,000 and were quickly divided up among us, bringing a smile to Muslim faces at their lamentations. How many well-guarded women were profaned, how many queens were ruled, and nubile girls married, and noble women given away, and miserly women forced to yield themselves, and women who had been kept hidden stripped of their modesty, and serious women made ridiculous, and women kept in private now set in public, and free women occupied, and precious ones used for hard work, and pretty things put to the test, and virgins dishonoured and proud women deflowered, and lovely women prostrated, and untamed ones tamed, and happy ones made to weep! How many noblemen took them as concubines, how many ardent men blazed for one of them, and celibates were satisfied by them, and thirsty men sated by them, and turbulent men able to give vent to their passion.²⁸

Notwithstanding Imad ad-Din's boisterous verbosity, his description shows very clearly what a female captive could expect. His flowery language gives recognition to differences of rank between female captives, but shows clearly that sexual abuse was considered the

²⁷ Bradbury, *Medieval Siege*, 94, 101, 322. On the trope of rape in chivalrous literature, see K. Gravdal, *Ravishing Maidens: Writing Rape in Medieval French Literature and Law* (Philadelphia, 1991).

²⁸ Imad ad-Din, *Kitâb al-Fath*, 34 (Nazareth), 50. Translation cited from Gabrieli, *Arab Historians*, 163.

William of Tyre tells a corresponding story about Baldwin I. On an expedition to Arabia, Baldwin encountered a captive woman, the wife of a Bedouin chieftain, who was in labor. Baldwin had mercy on the woman and left her a bed, food, and a maid to take care of her. He even gave her his mantle as a cover and two camels for milk. This spectacular show of generosity is described as part of the king's chivalrous magnanimity.⁴⁵ Curiously, none of Baldwin I's contemporaries mentions this chivalrous story. Fulcher of Chartres, who was together with the king on the expedition, knows nothing about it. If this event of merciful regard for motherhood ever took place it was not seen as worth recording in the early twelfth century. William of Tyre, writing in the early 1180s, elaborated on the details of the story. He also claimed that Baldwin was given his due: later, at the siege of Ramle (1102) when Baldwin was forced to flee, the lady's grateful husband saved the fugitive king's life and showed him the way to safety.⁴⁶ According to contemporary chroniclers, the same Baldwin had no moral scruples about smoking out the women and children from the caves between Ascalon and Egypt (Beth Guvrin?). He killed some of the women together with their children and had no merciful regard for motherhood.⁴⁷ The rank of the chieftain's wife may have played a definitive role in Baldwin's decisions and may explain his different reactions to the plight of mothers in captivity; alternately the difference in the reaction reported may have stemmed from the ideals current in the narrator's day.

Life in captivity

We have already seen that life in captivity is very seldom described in Latin sources. If described at all, it is usually the grim fate of a male captive that is dwelt upon as a background and contrast to his later, often miraculous, redemption. Women have no part in these stories. As sexual abuse was taken for granted, it was probably very unpleasant for a male writer to think about the life of a conquered wife or daughter. The less one knew about it, the better. The Arabic

⁴⁵ WT, X, 11, 464-465: *Humanitas et clementia*. William emphasizes the woman's importance: *quedam illustris femina, cuiusdam magni et potentis principis uxor*.

⁴⁶ WT, X, 21.

⁴⁷ AA, VII, 40.

CHAPTER EIGHT

CHARITY AND PRESTIGE: THE MILITARY ORDERS AND THE RANSOM OF CAPTIVES

The monastic orders may be regarded as a seismograph of social currents in medieval European Christianity. In attempting to track the main changes in Christian society from the popular point of view, the monastic orders are a suitable place to start, although we cannot, of course, ignore the role of outstanding intellectuals and saints as social leaders and pathfinders. Although intended for the chosen few and not for every Christian, important changes in religious trends and contemporary problems found their expression in the monastic vocation. In the context of this examination of captivity and ransom in the Latin East the military and redemptionist orders, established in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries respectively, serve as an indicator of the alteration in attitude toward these issues. Redemptionist activity on the part of the military orders and the foundation of redemptionist orders can be seen as illustrating the shift from individual to institutional responsibility for captives. Having said this, there are several enigmas that remain unresolved. These include the lack of documentation for activity on the part of the Trinitarian Order, a redemptionist order founded specifically to ransom captives, in the Latin East, and the discrepancy between well-attested activity and growth of the redemptionist orders in Spain as opposed to the lack of documentation for the Latin East. If we see the foundation of the redemptionist orders as an answer to a pressing need in Christian society, the question arises why they were not founded or prominent in the Latin East. I shall return to these issues later.

For the sake of clarity I would like to note that we are looking at a two-pronged development: it is a well-known fact that the military orders originated in the Holy Land as part of the crusader movement and were a unique contribution to the history of the monastic movement. They multiplied and flourished with the help of their affiliated houses in the West, but in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries their center and main field of activity were in the Latin East.

The redemptionist orders, on the other hand, seem to have been a distinctively European invention, and although the movement had its moments in the East the lay orders of ransom did not become the central solution to the problems of captivity there. Nonetheless, the activity of both types of order mirrors Christian society's response to felt needs arising from the unique situation of a warrior society.

For lay Christians, the crusades were an alternative way to achieving salvation to that of leaving the world and becoming monks.¹ If in Europe the monastic orders reflected societal change,² the foundation of the military orders in the Holy Land in the twelfth century mirrored the socioreligious needs of that period. It is no coincidence that the military orders were the one real innovation one can attribute to crusader society in the Latin Kingdom. There were no outstanding intellectual luminaries and only a few contemplative saints in the Latin East, nor did universities and important centers of study develop there. In a society organized for war the spiritual need for perfection was met by the unique fusion of the monk and the warrior: the knights of the military orders. The social tasks of the orders, fighting for the faith and caring for the sick, warfare and welfare, fitted the needs of crusader society and therefore the orders flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The different nationalities that swarmed to the Holy Land in this period and wanted a specific expression of their religious devotions and needs founded new branches of the military orders, such as St. Mary of the Germans – the Teutonic Order, and St. Thomas of Canterbury for the English, among others. All these new orders looked to the established military orders of the Temple and Hospital for affiliation, as these apparently fulfilled the need for a religious vocation suited to the warlike temper of their members.

Of these military orders, it is the Trinitarian Order that represents a turning point in ransom. Founded with apostolic blessing in

¹ Bull, *Knightly Piety*, 3-5.

² Thus the reform of Cluny that emphasized the ties and the hierarchy between the center and the daughter houses coincided with tenth-century feudal trends in western society, and Cîteaux's more diversified dependencies and stricter surveillance between the monastic houses fitted the more full-fledged feudal society of the twelfth. Cluny's promotion of pilgrimage both led to and voiced a popular religious movement. The mendicant orders of the thirteenth century likewise mirrored deep social changes, such as the rise of urban society and its needs. See G. Constable, *The Reformation of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge, 1996) 5-8, 21-22, 42-43.

Cerfroid, France in 1198 by John of Matha, this institution specifically devoted itself to ransoming captives. Its main emphasis was on the need for and the importance of the deed of ransom as an important charity. Although defined as a military order, clearly the Trinitarians and the other redemptionist orders that grew up in its wake differed in nature from the earlier military orders whose main vocation was to defend and fight for the Holy Land. The Trinitarians pledged themselves to deal with the aftermath of war, but did not themselves take part in it. Perhaps the founding of this new order came in the wake of the Battle of Alarcos in Spain (1195) in which large numbers of Christians were taken prisoner by the Muslims. The Trinitarian vocation was first and foremost charity, not military succor.³

Perhaps even more importantly, we may see its foundation as evidence for a new current in western Christian society's notion of captivity and ransom. Even if this redemptionist order could not help everyone, from now on a captive was in principle not alone with his quandary. The Trinitarian ideology changed the captive's plight from one of individual responsibility to the responsibility of Christian society.

The Trinitarians

The Trinitarian Order enjoyed strong papal backing. In his bulla *Cum nobis petitur* Innocent III confirmed the first possessions of the Trinitarian Order and also formulated a new emphasis on the charitable deed of ransom:

Protection is given to the House of the Holy Trinity at Cerfroid (France), which our beloved daughter in Christ M(argaret), Countess of Burgundy charitably granted to you for the ransom of those who, fortified by the armor of faith and happily resisting as a wall of defense for the love of God are so often detained by the enemies of the cross of Christ and who are joyfully sustaining the yoke of barbarous captivity in hunger and thirst and in every kind of travail for Christ.⁴

³ The first sentence of Innocent III's letter to the Trinitarians states that they stem from the root of charity – *a caritatis radice procedunt*. See *Die Register Innocenz' III, 1. Pontifikatsjahr, 1198/99*, ed. O. Hageneder et al. (Graz-Köln, 1964) no. 481, p. 703.

⁴ 16 May 1198, *Archivio Segreto Vaticano: Registra Vaticana*, vol. 4, fol. 62v, no. 247; Cipollone, "Appendice Documentaria", no. 18, p. 489.

Cipollone correctly notes this formulation as a watershed in the idea of ransom, as it transforms the captive from a victim to a heroic martyr.⁵ The metaphors employed here are military: the captive is not a defeated weakling, but rather armed and fortified by faith and resisting as a wall of defense; in other words, he is still perceived as a warrior in a holy war.⁶ His mission is to resist apostasy and his suffering is not senseless – it is ‘travail for Christ’ – a kind of living martyrdom. In his effort to promote the new order, Innocent made the passive suffering of the captive the object of awe, not pity. One may wonder how joyfully the captives sustained their yoke, but nonetheless their predicament is described as an active, heroic feat. The shift in tone is even more striking when seen against the historical background of the thousands of captives taken after Hattin, which played a role in fostering this change. In other words, the captives were now seen not as miserable failures but as an integral part of a warring society, in which it was the Trinitarians’ task to reacclimate them.

The Trinitarians pledged themselves to give a third of all their income, mainly from charity, to ransom captives or to buy slaves to be used in captive exchanges. Their rule stipulated payment of a reasonable price for captives: *dato precio rationabili pro redemptione ipsorum*.⁷ Members of the order were supposed to cross into enemy territory and act as negotiators for ransom, and the order would found hospitals to care for the redeemed, both physically and mentally.

On the facade of the Church of St. Thomas in Formis in Rome there is a mosaic medallion (ca. 1210) showing *Jesus in majestatis*, seated on an elaborate throne and holding a Christian captive in one hand and a Moorish captive in the other. The caption reads *Signum ordinis sancta Trinitatis et captivorum*; in other words, this is the emblem of the Trinitarian Order. (See plate 7.) Many scholarly

⁵ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 369-95.

⁶ *Armatura fidei communiti, pro lege Dei se murum hilariter opponentes* (Cipollone, “Appendice Documentaria”, no. 18, p. 490). See J.J. Gross, “Inter Arma Caritas: The Early Trinitarian Story”, paper delivered at the International Medieval Studies Congress, Western Michigan University, 7-10 May 1998.

⁷ Trinitarian Rule (RT), no 2, in MS Reg. Vat. 4, fol. 126v, facsimile in *Liberazione dei ‘captivi’*, ed. Cipollone, p. 387. Cf. the Mishnaic dictum: “Captives should not be ransomed for more than their value as a precaution for the general good” (*Gittin* 4:6).

studies have been devoted to the iconography of this emblem.⁸ In my opinion, this mosaic represents a captive exchange. As the Trinitarians saw their vocation as identification with Christ, the exchange of captives by the Redeemer served as an exemplar for their redemptionist activity.⁹

Innocent III's letter of introduction to Miramolinus (probably the emir of the faithful), the Emir of Morocco, dated 8 March 1199, does not mention the Trinitarians by name but seems to describe the bearers of the letter as such:

Indeed some men, among whom are the bearers of this letter, not long ago were divinely inspired and established an order and its rule, on the basis of which they must use for the ransom of captives one-third of all the revenue which they now have or which they will acquire in the future. Moreover, in order that they may be more able to carry out their project – and because it is often easier to set a captive free from imprisonment through an exchange than by ransom – they have been authorized to ransom pagan captives from Christians and then exchange them for the liberation of Christian captives. Hence, we have deemed it appropriate to inform you by this apostolic letter about the undertakings of which we have spoken, since they benefit both Christians and pagans.¹⁰

Letters of introduction to ensure safe-conduct of mediators were not unusual either in the Latin East or in Spain where the *exeas* and *alfaques* had been active for more than a century as negotiators and mediators for ransom. It is not clear why the mediators, who may have been John the Matha and some of the founding brothers of the Trinitarians, are not mentioned by name or order, nor why they chose Morocco as the place to center their efforts. North Africa became one of the main arenas of Trinitarian activity in later years,

⁸ See G. Cipollone, *Il mosaico de S. Tommaso in Formis a Roma (ca. 1210): contributo di iconografia e iconologia*, Ordinis Trinitatis Institutum Historicum, Series Miscellanea 1 (Rome, 1984) and the bibliography there.

⁹ Cf. A.A. Roest Crollius, "La liberazione dei 'cattivi' tra Christianità e Islam. Concluding Remarks: Anthropological and Theological Aspects", in *Liberazione dei 'cattivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 810 who sees the mosaic as representing the universality and solidarity expressed by Christ holding both Christian and Moor in his hands. Whereas this explanation fits modern religious sensitivities it seems anachronistic to attribute it to the thirteenth century.

¹⁰ *Inter opera misericordie*, Reg. Vat., vol. 4, fol. 148r-v, no. 9; Cipollone, "Appendice Documentaria", no. 26, p. 506, translation cited from J.J. Gross, "Christo in Captivis", 4.

where they ransomed captives taken by pirates or brought from Spain. We know nothing of the outcome of this particular mission, nor why no traces of similar Trinitarian activity on behalf of the numerous and needy captives of the Holy Land at the end of the twelfth century have survived.

Trinitarian activity covered all three phases of ransom: fund-raising, negotiations, and repatriation of the released captive. As a fund-raising mechanism the Trinitarians used propaganda campaigns; in Europe they sometimes begged as a means of raising funds. Once the funds were collected, the Trinitarians either paid the sums or financed the ransom temporarily, on the assumption that the captive would eventually repay the money. To ransom a captive without expectation of remuneration was an exceptional eleemosinary deed of helping the poor. Presumably practiced from the late twelfth century by the Trinitarians, there is explicit evidence for ransom payments by a redemptionist order a generation later: the Mercedarian Order in Spain.¹¹ Even in a case where the ransomer extended credit for the ransom payment this was deemed an act of charity, as his chances of recovering his money were slim.

Negotiations differed according to the rank of the captive involved. In the case of an important personality negotiations for his or her release often took place on an international diplomatic level. In the case of a simple warrior or civilian, negotiations focused mainly on the economic aspect, including bargaining over the price. This stage was the most dangerous and complex part of redemptionist activity, as it often involved entering hostile territory.

The final stage of Trinitarian activity on behalf of captives involved their repatriation and care. This might mean simply tending to the captive's physical needs upon return in a hospital, providing economic assistance toward a new start in his or her former society, or even psychological and religious assistance with the sociological problems a captive confronted upon returning home after an extended absence. In practice, the responsibility for all three facets of ransoming captives meant that the Trinitarians acted on three levels: they organized fund raising in Europe, two-thirds of which was slated for the upkeep of their members and one-third for ransom; they had to choose members who were capable negotia-

¹¹ Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 115.

the Iberian peninsula.”³² Cipollone pointed out that the Trinitarians were more prominent in Europe than in the Holy Land.³³ Brodman described the Order of Merced, “as a regional order of the Church, the product of the distinctive warfare along the Spanish frontier, an order which grew out of local circumstances. Mercedarians thus confined their ministry and alms activities to those frontier provinces of Europe where residents experienced the threat of capture. When their fellow redemptionists, the Trinitarians, ventured beyond this zone, it was as hospitallers, not as ransomers.”³⁴ It would certainly be untenable to claim, as Brodman does, that the threat of captivity was less real or frequent in the East, yet he correctly states that the institutionalized organization of ransom was slow to emerge there.

The minor role played by the Trinitarians in ransoming captives in the Holy Land remains puzzling. Cipollone explains this as the result of the high rank and price of the prominent captives, who were ransomed privately or by other orders. As the Trinitarians did not ransom the magnates who could manage alone but rather concentrated on the poor and lowborn more in need of their help, the chroniclers, who deemed such captives unimportant, did not mention them. Therefore Trinitarian activity in the East is not well documented.³⁵

It is possible that the absence of records of Trinitarian activity in their early years can be attributed to the time it took to get organized and raise sufficient funds for the order’s direct needs and for ransom as well. Not all of the Trinitarian foundations were located in areas where it was necessary to ransom captives. Some of the foundations, such as Fontainebleau (1260, a church and hospital) and Meaux (changed to a Trinitarian hospital in the mid-thirteenth century) were situated far from the sea or the frontier; therefore the obligatory third part mentioned in the rule was not used for ransom in those houses. Such houses and a long list of others provided economic backing for the activity of houses located closer to the frontier. Of forty-three foundations established during the first generation of Trinitarians, at least seventeen were hospitals. Apparently, taking care of returning captives and nursing them back to good

³² Forey, “Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives”, 279.

³³ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 442-44.

³⁴ Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 120.

³⁵ Cipollone, “Les Trinitaires”, 75-87.

health, as well as local charity, not necessarily connected to captives, were their *raison d'être*.

The question of how and why a monastic order became popular, prestigious, and considered worthy of support has been frequently discussed.³⁶ This is not a theoretical question. It had bearing on the recruitment of new members as well as on the order's ability to convince prospective donors that the order's cause and way of life were significant enough to ensure that the donor would derive maximum spiritual benefit from his donation. A steady flow of donations and recruits ensured the existence and growth of the order, and its enhanced prestige attracted yet more members.

Any donation to a religious cause could be defined as alms (*elemosina*) – charity. The popularity of certain kinds of charity can serve as an indicator of the social values of the society in which the donor lived, and the prestige he hoped to attain via his contribution. Thus, for example, donations to build and pay for the upkeep of bridges were regarded as a worthy charity, the individual's grant for societal welfare.³⁷ The sums given to different charities may demonstrate their standing in the mentality of the period, as reflected in the grants made by a wealthy resident of Acre.

In 1264 Saliba, a confrère of the Hospitallers and a rich burgher of Acre made his will. Naturally, he gave large sums to the Hospital, and smaller amounts to diverse churches and monastic institutions. The Trinitarians rank low on the list, together with the confraternity of the Holy Spirit, which also dealt in ransoming captives.³⁸ They were bequeathed three besants each while the Carmelites received five besants and the leper hospital of St. Lazar six besants. The Hospitallers received, among other things, 475 besants.³⁹ Although this was the will of a private man, a wealthy Syrian Christian in Acre, and his affiliations and priorities may stem from personal reasons unknown to us, the ranking of donations may be an indication of the redemptionist orders' lack of prominence in Christian

³⁶ See, for example, H. Nicholson, *Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights: Images of the military orders, 1128-1291* (London, 1993) 57-68; M. Barber, *The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple* (Cambridge, 1994) 229-80.

³⁷ N. Brooks, "Medieval European Bridges: A Window onto Changing Concepts of State Power", in *Communities and Warfare, 700-1400* (London, 2000) 24-31.

³⁸ For the activities of the Order of the Holy Spirit, see RRH, no. 982 and the notes there. They were mainly a confraternity who pledged themselves to ransom their own members who fell into captivity.

³⁹ Delaville, *Cartulaire*, 3:91, no. 3105.

society in thirteenth-century Acre. Albeit, the Trinitarians had a place and were bequeathed a sum, but they were evidently regarded as a minor means of ensuring a place in heaven via charitable donating.

The redemptionist activity of military orders in the East

As noted, the older more established military orders were more prominent than the redemptionist ones in the Holy Land. The military orders in the East had some involvement in ransoming captives, although they did not see it as their main vocation as the redemptionist orders in Spain did. Nor did their activity encompass all three stages we outlined for the Trinitarian Order. It is possible that the institutionalization of ransom with the entry of the Trinitarians to the eastern arena sparked increased concern on the part of the military orders with freeing captives. The possibility of financial gain also played a role in this change.

The statutes promulgated by the Hospitaller General Chapter in 1182 define the amount of alms that ought to be given to a ransomed captive to make a new start, but say nothing about freeing him from captivity in the first place. Presumably they assumed that this would be done by somebody else, in most cases the captive himself.⁴⁰ In the preamble to a charter from 1201, the donor, Christiana, the daughter of Roger of Haifa, enumerates the charity of the Hospitallers toward the sick, the poor, and captives together, providing evidence that their rule of almsgiving was implemented and that in the early thirteenth century helping captives was among their charities. Christiana mentions not only the hospital as a worthy reason to give them charity, but also their work for captives – *captivis jugiter irrogantur*. We do not know if her knowledge came from personal experience. Even if it did not, the Hospitallers' assistance to captives is enumerated among the good works to which she contributed financially by becoming a *consoror*.⁴¹

Raymond of Tripoli confirmed the rights of the Hospitallers in

⁴⁰ *Idem etiam elemosinarius cuilibet capto cum primo a iugo captivitatis evellebatur, duodecim denarios de consuetudine erogavit* (Delaville, *Cartulaire*, 1:428, no. 627: *Statuts promulgués par le chapitre général de l'ordre sous le magistère de Roger de Molins*).

⁴¹ *...notum sit presentibus et futuris quod ego Christiana, filia quondam Rogerii de Cayphas, videns et perpendens immensa beneficia et elemosinas, que in sacra domo sancti Johannis Hospitalis Iherusalem infirmis pauperibus et captivis jugiter irrogantur, ad salutem animarum om-*

the ransom arrangements made by Louis for himself and his army. It seems that the orders were reluctant to pay large sums for the ransom of their captive brethren, but were happy to see the king do it in their stead. Thus, notwithstanding their apparent reluctance to ransom their members, the Hospitallers and the Templars did agree to treaties including exchanges of prominent captives from their ranks. In practice, the orders seem to have relied on royal assistance for ransom agreements, although they may have contributed to the financial side of the arrangement.⁵³

Although we have noted the Trinitarian presence in the Holy Land, and their papal backing and promotion, they do not seem to have made their mark in ransoming at the place they were sorely needed: the Latin East. Nine years after their inauguration, those in need of help still seem to have preferred the old-established institutions. The Hospitallers' Cartulary of Eterpigny (Picardy, France) mentions one Bartholomy of Mezières, who in 1207 was released from captivity as a result of the Hospitallers' negotiations. In return the order received an annual rent in wheat and oats. That same year John of Vilers, while in the Holy Land, granted the Hospitaller house of Eterpigny two mills in thanks for the order's involvement in his release from captivity.⁵⁴ John of Vilers fell into captivity together with Renaud, count of Dampierre. They had set out on the Fourth Crusade, but made for Syria instead of landing in Constantinople.⁵⁵ In June 1203 they were captured near Barin. Thirty years later Renaud came back, thanks to the ransom paid by the Hospitallers. He is found in Dampierre giving a charter, probably to raise money to pay back the ransom.⁵⁶ He then founded the commandery of Autrecourt (Haute-Court, commune d'Espence), which was later united with St. Amand, near Vitry. Renaud explicitly stated that the

⁵³ Forey, "Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives", 263-65.

⁵⁴ Cartulary of Eterpigny, MS Paris, BN, nov.acq.lat. 972, fols. 25-26, 57-58. I thank Judith Bronstein for the references from this MS.

⁵⁵ Alberic of Trois Fontaines, *Chronicon*, anno 1202, ed. M. Bouquet, *RHGF* 18 (Paris, 1879) 763.

⁵⁶ *Chartes des comtes de Dampierre*, ed. de Barthélémy in "Chartes de départ et de retour des comtes de Dampierre-en-Astenois IV^e et V^e croisades", 190-207.

century Latin Kingdom prevented the redemptionist orders from expanding the precarious foothold that they had barely achieved in the Holy Land. The involvement of the military orders in redemption of captives who were not members of their order indicates the spread of the idea that captivity required organizational solutions.

Other redemptionist orders

What happened to the other western redemptionist orders in the Holy Land? We have already seen that the late twelfth century was characterized by fresh ideals of religiosity that culminated in the new orders of mercy: Santiago, Merced, and the Trinitarians among others. One of their aims was to collect alms for the ransom of captives – their main task as they saw it. Therefore they took upon themselves the whole process of ransom, from sending envoys to negotiate with the enemy, to begging for alms for ransom money, and maintaining hospitals to care for the freed captives who were often asked to repay by contributing to charitable works. This kind of active social commitment may perhaps be compared to the Mendicant Orders, who in the West were supported by begging for alms. It should not surprise us that branches of the main orders played different roles in East and West.⁶⁶ After the fall of the Latin Kingdom, for example, the Franciscans in the East became the custodians of the holy places, as the ideals central to the order in Europe were not relevant in the post-Latin Kingdom period. We also have the strange case of the Order of Mountjoy, which underwent several permutations, including a period as a redemptionist order in the Holy Land.

There is evidence for brief activity in the Holy Land by this order, which was founded in Spain. As one of the less fortunate orders which did not experience much success in recruiting members and benefactions, Mountjoy changed its affiliation and charitable aims to gain more prestige and support. Its confusing history has

⁶⁶ Cf. B. Hamilton, "Ideals of Holiness: Crusaders, Contemplatives, and Mendicants", *Prayer, War, and Crusade* (Essays Commemorating the Nine-Hundredth Anniversary of the Proclamation of the First Crusade), *International History Review* 17 (1995) 693-712.

been a subject for scrutiny from Delaville le Roulx to Mayer and lately Forey and Pringle.⁶⁷ The monastery of Mountjoy at St. Samuel or Nabi Samwil started before 1131 as a Premonstratensian house of regular canons sponsored by Baldwin II and St. Bernard. Prior to 1153 it established a second center near Ramle,⁶⁸ which was considered a safer location than the hill outside Jerusalem. Its abbot Amalric was appointed bishop of Sidon.⁶⁹ Two generations later, in Spain, the Leonese Count Rodrigo Alvarez started a tortuous spiritual journey between different religious orders. In 1171 he entered the Spanish military order of Santiago, later a redemptionist order. Dissatisfied, he founded a new community, Mountjoy, which adopted the Cistercian rule and obtained its first grants in Aragon in 1174. Having obtained the patronage of Alfonso II of

⁶⁷ See J. Delaville le Roulx, "L'ordre de Montjoye", *Revue de l'Orient Latin* 1 (1893) 42-57; H.E. Mayer, "Sankt Samuel auf dem Freudenberge und sein Besitz nach einem unbekannten Diplom König Balduins V", *Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken* 44 (1964) 35-71; A. Forey, "The Order of Mountjoy", in *Military Orders and Crusades* (Aldershot, 1994), article 11, pp. 250-66; D. Pringle, *The Churches of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1993), s.v. *Kafr Jinnis*; *ibid*, vol. 2, s.v. *Mount Joy*.

⁶⁸ In 1131 Innocent II appointed another Premonstratensian named Amalric as official preacher. He took up his work in 1136 and was given the church of Habakkuk (probably Kafr Jinnis [Abbacuc de Cancie], grid ref. 141/156) and Joseph of Arimathea (Rantis) near Lydda, that is, in the lordship of Ramle. According to N. Backmund (*Monasticon Praemonstratense*, 2d ed. [Berlin, 1983] pt.2, 498, 507) they recruited well but did not succeed in the task of evangelization. Ramle was a town and center of a seignory and was probably fortified in the 1130s. It seems likely that it was considered safer than the shrine of St. Samuel. The two places were connected on the pilgrim route as both Fretellus and even the Jewish pilgrim Benjamin of Tudela went from one place to the other (from Hebron, to Beit Jibrin, to St. Samuel of Shiloh, to Mahomerie le petit, to Beit Nuba, and to Ramle): "Three parasangs further one reaches St. Samuel of Shiloh. This is the Shiloh which is two parasangs from Jerusalem. When the Christian captured Ramlah, the Ramah of old, from the Mohammedans, they found there the grave of Samuel the Ramathite close to a Jewish synagogue. The Christians took the remains, conveyed them unto Shiloh, and erected over them a large church, and called it St. Samuel of Shiloh unto this day.... Thence three parasangs to Rams, or Ramleh, where there are remains of the walls from the days of our ancestors, for thus it is written upon the stones. About 300 Jews dwell there. It was formerly a very great city; at a distance of two miles there is a large Jewish cemetery" (Benjamin of Tudela, *The Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela*, ed. M.N. Adler [1907; reprint, New York: Feldheim, n.d.] 26-27). Another Premonstratensian fortified tower was Bethenase (Burj Bait Nasif, grid ref. 151/147).

⁶⁹ WT, XVII, 26: *substitutus est ei dominus Amalricus, pie in domino recordationis, abbas canonicorum regularium ordinis Premonstratensis, in eo loco qui dicitur Sancti Abacuc sive Sancti Ioseph, qui cognominatus est ab Arimathia, vir simplex ac timens deum... Qui in ecclesia*

Aragon, he was endowed with the newly conquered Teruel (Spain), which later became a center for ransoming captives. The order was named the Military Order of Mountjoy in 1180 in a papal confirmation, which also refers to its possessions in the Holy Land.⁷⁰ Alexander III issued two confirmations of the order's possession in 1180. Royal patronage was promised by Baldwin IV's confirmation of the grants made to Count Rodrigo: "on the condition that if Rodrigo will not fight the Saracens perpetually he shall return the land, and that he will give the same part of the spoils of war to the king that the Hospitallers do".⁷¹ In other words, the foundation had become a military order.

In 1188 the order was joined to the Hospital of the Holy Redeemer at Teruel. Its main objective from then on was the ransom of captives: ten *maravedis* were to be contributed toward the ransom of each prisoner.

The papal confirmation of 1180 mentions that Rodrigo had begun to build a chapel at Mountjoy outside Jerusalem, which was not completed at the time: "And your church that you have started to build by the same house and the chapel that you constructed in solitary places, that is miles away from cities, castles and villages".⁷² Archeological excavations conducted during recent years by Michael Dadon and Isaac Magen place this sentence in a new light. The excavations uncovered a large compound approximately 100x50 meters

Liddensi...munus consecrationis dicitur recepisse. Note that WT sees the two places as one and connects them both to Abacuc. The consecration was naturally held in Lydda, the episcopal city, but Amalric was probably connected to Ramle.

⁷⁰ RRH, II, 553a: *Balduinus IV, rex Hierosolymitanus, comiti Roderico, magistro ordinis "d'Avis", quae Raynaldus, olim princeps Antiochiae, postea dominus Montis regalis et Ebronensis, consensu Stephaniae uxoris, Honfredi et Isabellae liberorum, Guillelmi, comitis Ascalonitani et Joppensis et Isabellae comitissae donaverat* (William Longspear married Isabelle in Oct. 1176; d. June 1177) *scilicet magnam partem terrae cum casalibus ea conditione confirmat, ut nisi Rodericus in perpetuum contra Saracenos bellaret, hanc terram donatoribus reddat et semper eandem partem praedae bello captae, quam fratres Hospitalis dare tenentur regi, concedat.* For the full text see Delaville, "Montjoye", 52. The Military Order of Evora (c.1166) was affiliated to Calatrava, became its Portuguese branch, moved its headquarters to Avis (South Portugal) and was renamed d'Avis. It seems unlikely that Rodrigo headed that order too. See also T.M. Vann, "A New Look at the Foundation of the Order of Calatrava" in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions: Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O'Callaghan*, ed. D.J. Kagay and T.M. Vann (Leiden, 1998) 93-114.

⁷¹ Forey, "Mountjoy", 254-57.

⁷² *...et ecclesia vestra, quam apud prefatam domum edificare cepistis, et oratoria que in locis solitariis, scilicet per miliare a civitatibus, castris villisque remotis, construxeritis...* (Delaville, "Montjoye", 52).

The growth of redemptionist orders in Europe, with branches in the Latin East, plus the involvement of military orders in some aspects of ransom, reflect the shift from captivity as an individual predicament to a problem necessitating institutional intervention. Trinitarian ideology brought with it a change in the image of the captive from that of cowardly failure to heroic soldier for Christianity. The establishment of the Trinitarian Order decisively altered the conception of the captive and society's perception of him, even if we are unable to prove broad-branched activity on the order's part in the Latin East. We shall see further indications of this significant shift in the literary descriptions of captivity that are the subject of the next chapter.

parochie iure. 7c. usq; salus privilegij pontificu Romanoru. Ad h nouas 7
indebitas exactiões. 7c. usq; phibem. Sepulturam q; ipi loci. 7c. usq; cōpa as
sumuntur. Decimas preterea 7 poss. 7c. usq; de nra aūc factas. Obeunte u te
ne eide loci porilla. 7c. usq; puidint eligendā. Paci q; 7 tñqllitati iure. 7c.
usq; audeat exercere. p retea os libtates 7 imunitates. 7c. usq; 9 munimul.
Decernim g. 7c. usq; pfuturi. Salua se. ap. aūc 7 diocesanoy epoy canoica
iustitia. Siqua g. 7c. usq; distete subiaceat ultioni. Cunctis aut. 7c. usq;
inueniant. Am. Am. Am. Dat. Lateran p manu magri Willi Notary sce
Romān ecclie 7 Vicecellary. ij. K. Jan. Indic. xi. Incarnatiōis dnice
Ann. m. cc. xxxvij. Pont uero doni GRISORDII. pp. viij. Ann. vndecimo.

Religiosam uitam. 7c. usq; infringat. . . m mstro domus sce Trinitatis 7 captuoy
Capitil in dno fil uris iustis postulationib; ei; srib; tā pntib; q; futuris reglare
clemtē annuū. 7 Domum sce Trinitatis 7 Captuoy in qua uita pfectis impm.
diuino. 7c. usq; 9 munim. Statuentes ut quascūq; possessiōes quicq; bona ead do
mus impntiay. 7c. usq; uocabulis. Locum ipm in quo pfata Dom sita ē cū oib;
ptinetijs ff. Domos sitas an domū uiam in Accon. quas sub ppetuo annuo censu
tenetis a Rege Jerlimitan. Domos 7 Curtem quas habetis post ecclia sce Cateri
ne de Campobelly sitas in Suburbio Acconen. Domos sitas in Capo Epi Acconen.
Jardinum q uulgarit quarebaches appellatur que ab epo 7 ecclia Acconen tenetis
sub annuo cēsu octo bicatioy sitū int Cimiteriū sci Nicolai 7 fossatū Ciuitatis
Acconen. Annuum redditum Quatraginta bicatioy sarracenat que de dono i
clite re. Johis regis 7 m. Regine Jerlimitan habetis 7 possidetis in redditib; re
gis in Accon vineam q; ortum 7 tiam cultam 7 incultam Turrim 7 domos in
eis edificatas q sub ānuo censu duodecim bicatioy a moialib; sci Lagari de Be
thania tenetis sita sup mare uix douaria Templi. Ecclia 7 hospitale sci mi
chael ext muros Cesarce palestine. 7 tiam 7 ortū sibi ptigua. Duo Casalia
quoy unum belueer 7 aliud casalin uulgarit appellatur. cum domib; tris cul
tis 7 incultis nemorib; arborib; fructiferib; 7 instructiferis. aqs puteis 7 oib;
alijs ptinetijs ff. Annuū redditū Centum modioy frumti ad msiuā Cesa
rce palestine papienū in ortis ecclie Cesarien tpe array. Domos quas ha
betis in suburbio Joppen. Eccliam 7 hospitale sci Nicolai in Ciuitate Berthen
cū domib; sibi adiacentib; necn ortis uineis tris cultis 7 incultis sitis in
territorio Berthen. 7 cū annuo redditu decē 7 Octo modioy frumti 7 Quinqu
gita Jartis unū tpe vndemay ad msiuā regalem. Ex dono cla. me. Regis
Baldouī annuū redditū duodecim bicatioy sarracenat in redditib; Ciuitatis
7 Territorij Berthen ad dcām eccliam 7 hospitale sci Nicolai spectantem. nec
nō poss alias cū ptis uineis nemorib; 7c. usq; imunitatib; ff. San Noua
lum urōy. 7c. ut sup. usq; exhibe. Obeunte u te ne eide loci m mstro. 7c.
ut sup. usq; p di timorem puidint eligendū. Paci q; 7c. ut sup. usq; in fi
nem. Dat. ut sup. . . Epō Balneoregen.

Sicut ubi iniquitatis filios tra confunderet. 7 iniquitates eoy celi syda reuelarent
ac manifestaret ipoy scelā toti mundo ut nō solum hoies sz 7 elemta ipa cōmiserent
i eoy excoium 7 ruinam ut eēt cūctis gntib; in sibilum 7 stuporem. ultio de illis
sumi n poss; sufficēs siue digna. Nam sic eos ppa excoauit malitia q nec ipos cō
pescuit nra 7 frūm nūoy pntia quoy saltem facies enibescē debuerūt. nec inhi
bitio plies inculcata. 7 excois snia in. potestatem Consiliū 7 Aldebandinū q
se gerit p Baluo Cōmunitatis Vitby ac seqces eoy a nob; plata potuerit aliqten

Gregory IX's confirmation of Trinitarian holdings in the Holy Land.
(Rome, Vatican Library, Reg. Vat 18, fol 345v [ep. 341]).

CHAPTER NINE

SHAMEFUL FAILURE OR ROMANTIC HERO: IMAGES OF CAPTIVITY

Having explored the practical shift in treatment of the problem of captivity in the Latin East, it remains to consider its literary expression in the western homelands. Literary representations, both historiographical and poetic, reflect if not medieval reality then medieval mentality. In a sense, changes in mentality may have deeper long-term significance than practical actions; thus the relevance of literary sources in addition to record sources to our study of captives and ransom.¹

Medieval historiography concerned itself mainly with the story of the victorious warriors. The story of the vanquished was better not dwelt upon. When they did describe downfall the chroniclers usually explained the fate of the defeated as a result of sin or failure to maintain divine standards. Another possible way of treating defeat was to transform it into victory by depicting the slain in battle as heroes and martyrs. The death of the warrior thus became a religious motif, and was thereby awarded an added dimension of value. The main theme of the chroniclers was, however, the victory in the East, replete with miracles proving God's special intervention. The Crusades were seen by the chroniclers as *Dei Gesta per Francos*, God's action in history. Thus the Crusades were a worthy object for study by historians, and no detail was considered superfluous.

The captive, however, did not fit this pattern of heroism and victory. Whether a soldier vanquished in battle or a conquered civilian, having lost his freedom yet being alive and not a dead hero, the captive posed a real problem. For the crusader leadership this problem

*An earlier version of this chapter appeared as "Jämmerlicher Versager oder romantischer Held? Gefangenschaft während der Kreuzfahrer-Epoche", in *In der Hand des Feindes: Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. R. Overmans (Köln, 1999) 119-40.

¹ N. Daniel, *Heroes and Saracens: A Re-interpretation of the Chansons de Geste* (Edinburgh, 1984) 1-20. See also P.R. Grillo, "Chronicles and the Continuations of the Old French Crusade Cycle", *Studi Medievali* 37 (1996) 905-16.

was twofold: a technical problem of how to deal with one's fellow-warriors taken captive by the enemy, and the shattering of the image of the triumphant Christian warrior winning the day against the Saracens. Medieval discourse, as expressed by historians and chroniclers and literary recounting, treated these problems differently and developed distinct images of captivity. The demarcation between contemporary historiography and literature – the same story told in a *chanson de geste*, an epic poem of chivalry – is often blurred, because both sources strive to paint an edifying picture of events. This made way for the so-called historical romance, “that form of narrative where historic truth decks itself out with all the pomp and trappings of her sister, Fiction”.² The chronicler presumes to tell what happened, while the troubadour often found it more interesting to tell what ought to have happened. Both, however, wanted to convey the significance of events for posterity. This examination of the development of the image of the captive in historical and literary sources raises some primary questions.

First, can we identify a link between the practical aspects of ransoming or liberating captives and changes in the image of captives? Did the greater familiarity with the enemy that emerged from captivity and the need for negotiations between the fighting parties influence the conceptualization of captivity? How did the writers – poets and chroniclers – come to terms with the gap between their preconceptions and reality? And to what can we attribute the concomitant changes in outlook?

Searching for changes in medieval mentality and concepts is a tricky business, as such changes were usually very slow and often almost imperceptible. They are generally not explicitly mentioned by the sources. Nor can we rely solely on historical sources, with their descriptions of battles and their outcomes. The literary image of the battlefield and its repercussions in the chansons, although only remotely connected to ‘what really happened’, may often show the deeper trends of changing perceptions.

As in life, the literary image of captivity encompasses four different phases: the circumstances leading to captivity, life in captivity,

² T.A. Archer, “The Council of Clermont and the First Crusade”, *Scottish Review* 26 (1895) 293, cited by S.B. Edgington, “Albert of Aachen and the *Chansons de Geste*”, in *The Crusades and Their Sources: Essays Presented to Bernard Hamilton*, ed. J. France and W.G. Zajac (Aldershot, 1998) 23-37.

relations between captor and captive, and, finally, the termination of captivity. In all these phases we can discern the polarized tendencies of the authors: to emphasize the captive's shameful ignominy or to convert him into a hero.

The circumstances leading to captivity

The narratives vary in depicting the events leading to captivity, ranging from a detailed description of the battle and circumstances of capture to a swift, superficial mention of the bare fact. Some literary narratives do not even mention the loss of liberty, as if captivity were simply a happenstance, the starting point for the story of the hero-in-the-making.

The historian William of Tyre minces no words as to the ignominy of the captives, stemming from the circumstances of their defeat. In his eyes, the captive had chosen a shameful life over heroic death. When William of Tyre argued that captivity was a fate worse than death he may have captured the feeling prevalent in the pre-Hattin Crusader Kingdom. Time and again he emphasized the shame connected to defeat and captivity. Witness his description of the Battle of Malha (1157):

A very large number of our leaders were taken prisoner that day, but very few were killed. For all indiscriminately, warriors renowned for wisdom and experience in war and common soldiers alike, to save their miserable lives surrendered without resistance like the lowest slaves, utterly regardless of the *shameful yoke* of slavery and the *ignominy* which would cling to their names *forevermore*.³

This historian of the Crusader Kingdom made certain that *perpetua infamia* would cling to the names of the prisoners by explicitly naming the leaders taken captive.⁴ In William of Tyre's opinion it was not the loss of status and liberty that made the captive despi-

³ *Capta est illa die de principibus nostris maxima multitudo, cesi vero pauci, nam omnes indifferenter, tam qui rei militaris dicebantur habere prudentiam et usum precipuum quam gregarii, hostibus, tanquam vilia mancipia ignominiose servitutis iugum et perpetue infamie notam non abhorrentes, ut misere vite consulerent sine contradictione se tradebant...* (WT, XVIII, 14; lines 8-14, 830-831; trans., 2:261).

⁴ "Among the prisoners were the noble and distinguished Hugh d'Ibelin; Eudes de Saint-Amand, the king's marshal; John Gotmanus; Rohard of Jaffa and

cable, but rather the circumstance of surrender without a serious fight. In the case of the Battle of Malha, this was proved by the fact that many were taken prisoner and only a few killed. William's harsh judgment on the renowned warriors stemmed from the battle's outcome, although he himself noted that the ambush laid by Nur-ed-Din left the Franks little chance of victory. At the same time he interpreted the battle and its results as divine punishment for the warriors' sins.⁵ With both military strategy and God's wrath working against them, one would think the nobles had little choice but to surrender, but that was not the way William saw it. In his eyes, they were clearly despicable failures.⁶

In his description of the Battle of Artah between the Franks and Nur-ed-Din in 1164, William of Tyre castigated those warriors who preferred captivity to death even more adamantly:

Overwhelmed and shattered by the sword of the enemy, they were *shamefully* slain like victims before the altar. No one called to mind his former valor; no one, remembering his own prestige and that of his fathers, strove to avert disaster or to fight for the defense of liberty and the glory of his ancestors. *Regardless of honor* all threw down their arms precipitately and *ignominiously* begged for life, which would have been better expended in fighting manfully for the fatherland as an example for posterity.... To save their lives even at the *cost of shame and reproach*, Bohemond, prince of Antioch, and Raymond, count of Tripoli, surrendered to the enemy. Colman, the governor of Cilicia, Hugh de Lusignan, who was mentioned above, Joscelin III, son of Joscelin II, count of Edessa, and many other nobles followed the same course. Chained like the lowest slaves, they were led *ignominiously* to Aleppo, where they were cast into prison and became the *spectacle* of the infidels.⁷

The historian's harsh judgment on the captives, explicitly preferring their death to captivity and castigating them as shameful cowards,

Balian, his brother; Bertrand de Blanquefort, the master of the Knights of the Temple, a religious and God-fearing man; and many others whose names are unknown to us" (ibid.).

⁵ See also WT, IX, 21; trans., 1:411: "Lord Bohemond himself, because of his sins (*peccatis exigentibus*), was captured by the enemy and thrown into chains."

⁶ See Pope Adrian IV's letter to Samson, archbishop of Rheims, in which he wrote that 87 Templars (*novi Machabei*) and 300 knights were captured or killed because of our sins (*peccatis exigentibus*). *Epistolae Adriani IV Papae*, ep. 34, in RHGF 15 (Paris, 1878) 681.

⁷ WT, XIX, 9; trans., 2:307-8 (slightly revised).

may have served a double purpose: to advocate prowess in battle, and also to alleviate the problem of captivity. If the captive was to blame for his failure, this considerably lessened his fellow-fighters' responsibility for his future welfare. We have seen above the prevailing reluctance of the first generations of crusaders to pay ransom to free their comrades.⁸ Public opinion that condemned the captive as a coward responsible for his own failure made this reluctance less reprehensible, and alleviated the burden of responsibility. Thus it was possible to see captivity as an exceptional occurrence, something outside the purview of a valiant knight.

But captivity was a fact of life in a frontier society like the Kingdom of Jerusalem and not only lowborn soldiers were captured. If important nobles like the leaders mentioned above could be described as 'regardless of honor' we can assume that this image applied to any captive. The most striking example is Baldwin II, king of Jerusalem, himself taken prisoner in 1123 as described by Fulcher of Chartres:

At that time it happened that Baldwin, king of the people of Jerusalem, was captured. For Belek who some time before had taken Joscelin and Galeran as prisoners now seized Baldwin also. The latter had not expected this and was not prepared. Nothing could have been more joyful to the pagans or more horrible to the Christians.⁹

How did a fighting society that viewed its captives as miserable failures cope with such a situation? Fulcher of Chartres, chaplain to King Baldwin I and contemporary historian of Baldwin II, made a curious attempt to explain the events:

We had lost Baldwin, but we had adopted God as King of all.... Perhaps he was no king whom we had lost by accident, but He who recently won the victory is not only King in Jerusalem but over all the Earth.¹⁰

It is significant that Fulcher preferred to gloss over the events leading to the king's capture as an accident,¹¹ assigning no blame to

⁸ See chapter 1.

⁹ FC, III, 16, 1; trans., pp. 239-40.

¹⁰ FC, III, 21, 2; trans., p. 245.

¹¹ It was an accident. But there were other cases of captivity caused by accident that were severely criticized. See, for example, WT, XVII, 11; trans., 2:201: "Joscelin the Younger, count of Edessa, was far inferior to his father in character. He was a lazy, idle man, given over to low and dissolute pleasures.... Attended only by a young

his king. The anomaly of a king in captivity made him doubt not the image of the captive, but rather Baldwin's status as true king! We may note that Fulcher was apparently not the only one in the kingdom who doubted the sovereignty and legitimacy of a captured king. According to Galbert of Bruges, the council of Jerusalem offered the kingdom to Charles of Flanders who refused to accept it.¹² The rumors that instead of ransoming their king for an enormous sum of money, some of his subjects preferred to offer the crown of Jerusalem to another candidate must have damaged the king's reputation. Only after the king managed to ransom himself following sixteen months in captivity did his prestige rebound, and even then the chronicler Fulcher of Chartres still reminded the reader of his former ignominy:

After he had by now been trampled upon for a long time and brought to the lowest point by the wheel of fortune, and had almost come to the point of giving up shamefully and miserably, now by the will of God the king was made strong again and restored to his pristine glory.¹³

As long as the king still owed money to free the hostages he had given as surety for his ransom, he was "obliged to be anxious about a future that was uncertain and doubtful" according to Fulcher.¹⁴ Any trace of the shameful event and its economic repercussions had to be wiped out to attain honor. By way of contrast we may note the eulogy written by Ibn al-Qalanisi after Baldwin's death:

He was an old man whom time had worn down with its hardships, and who had suffered many rigours of fortune from its vicissitudes and calamities. On many occasions he fell into the hands of the

man who was leading his horse, he had left his escort and turned aside to relieve the needs of nature, when, unknown both to those ahead and those following, he was attacked by brigands who rushed forth from ambush. He was seized and led in chains to Aleppo. There, overcome by the squalid conditions of the prison and the heavy iron chains, wasted by mental and physical sufferings, he reaped the result of his dissolute ways and came to a wretched end."

¹² Galbertus Notarius Brugensis, *De multro, traditione, et occisione gloriosi Karoli comitis Flandriarum*, chap. 5, lines 1-11.

¹³ FC, III, 44, 2, 3; trans., 281.

¹⁴ FC III, 38, 1; trans., p. 272.

Muslims as a prisoner, in times both of war and of peace, but he always escaped from them through his famous devices and historic stratagems. After him there was none left amongst them possessed of sound judgment and capacity to govern.¹⁵

In writing about enemy captives, Fulcher adopted a condescending attitude and, although willing to see captivity as a better choice than death, it was nonetheless unequivocally connected to shame: "Battle is dangerous, flight is shameful; but it is preferable to live as a weakling, than to be dead and to mourn forever. And so the Turks chose flight in order to retain life."¹⁶

The feeling of shame connected to captivity was so universal that even Jewish exegesis equated the two: "A man of flesh and blood, if he has a relative who is a captive, is ashamed to admit he is a relative. Not so the Holy One, blessed be He, who liberated his captive people from Egypt and calls them *the people nearest him* (Ps. 148:14)."¹⁷ Thus even the Egyptian captivity was in principle connected to shame by a people proud of its concern for captives.

The shame associated with capture may have been one of the reasons that the Frankish prisoners in the Latin Kingdom had to ransom themselves. We have seen that after the Battle of Malha (1157), the king who had himself 'wisely'¹⁸ fled the battlefield did not contribute towards the ransom of his soldiers and let them fend for themselves. Even Johannes Gutman, who had been willing to give his horse to save the king's life in 1147,¹⁹ had to sell his manor-house Bayt 'Itab near Jerusalem and four other casalia to raise 1,400 besants for his ransom.²⁰ Additional captives taken during this battle, including Ralph, the vassal of Hugh of Ibelin, and Hugh of Ibelin himself, had to sell their property to raise funds for their

¹⁵ Ibn al-Qalanisi, *Damascus Chronicle*, trans. Gibb, 208.

¹⁶ FC, III, 50, 12; trans., p. 291: *Gravis quidem pugna ignominiosa est fuga, sed tolerabilius est infirmum vivere quam mortuum in aeternum plangere. Itaque Turci elegerunt fugam, ut retinerent vitam.*

¹⁷ *Midrash Tehillim*, Psalm 4. For another English translation, see *The Midrash on Psalms*, trans. William G. Braude, Yale Judaica Series 13 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959) 1:69.

¹⁸ WT, XVIII, 14. Cf. Ralph Niger, *De re militari et triplica via peregrinationis Ierosolimitane*, I, 42, p. 117. In his opinion flight from the enemy (i.e., sin) is preferable to captivity.

¹⁹ WT, XVI, 10.

²⁰ RRH, no. 368, p. 97; Ellenblum, *Frankish Rural Settlement*, 161-62.

ransom.²¹ The king's only contribution was to confirm the sales.²² Crusader society did not take financial responsibility for its captives and preferred to place the burden on the captive himself.

Having noted the negative image of the captive in the early histories, it may seem strange that the romantic epic of the First Crusade, the so-called Old French Crusade Cycle, chose the captive as one of its heroes. *Les Chétifs* tells the fictitious story of the adventures of a group of noble captives.²³ The same heroes figure prominently in the *Chanson d'Antioche*²⁴ and in the *Chanson de Jérusalem*.²⁵ In *Les Chétifs* the poet changes the character of captivity radically. The captive, Richard de Chaumont, is not a weak man who has lost his freedom as a result of failure, but rather the savior of his captor Corbaran (a literary adaptation of Kerbugha of Mosul). Corbaran needs the captive's prowess to purge himself of the accusation of treason after his defeat at Antioch. In another episode the captive Harpin de Bourges saves the captor's son from wild animals. Again, the captives are strong and capable of fighting, *grans ert sa vertus*,²⁶ *preus estes et senés*,²⁷ *cevaliers hardis*.²⁸ In other words they are ideal knights,²⁹ and their captor is dependent on them. The reality must

²¹ Delaborde, *Chartes de Terre Sainte provenant de l'abbaye de Notre Dame de Josaphat*, no. 32, p. 78; RRH, no. 360, dated 1160.

²² RRH, nos. 360, 368. The king may have helped Bertrand de Blanquefort who appears as witness on a charter from November 1160 (RRH, no. 355). For the problem of ransom in the Military Orders, see Forey, "Military Orders and the Ransoming of Captives", 259-79.

²³ *Les Chétifs*, ed. G.M. Myers (Tuscaloosa, 1981). Myers tries to connect the captives to historic personalities in his "Le développement des *Chétifs*: la version fécampoise?" in *Les Épopées de la Croisade: Zeitschrift für französische Sprache und Literatur*, ed. K.-H. Bender and H. Kleber, Beiheft NF 11 (Stuttgart, 1987) 84-90; see also G.H.M. Claassens, "The Cycle de la Croisade: Vernacular Historiography", in *Cyclification: The Development of Narrative Cycles in the Chansons de Geste and the Arthurian Romances*, ed. B. Besamusca, W.P. Gerritsen, C. Hogetoorn, and O.S.H. Lie, Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, deel 159 (Amsterdam, 1994) 184-88; A. Hatem, *Les poèmes épiques des croisades: Genèse-historicité-localisation* (Paris, 1932).

²⁴ *La Chanson d'Antioche*, pp. 44-54 and passim.

²⁵ *La Chanson de Jérusalem*, ed. N.R. Thorp, The Old French Crusade Cycle 6 (Tuscaloosa, 1991) 38-43, 93-97. I would like to thank Myriam Greilsammer for her assistance in interpreting the chansons.

²⁶ *Les Chétifs*, line 264.

²⁷ *Les Chétifs*, line 1839.

²⁸ *Les Chétifs*, lines 2805, 3206-7, 3735; Appendix 7, line 52.

²⁹ S. North, "The Ideal Knight as Represented in Some French Narrative Poems, c.1090-c.1240: An Outline Sketch", in *The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood*, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey, The Strawberry Hill Conferences (Bury St. Ed-

have been very different. Nonetheless, by creating this heroic literary image, the poet ameliorated the harsh facts and transformed the captive from victim to hero.

How did the valiant heroes of *Les Chétifs* become captives in the first place? In contrast to the historian, the poet prefers to introduce his heroes without going into detail about the military defeat. Only in line 456, when Richard introduces himself to Corbaran, does he say: '*A le mute fui pris en l'ost maistre Pieron*',³⁰ barely mentioning the fact that he was captured, without explaining how this came about. This appears after five lines in which he divulges his name, ancestry, and the aim of his pilgrimage. Those are the important characteristics worthy of elaboration. The military defeat is quickly passed over. Later, after the reader has learned about the courageous feats of the heroes, each is asked to relate the circumstances of his capture, but they have no individual stories to tell. The emphasis is placed rather on the large number of captives taken, which included more than fifty knights:³¹

*.VII. mil caitif et plus de gent desbaratee
De l'ost Pieron l'Ermite et prise et amenee
Par païenime fu vendue et acatee*³²

If more than seven thousand crusaders were conquered and captured, one could hardly blame the individual captives who were sold and bought by the pagans. A hundred lines later, the same number, seven thousand, is repeated as the number of prisoners,³³ and Baudouin de Beauvais, another heroic captive, tells the same story to Saint Michael.³⁴ When Harpin de Bourges, the third hero of *Les*

munds, 1986) 111-32; D. Jacoby, "Knightly Values and Class Consciousness in the Crusader States of the Eastern Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Historical Review* 1 (1986) 158-86.

³⁰ For the *mute* of Peter the Hermit, see D.A. Trotter, "The Vocabulary of Crusading in Old French", in *Medieval French Literature and the Crusades (1100-1300)* (Geneva, 1988) 40.

³¹ For example, *Les Chétifs*, line 1346: *Plus avons de .L. cevaliers adoubés*.

³² *Les Chétifs*, lines 1686-1688.

³³ *Les Chétifs*, line 1761; cf. lines 1794-1797: *Estoit en païenime uns hom escativés / De l'ost Pieron l' Ermite quant fu desbaratés, / Fu amenés et pris et des autres assés; / par païenime fu vendus et achatés* (difference in spelling in the original).

³⁴ *Les Chétifs*, line 2498.

Chétifs, again tells the story, repeating the number of fifty knights and providing some new details, the audience probably knew the rhymes by heart and captivity was no longer a shameful event.³⁵ The defeat faded into a versified background, sounding like a refrain, and did not blemish the captives' positive attributes.

Life in captivity

The early chroniclers supply some gruesome details of the fate of the captives, ranging from the enemy's use of torture to descriptions of foul, dark dungeons and heavy chains. The later *chansons des geste*, while repeating the same descriptions even more graphically, sometimes describe life in captivity very differently.

Most of the contemporary historians of the crusades either knew very little about the everyday life of the enemy, or in any event did not tell the reader much. If they wrote about conditions in prison, they emphasized its harsh elements and the captor's cruelty.³⁶ Even if the Latin historian was not familiar with the details of enemy treatment of captives, he could easily fill in the facts from his knowledge of his own camp, as torturing captives and keeping them under harsh conditions was not confined to the Muslim side. In this respect there were no marked differences between history and literature.³⁷ The preoccupation with torture and gruesome details, apart from reflecting the facts, may also reflect the authors' literary preferences. Thus, in his *Bella Antiochena* Walter the Chancellor spares no details in describing the sadistic torture of the captives taken after the Battle of *Ager Sanguinis* in 1119:

In the manner of dogs tied together two by two by the neck, waiting in a circle...to undergo the death sentence.... The badly wounded and the others, they fell at the hands of the heathen not only with their heads cut off but they even suffered agonizing death with the skin flayed from the living and half-severed head.³⁸

³⁵ *Les Chétifs*, lines 3654-3659.

³⁶ See chapter 5.

³⁷ See *Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 4373-4374.

³⁸ Walter the Chancellor, *Bella Antiochena*, VII, 1-5, pp. 91-92; trans., p. 132.

Walter the Chancellor's narrative, which depicts the Muslim victor al-Ghazi taking sadistic pleasure in seeing the misery of the captives while making fun of their suffering from heat and thirst, is one of the most graphic in twelfth-century historiography.³⁹ It should, however, be noted that Walter himself was among the captives and evidently described the horrors he himself had suffered or witnessed. Thus, while the torture may not have been so exceptional, the detailed description of it was an unusual theme in a historical narrative. It was, however, not unique. Witness the historian Guibert of Nogent's description of how Gervaise of Bazoches' head was made into a goblet:

The crown was then sawn from his head, and the rest was made into the form of a cup, as though to hold drinks for the king of Damascus, by whose order these acts had been done, to frighten our men. By dying to preserve the confession of his faith, this knight made himself a martyr who would be known for ages to come.⁴⁰

The motif of the martyr's head used as a chalice may have been connected to the imagery of the Holy Grail, the vessel containing the blood of Jesus and the literary symbol of chivalry. These descriptions were, however, exceptions. But the use of captives as targets for children or trainees to shoot at is repeated many times, both in the chansons and in the chronicles and it was probably a widespread form of torture.⁴¹

In *Les Chétifs* the horrors of captivity are not described following the defeat, but rather as part of the conditions in confinement. The chanson depicts the tribulations of everyday life in captivity, the hunger and thirst, the heavy iron chains, the gruesome jail,⁴² and worst of all, the need to labor physically, to work with the masons to construct walls, and being subjected to similar signs of slavery.⁴³

³⁹ Ibid., trans., pp. 133-34.

⁴⁰ Guibert de Nogent, *Dei Gesta per Francos*, VII, 49, lines 2143-2160; trans., p. 165.

⁴¹ *Les Chétifs*, lines 352-355. The chanson sees this form of torture as vengeance: *De vos se velt vengier, par le mien esciant/ Mis serés au bersail, si trairont li enfant,/ Et li mellor Turcople et tot li mius tirant*. Cf. OV, VI, 11, 26, p. 113; *Gesta Francorum* I, 2, p. 4; and WT, XII, 19.

⁴² *Les Chétifs*, lines 369-372.

⁴³ Ibid., lines 459-462: */ Maint service ai rendu escuier et garcon/ De lor herbe soier, [de] porter en maison/ Et de porter vo pierre, vo cauc et vo sablon./ Maint coup en ai recut de verge et de baston*. Cf. lines 630-631: *Cil seut porter le pierre, le cauc et le mortier, et si n'avoit de pain le jor c'un seul quartier*. In line 446 Calabre, the mother of Corbaran, explains that

mutual respect.⁵¹ (See plate 10.) Respect for the status of the vanquished captive often saved his life. Esteem for chivalry was also prominent in medieval Muslim society, and therefore noble captives were usually well treated. This was partly because of their financial value in case of ransom, but it was also deeply rooted in the warring society's social concepts. Thus, according to Orderic Vitalis, King Baldwin II and Joscelin were not asked to perform any tasks when in Balak's captivity, whereas all the other captives had to carry water and toil like beasts of burden.⁵²

The notion that noble captives ought to be treated according to their rank was deep-seated in Muslim tradition. An example of this respect for social class can be seen in the tenth-century chronicle of Mas'udi, which tells the story of a noble captive from the tribe of Quraish who is hit in the face and humiliated by his patrician Byzantine captor. The captive challenges the caliph Mu'awiya to redress the wrong done to him. When Mu'awiya is told of the insult he feels the most profound indignation. Through an intricate plot he ransoms the man of Quraish and manages to kidnap the patrician and bring him to his court. He then summons the insulted captive to a great hall thronged with the leading men at court and tells him:

Rise, take vengeance on this patrician who once struck you on the face on the carpet of the Greek ruler. We have neither abandoned you nor have we delivered up your honor or your blood.... Take care not to exceed the limits of what you received from him. Revenge yourself to the extent of the insult that he inflicted on you.⁵³

The story of Mu'awiya shows that the caliph admits his responsibility for the welfare of his men taken prisoner. He is insulted by the charge leveled against him that he does not protect his men, but he is not angry with the man of Quraish for having uttered the complaint. Retribution takes place publicly, in a large hall thronged with people who watch the spectacle. It should be noted that both captor

⁵¹ See P.R. Grillo, "The Saladin Material in the Continuations of the First Crusade Cycle", in *Aspects de l'épopée romane: mentalité, idéologie, intertextualités*, ed. H. van Dijk and W. Noomen (Groningen, 1995) 159-66.

⁵² OV, VI, 11, 26, p. 113.

⁵³ Mas'udi, *Meadows of Gold: Abbasids*, 8:75-88, par. 3202-3212, pp. 320-21.

and captive are from the aristocracy – a patrician and a man from the Quraish tribe. Commoners could probably not expect to be defended in the same way. The pride of the nobility was hurt and that was what Mu'awiya set out to redeem.

The same regard for rank and mutual respect of knights from both sides is expressed in the *Ordene de chevalerie*, a vernacular poem (ca. 1250). The poem provides a fictional account of how Hugh of Tiberias gained his liberty from Saracen captivity:⁵⁴ he had to instruct Saladin in the ritual of dubbing a Christian knight and to explain the symbolism of the constituent elements of the ceremony. Note the same motif as in *Les Chétifs*, of attaining freedom from captivity via chivalrous feats. This possibility assumes that both sides share this value. Whether the story has any factual basis is irrelevant. The main thing is the poet's notion that Hugh possessed something worth his ransom. He could offer his knowledge of the ritual of dubbing a knight, in other words the symbols of his rank and status that constituted a common bond between captor and captive. The motif of Saladin freeing a captive in return for initiation into the secrets of knighthood occurs many times in the romantic literature of the crusades. The most likely person to have knighted Saladin himself, if the story has any historical truth, was Humphrey of Toron, who significantly was accused of too great a familiarity with the Muslim leader.⁵⁵ That is the reconstruction of Saladin's biography offered by the *Itinerarium peregrinorum*: "He went as a candidate for knighthood to Enfrid of Turon, an illustrious prince of Palestine, and received the belt of knighthood from him in accordance with the rite of the Franks."⁵⁶ If this was indeed the case it shows the basic link of honor between professional soldiers, even if they were enemies.⁵⁷

Another crucial link between captor and captive was that of sexual abuse. Rape of captive women was so common that it was taken for granted. In crusader literature this phenomenon develops a new dimension. The self-image of the early crusaders was clearly that of victorious warriors who had God fighting on their side. In their minds, the Muslims believed in their superiority too and there-

⁵⁴ Keen, *Chivalry*, 6-8.

⁵⁵ WT, XXI, 8.

⁵⁶ *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, I, 3; trans., 27.

⁵⁷ Strickland, *War and Chivalry*, 25.

fore wanted to mate with the captives as a means of breeding better warriors. This feeling of superiority emerges very clearly in the writings of the early chroniclers, as seen for example from Raymond d'Aguilers' account of the aftermath of the capture of Jerusalem in August 1099:

However, news came that the king of Babylon had arrived in Ascalon with a large force of pagans with the purpose of storming Jerusalem, killing all of the Franks twenty years of age and above, and capturing the rest along with their women. He would, so rumor held, mate the young Frankish males with women of his race and the Frankish women with young males of his land and thereby breed a warrior race (*gens*) from Frankish stock.⁵⁸

Even if we do not translate *gens* as 'race' the text proves a Frankish self-image of superiority. This genetic prowess remains even when the battle has been lost.

The motif of romantic or sexual relations between captor and captive occurs quite often in crusader literature, so often that it must certainly reflect historical reality. When Fulcher said that many Franks had married women converted to Christianity, he probably had this kind of relationship in mind. Muslim literature is also replete with stories of intermarriages. In his anecdote-laden memoirs, Usamah ibn Munqidh, who had close relations with the Latin Kingdom, related several stories about marriages between Muslim captors and their Latin captives.⁵⁹ In the *Arabian Nights* a Muslim merchant falls in love with a Frankish woman and only succeeds in obtaining her as his wife after she is sold as a captive slave girl in Damascus.⁶⁰ In the fantasy of both sides, victory quite clearly included conquest in bed.

But crusader literature emphasized the motif of breeding, which is not necessarily an integral part of the intimate relations between captor and his captive. Ida, margravine of Austria, widow of Leopold III, set out with Duke Welf of Bavaria on the ill-fated crusade of

⁵⁸ Raymond d'Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, XXI: *nunciatum est nobis quod rex Babyloniorum Ascalonam venisset...et, ut nobis relatum est quod Iherusalem expugnare venerat, et occidere Francos omnes a viginti annis et supra, et captivare reliquos cum mulieribus, daturus viros mulieribus de sua gente, et juvenibus mulieres, ut Babyloniorum domini deinceps bellicosas familias haberent de genere Francorum*. English trans., p. 132.

⁵⁹ P.K. Hitti, trans., *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades: Memoirs of Usamah ibn-Munqidh* (New York, 1929).

⁶⁰ *Thousand Nights and a Night*, ed. Burton, 9: 19-24. See chapter 7.

1101 and disappeared during a battle. Ekkehard of Aura states that Ida was killed, but legend had it she was carried off by one of the Saracens and became the ancestor of Imad ed-Din Zengi: *et impurissimo sibi matrimonia copulavit ex eaque Sanguinem illum sceleratissimum, ut aiunt, progenuit.*⁶¹ Accordingly, Zengi, the archenemy of the Franks in the first half of the twelfth century, owed his prowess to western descent. In the same way the story of the Princess de Ponthieu claimed that Saladin was of Christian descent, which explains how a Muslim could be such a valiant warrior. In *Les Chétifs*, the old mother of Corbaran wants to entice Richard Chaumont to breed warriors (presumably ones better than her son Corbaran). The captive refuses:

*Li mere Corbaran le prist a embracier;
En se canbre le maine, se il velt dosnoier
U parler a pucele, bien s'i puet aaisier,
Car la vielle en vausist avoir .I. iretier.
Mais Ricars nel fesist*⁶²

Nor did this legendary need to breed Muslim progeny of Christian warriors stop at the relationship between the living. According to the *Itinerarium peregrinorum* one of Saladin's soldiers cut off the genitals of the Templar martyr Jakelin de Mailly, who fought bravely at the Battle of the Springs of Cresson (1 May 1187):

He cut off the man's genitals, and kept them safely for begetting children so that even when dead the man's members – if such a thing were possible – would produce a heir with courage as great as his.⁶³

While Muslim literature fantasized about beautiful captive women subdued by warfare, the Christian legends thought the enemy was mainly in pursuit of their precious genes, one way or another.

It is not always easy to distinguish between historical reality and literary embellishment. Romance sometimes invades the chronicles

⁶¹ Purcell, "Women Crusaders", 57-64. Cf. AA, VIII, 39: *Comitissa vero Ida utrum capta et abducta, an pedibus tot milium equorum membratim discerpta fuerit, usque in hodiernum diem ignoratur, nisi quod aiunt eam inter tot milia matronarum in terram Corrozana aeterno exilio deportatam.*

⁶² *Les Chétifs*, lines 646-650.

⁶³ *Itinerarium peregrinorum* I, 2; trans., p. 26. Nicholson sees the first chapters of the book as a source "thin on facts and heavy on dramatic effect". Ibid., p. 4.

too. Orderic Vitalis, a level-headed Anglo-Norman historian, tells the long and romantic story of Bohemond's release from capture.⁶⁴ Melaz, the beautiful daughter of Bohemond's captor Danishmend, freed the captives on condition that they would fight on her father's side against his brother. Thus, in the same way as in *Les Chétifs*, the Muslim captor needs the help and prowess of the vanquished Christian knight whom he has captured. After a long, adventurous story, Bohemond and his friends return triumphantly to Antioch, where Melaz receives baptism and marries a Christian knight. The facts were, alas, less heroic than Orderic would have us believe. Matthew of Edessa's report of the facts is much closer to what we know of the practice of ransom according to Eastern standards:

In this same year [1103-1104] the Frankish count Bohemond was ransomed from Danishmend for one hundred thousand *dahekans*; this was accomplished through the mediation and assistance of the great Armenian prince Kogh Vasil. This ruler donated ten thousand *dahekans* towards Bohemond's ransom money, while the count of Antioch, Tancred, gave nothing. Vasil collected the ransom money, doing all in his power to have it procured from every part of his territories. Finally he handed over the sum of one hundred thousand *dahekans* and had Bohemond brought to him.⁶⁵

Matthew provides the pertinent facts we are conversant with from ransom lists: the sum paid, by whom it was paid, and who negotiated the deal, usually a prominent individual. The sum in question, 100,000 *dahekans*, which is equivalent to a king's ransom in local besants, fits Bohemond's status as the prince of Antioch. Therefore Matthew's report sounds reliable. Another informant who was near the scene and ought to have known the facts was Fulcher of Chartres. But he only describes Bohemond's joyous reception by the people of Antioch after he was ransomed.⁶⁶ Albert of Aachen, who can be seen as the disseminator of the story as it reached Europe, has a very different narrative: he says that Bohemond offered Danishmend an alliance against Kilij Arslan in return for his freedom. The emir agreed, and the Latin patriarch of Antioch, the Armenian prince Kogh Vasil, and Baldwin of Edessa raised the money. After this the Seljuk sultan sent letters to Danishmend, condemning

⁶⁴ OV, V, 10, 24, pp. 354-78.

⁶⁵ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, part III, 14, pp. 191-92.

⁶⁶ FC, II, 23, 1.

him for allowing Bohemond to be ransomed. What all these accounts have in common is the fact that Bohemond was ransomed in exchange for monetary payment.

Orderic Vitalis' intricate, romantic story of the enamored princess Melaz who frees Bohemond and uses his prowess to beat her father's enemies differs from the above narratives. In it Bohemond gains his freedom fighting for his captor. The story's happy end is, however, a little unexpected: according to the conventions of the genre Bohemond ought to have married the beautiful princess. He avoids this by using the weak excuse that he is obligated to return to Europe to fulfill his religious vow to Saint Leonard of Noblac. He promptly whisks the lady over to one of his young nobles in Antioch. This story is of interest because of the curious fact that a very similar miracle story appears in the *vita* and miracles of Saint Leonard of Noblac.⁶⁷ Here the beautiful Saracen woman is the wife, not the daughter, of the captor, and as is to be expected, the role of the saint in procuring the liberty of his protégé is more pronounced. It seems clear from the monks' report that their source for the miracle story was Bohemond himself, who disseminated this romantic version of his release. In actuality, the reliability and number of sources that report that his release was part of a monetary transaction conducted at the highest political levels, with the local princes more active, both in fund-raising and in contributing sums than Bohemond's compatriots, makes this version more likely. He may have secured a reduction in price by promising to enter into an alliance with Danishmend. Upon his return to Europe to raise money and troops for a war against the Byzantines, Bohemond launched a propaganda campaign in which he portrayed himself as an invincible hero. The *Gesta Francorum* is one facet of this campaign, writing the history of the First Crusade as a panegyric to Bohemond. Being a ransomed captive did not fit into this scheme, and a more heroic story, more in the nature of what befitted a *chanson de geste* had to be invented.

At the same time Bohemond was, according to Orderic, seeking to ally himself in marriage with the daughter of the king of France. Therefore, in his account, the enamored princess had to be the

⁶⁷ *Acta Sanctorum*, Novembris III, "Vita et miracula Sancti Leonardi (6.11)", 148-73.

wife (*Acta Sanctorum*) or the well-provided-for daughter of Danishmend (Orderic Vitalis) so as not to be an obstacle to the forthcoming wedding. If Bohemond indeed invented the story, as seems probable, he must have brazenly lied to the monks of Saint Leonard of Noblac. He piously offered his *vota* – chains of silver – to symbolize his redemption. The monks were only too happy to swallow the bait. Saint Leonard's fame as a redeemer of prisoners stems from the late eleventh century. In other words it was quite recent when Bohemond arrived there. A miracle story about a major hero of the First Crusade fitted the monks' needs admirably. They even divided Bohemond's story into two miracles, one for him and one for Richard of the Principate, his relative and fellow prisoner. In this way, the different worlds were reconciled: in the East Bohemond was ransomed by local princes, and in the West, where paying such an outrageous sum was not considered dignified, another narrative was invented, one that suited Bohemond's propaganda needs.

According to Orderic, Bohemond himself related the various adventures in which he had played a part: *referebat uarios euentus quibus ipse interfuit*.⁶⁸ The discrepancy between fact and romance may in this case not have been the fault of the jongleurs who chant the deeds in shameful songs – *cantilena de uobis cantetur in orbe*⁶⁹ – but may rather lie in a romanticized version related by Bohemond and his followers. The Armenian chronicler Matthew of Edessa uses the same kind of legend to explain the captor-captive relationship. According to Matthew, Adela, the wife of the errant crusader Stephen of Blois, tried to force Bohemond the valiant fighter to give her sons and when he refused she threw him in prison as a means of persuasion.

However, Bohemond rejected her proposal.... Nevertheless, the woman kept on insisting vehemently, but he still would not listen to her. Finally she put Bohemond in chains and threw him in prison. After staying in prison for a number of days, the count finally gave in and agreed to marry the woman.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ OV, VI, 11, 12, p. 68.

⁶⁹ OV, VI, 11, 25, p. 120.

⁷⁰ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, Part III, 20; trans., p. 194.

In all these stories, the captive is stronger than his captor. The forced mating may also have served another aim: it explained the disturbing intimacy between captor and captive that often seemed very suspicious in Latin eyes. It should be noted, however, that in this case too, literature repairs reality. While women were the usual victims of sexual abuse during captivity, in most of the legends the coveted captive is a male. Although in reality the great majority of captives were female, in *Les Chétifs* all the heroes are men. As the main theme is chivalrous adventure, there is no place for women. The only ladies are Muslim ones who will eventually end up as Christians and therefore they are beautiful, clever, and virtuous from the start.⁷¹

The termination of captivity

While flight or release by force was seen as the ideal solution to the plight of the prisoner, what happened in fact was more often ransom or death. The epic poetry of the Crusades tried to find other, more honorable solutions to captivity, such as gaining liberty via a courageous deed of chivalry. These nonrealistic happy endings were a popular literary ploy, used to amend the harsh facts of history.

To recall, in normal circumstances there were four alternatives at a captive's disposal to regain his freedom: apostasy to Islam, giving immediate liberty; flight, a dangerous expedient; liberation by force, which involved a third party; and ransom or exchange of captives.⁷² While the first two, apostasy and flight, entailed initiative on the captive's part, the other two were not in his hands. While apostasy must have occurred quite often in reality, it was never considered a valid solution either by the chroniclers or the authors of the epic chansons. The crusader chroniclers preferred to depict flight or liberation by force, which involved adventurous and daring feats and merited a detailed story.⁷³ Unfortunately, in most cases, both alter-

⁷¹ Daniel, *Heroes and Saracens*.

⁷² Cipollone, *Cattività*, 223.

⁷³ For example, the adventurous story of Joscelyn's flight from Kharput. See WT XII, 18-20, 568-570; FC, III, 23-26; cf. *ibid.*, II, 27, 9.

natives proved unfeasible, dangerous, and costly in terms of lives.⁷⁴ The most heroic and futile attempt to free a captive by force was the adventure of the Crusade of 1101 when thousands of crusaders gave their life to free Bohemond from the prison of Niksar.⁷⁵ Some years later, as we have seen, he was ransomed.⁷⁶

Therefore, ransom or exchange remained the safest ways to free captives. This was part of the customary way of war in the East and so entrenched that when the crusaders arrived they found a system of set tariffs for ransom, which was not to their liking. As we have seen, during the first years of fighting they often refused to ransom their captives, whether because of lack of funds or as a means of demonstrating to the enemy that they could not be blackmailed into stopping their conquest. Sometimes they were willing to let their comrades die rather than to jeopardize their military aims. However, when the Muslims suggested the alternative of ransom or death, it cannot have been easy for the crusaders to let their fellow-warriors die.⁷⁷ This is another sphere where literary adaptation may have served to reconcile the difficulties caused by the unpleasant facts the crusaders were forced to encounter. Tudebode's moving story about Rainald Porchet, who was killed at Antioch after his brothers in arms refused to ransom him,⁷⁸ was elaborately reworked in the *Chanson d'Antioche*. In the chanson Rainald became a great hero and was hailed as a martyr. We may perhaps ask if his legendary holiness was not at least partly due to the reaction of the crusaders who had refused to negotiate his ransom. In the *Chanson d'Antioche* Rainald's death is not detailed; the main point is his steadfast and heroic willingness to die. Negotiations for his exchange for the nephew of Yaghi Siyan (Garsion in the chanson) fail due to the nephew's precarious state (the crusaders had tortured him until he was barely alive).⁷⁹ Rainald is promptly tortured in revenge. Then

⁷⁴ For example, WT, XII, 20, 570.

⁷⁵ AA, VIII, 7-16; J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History* (London, 1987) 36.

⁷⁶ Matthew of Edessa, *Chronicle*, Part III, 14, 19.

⁷⁷ Cf. AA, VII, 3: "The gentiles, seeing that this vigorous man was disregarded and had been wounded, all affection having been put out of his comrades' hearts, were thus taunting the duke and all the Christian people with great blasphemies, saying: 'Wicked and cruel race, who care very little to spare your brother and fellow-Christian, but see him and his ruin.'"

⁷⁸ Tudebode, *Historia*, V, 79-81; trans., p. 58.

⁷⁹ *Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 4261-4346.

he is tied to a horse to make him look as if in good shape and displayed to the Christians for ransom.⁸⁰ He cries out to them that they should not pay anything because due to torture he is now worthless.⁸¹ The poet is not interested in the fate of the other captives who, according to Tudebode, paid for Rainald's heroism with their lives. For him the main point is to emphasize that the crusaders took vengeance for Rainald and catapulted the head of Yaghi Siyan's dead nephew into Antioch.⁸² By making Rainald a martyr, he was transformed from a tortured captive into a victorious knight of Christ.

At the siege of Arsuf (1099) the Muslims used the same tactics. They fastened one of the hostages, Gerard d'Avesnes, in the manner of a crucifix to the walls of the city to prevent the crusaders from shooting.⁸³ Gerard bursts out in a tearful speech asking Duke Godfrey to have pity on him, but to no avail. Godfrey's answer was:

If you were my own blood brother, like Eustace, you could not be freed from this predicament so that the city remained unharmed. If in fact you have to die, then it is better that you alone die.... For if you should die in this present life you will live with Christ in heaven.⁸⁴

Some months later, to their great surprise, Gerard was returned safe and sound to the crusaders, as part of an armistice. Gerard d'Avesnes never became a hero of the *chansons des geste*. He did not die as a martyr, and because he was returned safely to the Christian camp there were no hard feelings of having left a comrade in distress that needed refining via poetic adaptation.

Of the four main alternatives at the captive's disposal, death and ransom were the most frequent outcomes. Although perhaps the safest way to achieve one's freedom, ransom was, however, considered a humiliating solution. The captive became indebted, either to his family or friends, and often had to sell his property to pay off his debts. In contrast with reality, paying ransom was not usually an ac-

⁸⁰ *Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 4355-4371.

⁸¹ *Chanson d'Antioche*, line 4384: *Jamais ne seroit prise de nul d'els raençon*; lines 4414-4418: *por Deu je vos requier, / Et a tos vos barons en revoel jo proier, / Ke por moi ne rendés le vaillant d'un denier, / Car j'ai les garés quis, jamais n'arai mestier.*

⁸² *Chanson d'Antioche*, lines 4440-4445.

⁸³ AA, VII, 2.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

ceptable solution to captivity in the epic poems.⁸⁵ Fighting for the enemy was a valid way to pay for one's freedom. In the chansons this was not treason, but rather a chivalrous adventure. In *Les Chétifs* Richard earns his liberty and that of all his friends by his feats. Ernoul, another captive who appears in the chansons, gets an even better deal: if he takes a message to King Soudan he will acquire his freedom and become the friend of his former enemy who will give him his sister, a rich fee, and a horse.⁸⁶ The poetic image of the captive becomes the opposite of what happens in reality. Thus Corbaran calls Faramans, the former jailer who oppressed the captives, and commands him to give them twenty thousand besants (approximately the ransom-price of two very highborn nobles) as well as two Arab horses:

*Donés moi Bauduin .XX. mil de mes bezans,
Et .II. cevals d'Arabe et .II. mules anblans,
S'en ira en sa terre baus et liés et joians.*⁸⁷

The bold knights had good reason to return happy. Instead of paying ransom and returning impoverished they were rewarded with the fulfillment of any young knight's dream, namely a rich fee and a good match, a substantial sum of money and the best horses. Poetry transmuted the harsh consequences of captivity into a dreamland. It seems that in this case poetry and literary adaptations of historical facts were very remote from the course of the real events.⁸⁸ But we may discern a deeper connection to history: the poetic narrative tried to cope with the sore points and mend the problematic issues. By changing the captive from failure to hero, poetic truth not only mended reality, it may have functioned as a way to mold public opinion.

After the Battle of Hattin (1187), when many if not most of the nobles of the Latin Kingdom became captives, the public image of the captives changed. Pope Innocent III opened a campaign for a

⁸⁵ *Les Chétifs*, lines 4010-4012: *Si c'onques des .VII. vins nen ot nus raencon / Ne mais que uns tos sels, a Deu maleïcon.*

⁸⁶ *Les Chétifs*, lines 1831-1833: *Ains serés mes amis, mes drus et mes privés; / ...Si vos donrai ma suer se prendre le volés, / Et rices teneüres dont bien vos garirés.*

⁸⁷ *Les Chétifs*, lines 3245-3247.

⁸⁸ J. Bumke, *Courtly Culture, Literature and Society in the High Middle Ages*, trans. T. Dunlap (Berkeley, 1991).

new crusade, and at the same time made strenuous efforts to redeem captives.⁸⁹ In 1198 he confirmed the charter of the Trinitarian Order whose function was, as noted earlier, to ransom captives. Innocent not only encouraged ransom; he transformed the image of the captive. In one of his letters he described the captive as suffering for Christ.⁹⁰ Thus the captive suffered and was weak, but he suffered for Jesus and in his name and some of the glory of the martyr rubbed off on the captive. Jesus himself became a *quasi captivatus*.⁹¹ If the captive was made in Jesus' mold he was no longer a failure.

In his letters, Innocent III placed the responsibility for ransom on all Christians. How can one love one's neighbor and let him rot in jail? This was a new image of the captive, far from the unrealistic hero-making of the chansons, but at the same time a more positive image of captivity. Innocent III described the captive as weak and suffering both physical and mental humiliation, but did not depict him as a failure or as connected with shame. Although he may not have died in battle, the captive was still a religious hero.

Whether as a result of Innocent's influence or as a result of a historical progression, from the end of the twelfth century a new concept evolved, regarding the captive in a more positive light than some decades earlier. After the Third Crusade Richard I had to be ransomed, and in 1249 Louis IX was taken captive with his entire army. Although their people had to ransom them for enormous sums, the prestige of the captive kings was not tarnished. In the eyes of their contemporaries, Richard remained a lion-heart and Louis IX was considered a saint. Did the chansons of the Crusader Cycles contribute to this change in the image of the captive?

The chansons of the Crusader Cycles, in the version in which they have come down to us, were written in the late twelfth century. According to the latest editor of *Les Chétifs* it was written around 1160 and attached to the *Chanson d'Antioche*, which was based on an

⁸⁹ For general background on papal involvement in the war against the Saracens, see J. Gilchrist, "The Papacy and War against the Saracens, 795-1216", *International History Review* 10 (1988) 174-97. See also G. Cipollone, "Innocent III and the Saracens", in *Pope Innocent III and His World*, ed. J.C. Moore (Aldershot, 1999) 361-76.

⁹⁰ Cipollone, "Appendice Documentaria", no. 40, p. 529: *teneantur quasi pro Christo captivi*.

⁹¹ Cipollone, *Cattività*, 357; idem, "Appendice Documentaria", no. 20, p. 494.

earlier version.⁹² Thus, the chansons may have been instrumental in the process of changing attitudes toward captives, or even partly responsible for the shift that later took place. The literary image of the captive as a hero may reflect a slow change in perception that was taking place in crusader society. Different models of behavior thus made it possible to come to terms with the fact that captivity was a common occurrence and had to be terminated by undertaking responsibility. The inevitable consequence was that the captive was no longer to be classed as a 'lonely failure'.

The romanticization of the captive in the chansons must be seen as part of the broader phenomenon I have tried to trace here, one in which the image of the captive as a miserable failure was replaced by that of a heroic fighter. At the same time, in practice we see the emergence of a more humane and positive attitude toward the captive with the foundation of redemptionist orders and papal intervention. If the early chroniclers excoriated the kings who fell captive, even doubting their royalty in one instance, we have seen that the prestige of Richard Lion-heart and Louis IX did not suffer from their having been in captivity. This development reflects what I see as a significant change in mentality from the time of the initial Christian-Muslim encounter in the Latin East to the time of later conflicts.

⁹² Myers, "Le développement des *Chétifs*: la version fécampoise?" 84-90; S. Duparc-Quioc, "La composition de la *Chanson d'Antioche*", *Romania* 83 (1962) 1-29, 210-47.

CHAPTER TEN

RANSOM ON BOTH SIDES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Latin East is not the sole arena where we have evidence for a link between the Christian-Muslim encounter and changes in the customs connected to ransoming captives. There are important points of comparison between the Spanish Reconquista, where we find a Christian society in a state of constant war and negotiation with its Muslim neighbors, and the situation of the crusaders in the Latin East. In both arenas we find a heterogeneous Christian society composed of colonists and of new waves of warriors engaged in warfare with Muslim society.¹ It is reasonable then to expect similar developments in both these colonizing and warring societies in the sphere of treatment and ransom of captives. This is not the case, however. In Spain we can chart what may be defined as a full-blown development of institutions and laws dealing with captives: the municipal militias; royal intervention; the *Siete partidas* of Alfonso X (1252-84), which included a codification of the laws of war; and intensive activity by redemptionist orders. Whereas some of these phenomena are incipient in the Latin Kingdom, they did not reach a similar level of development there. In a sense, Spain represents what might have happened in the Latin East had the Kingdom continued to exist for several more centuries. After comparing developments in these two arenas, I put forth a suggested explanation for this discrepancy.

One substantial difference between the fighting societies on the eastern and western shores of the Mediterranean was the place of the municipal militias in the military body. In Spain the militias of towns endowed with *fueros* – settlement charters that defined their

¹ Another Mediterranean venue for which we can trace the line of development the Latin Kingdom might have taken if it had continued to exist is the Lusignan Kingdom of Cyprus. As it does not fit our criterion of a frontier society constantly engaged in encounters with the enemy it has been excluded from the discussion. On this kingdom, see P. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades, 1191-1374* (Cambridge, 1991); B. Arbel, *Cyprus, the Franks and Venice, 13th to 16th Centuries* (Aldershot, 2000).

rights and duties – flourished already in the eleventh century.² The *fueros* issued in 1129 to Cáteda, Carcastillo and Encisa in Navarra included paragraphs dealing with booty won in combat and the king's right to a fifth as his share.³ Thus in the 1130s the municipal militias were already clearly active military elements taking part in raids and conquests. In the *Fuero de Calatayud* of 1131 the questions of prisoner exchange and the right to indemnify personal wounds and the loss of animals from booty taken in combat were raised. About a century after militias started to become prominent in the fight for the frontier in Spain we see the first codified evidence of responsibility for captives. As early as the Castilian *fuero* of Escalona (1130) towns tried to guarantee the right of a captive's family to purchase at a fair price a locally held Muslim slave who could be exchanged for their relative. The towns felt a particular responsibility toward their own militiamen who were captured in battle and in various ways offered captured Moors, livestock, or shares of the booty as contributions toward their ransom.⁴ Brodman describes this responsibility for their captives as follows: "Since these men lost their liberty in the town's service, the town accepted two responsibilities toward them. First any arms, horses or equipment lost by the captive in battle would be replaced. Second, Muslims captured by the town were to be used first to ransom any captured soldiers." The town would provide to the captive, his family, or friends a Muslim of the same status – horseman or foot-soldier – from the booty before any shares were handed out to others.⁵

Comparing development in Spain with that in the Latin East we would expect to find similar laws after a century of warfare in the thirteenth-century East. Whereas we do have a few charters of settlement in the twelfth century,⁶ and one even mentions the question of booty taken from raids,⁷ there seems to have been no municipal

² A. Sacristán y Martínez, *Municipalidades de Castilla y León* (Madrid, 1887) 105, 122; J.F. Powers, *A Society Organized for War: The Iberian Municipal Militias in the Central Middle Ages, 1000-1284* (Berkeley, 1988) 15.

³ Powers, *Society Organized for War*, 27.

⁴ Brodman, "Municipal Ransoming", 319-30; idem, *Ransoming Captives in Crusader Spain*, 7.

⁵ Brodman, "Municipal Ransoming", 323.

⁶ G. Bresc-Bautier, ed., *Le Cartulaire du Chapitre du Saint Sépulcre de Jérusalem* (Paris, 1984) no. 117, pp. 237-40.

⁷ Beth Guvrin, 1168. See Delaville, *Cartulaire*, 1:273, no. 399: *et de omnibus lucris que fecerint super paganos*.

organization responsible for ransoming captives. Significantly, late-twelfth-century *assises* from the Latin Kingdom mention remuneration for horses lost in battle,⁸ but do not codify responsibility for captives. The responsibility of the municipal authorities for the soldiers sent to fight in their name is not found there, although there may have been the beginnings of militia organization in the Latin Kingdom.⁹ At the Battle of Gaza (1170) “a company of sixty-five light-armed youths, valiant fighters, natives of a town called Mahumaria, near Jerusalem” joined the army.¹⁰ Unless we assume that this defined group was a militia, it is hard to explain its presence in a battle in Gaza, far from its hometown. As Mahumaria (al-Birah) is one of the settlements of *burgenses* for which we have a founding charter, the existence of these non-noble youths as a military company implies the start of a militia organization in the last quarter of the twelfth century in the Latin Kingdom.¹¹ But we do not have any evidence for the next step of development, namely the municipal organization of ransom prevalent in Spain.

The ransom of captives in Spain was already, in the twelfth century, negotiated and organized by special mediators called *exea* or *alfaunque*. In the *carta puebla* of Belchite (1116) the *exea* – a merchant acting as mediator – is mentioned. In the later Cuenca Teruel *fueros* the *exea* became the commander of a commercial caravan that carried merchants between Christian and Muslim towns.¹² He received a fifth of the ransom or one gold *maravedi* in the case of captive exchanges where no money was involved. (In other cases the sum is ten percent and an extra gold coin for bringing the captive back.)¹³ In the Leonese-Extremaduran-Portuguese *fueros* the merchant ransomer is called *alfaunque* and this is the term used in the *Siete partidas*. Starting as a private, commercial enterprise, in the twelfth century these merchant redemptionists were municipal officials, or at least their reimbursement was regulated by the *fueros*.

In the thirteenth century the *exesas* or *alfaunqueques* became royal officials and the *Siete partidas* dedicates a whole chapter to the charac-

⁸ *Livre au Roi*, chaps. 10-13.

⁹ M. Ehrlich, “The Inland Towns in Twelfth-Century Palestine” (Ph.D. diss., Bar-Ilan University, 2001), 145, 197 (Hebrew). For the military obligations in the Latin Kingdom, see P. Edbury, *John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem* (Woodbridge, 1997) 127-54.

¹⁰ WT, XX, 20.

¹¹ Bresc-Bautier, *Cartulaire du Saint Sépulcre*, no. 117, pp. 237-40.

¹² Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 8.

¹³ Brodman, “Municipal Ransoming”, 328.

teristics needed to be an *alfaunque* – sincerity, nonavariciousness, language proficiency, benevolence, courage, and property ownership – and the reward to which he is entitled.¹⁴ We have no parallel legislation in the Latin Kingdom. We have noted that both belligerent sides there extended safe-conduct to mediators negotiating exchange of captives, but the function of an *exea* or *alfaunque* as an intermediate stage before dispatching full-blown diplomatic envoys was apparently lacking. It may be that in the Holy Land too the ransom of captives was connected to merchant caravans, although we have no evidence for an official mediator who ransomed captives as a main lucrative line. However, Ibn Jubayr describes an astonishing situation whereby during the war between Saladin and the Frankish Kingdom, apparently at the siege of Kerak, a caravan laden with Christian captives was allowed to cross the lines without being stopped.¹⁵ Commerce seemed to continue unhindered in the middle of the war.¹⁶ If this caravan was headed by such a ransom mediator as part of a process of captive exchange the anomaly noted by Ibn Jubayr seems more logical. But Ibn Jubayr, who was probably familiar with Spanish mores, does not say explicitly that this was the case and there is no other evidence for a commercial *exea* or *alfaunque* in the Latin East. We do know about diplomatic negotiators who crossed the lines and enjoyed safe-conducts in the Latin East centuries before the Crusades, but private merchants who worked to ransom captives, as distinct from slave-dealers, are not named. The organized techniques prevalent in Spain seem to have been unique to this frontier society.¹⁷

The sensitivity toward captives in Spain included special care for female captives, which was absent in the Latin East. Thus the pledging of daughters as sureties for a father's ransom was completely forbidden by the Cuenca-Teruel *fueros* under penalty of death at the stake. There was a general prohibition against handing

¹⁴ *Siete partidas*, 2:30.

¹⁵ Ibn Jubayr, *Travels*, 301.

¹⁶ See D. Abulafia, "The Role of Trade in Muslim-Christian Contact during the Middle Ages", in *Mediterranean Encounters: Economic, Religious, Political, 1100-1500* (Aldershot, 2000) article 1, pp. 1-24.

¹⁷ T.M. Vann, "Muslim Captives and the Town of Moya", *Mediterranean Studies* 6 (1996) 39-50.

any women over to the Muslims.¹⁸ We have already seen that this was not the case in the Latin Kingdom. There even King Baldwin himself gave his little daughter as hostage, a mother could be hostage for her sons' release, and the ruler of Cyprus gave his daughter as hostage. This difference in mores did not stem from better conditions for women in captivity in the East than in Spain, but from less organized ransom and less concern with the outcome of such periods of captivity for the women involved.

The *fuero* of Viguera and the Val de Funes placed a strong obligation upon a son to free his father from captivity. An abandoned father could disinherit his son. A father could send his son as hostage for a period of up to three years. If he did not ransom him by then, the municipal judge and officials were ordered to seize the father and his property and exchange it for the son. These provisions are taken up in the *Siete partidas*.¹⁹ Comparable rules in the thirteenth-century assises in the Latin East make it the son's duty to ransom his father and vice versa.²⁰ But even the thirteenth-century Latin Kingdom's rules are less elaborate than those of twelfth-century Spain.

The positive image of captives in Spanish mores can be seen from the preamble to Title 29 of the *Siete partidas*:

Men ought naturally to feel sorrow for members of their own religion when, as captives, they fall into the power of the enemy, for the reason that they are deprived of liberty, which is the most precious thing which men can enjoy in this world. Wherefore, since in the preceding Titles we treated of war and of all the matters pertaining to it which should be observed; we desire now, in accordance with the regulations of the ancient sages to speak of men who are taken captive in warfare. First, we shall describe what a captive is, and how captives should be liberated; and afterwards who those are who are bound to set them free, and moreover, how their property should be taken care of while they lie in captivity.²¹

This compassionate attitude toward captives finds its parallel in Innocent III's letters of 19 to 29 April 1213:

¹⁸ Brodman, "Municipal Ransoming", 324.

¹⁹ *Siete partidas*, 2:29:3

²⁰ *Assises de la cour des Bourgeois*, RHC Lois II, par. 240, p. 170.

²¹ *Siete partidas*, 2:29.

For how can a man be said to love his neighbour as himself, in obedience to God's commands when, knowing that his brothers, who are Christian in faith and in name, are held in the hands of the perfidious Saracens in dire imprisonment and weighed down by the yoke of the most heavy slavery, he does not do something effective to liberate them, thereby transgressing the command of that natural law which the Lord gave in the Gospel: Whatsoever you would do that men should do to you, do you also unto them? Or perhaps you do not know that many thousands of Christians are being held in slavery and imprisonment in their hands, tortured by countless torments?²²

Feelings of compassion and a positive attitude toward the suffering captives are expressed similarly in both texts. However, whereas the legislator in the *Siete partidas* seems to take it for granted that effective measures will be taken to free the captives and his aim is to regulate those efforts, Innocent seems to have been unsure about the practical results of his letters. He can justify the former behavior toward captives in the Holy Land only by assuming that their plight was unknown – and he must have been aware that this was not the case. Thus while we have seen Innocent III as the precursor of a new attitude toward ransom in the East, the *Siete partidas* represents the culmination of a long-term process already at work in Spain.

Some of the laws formulated in the *Siete partidas* seem to have existed in practice in the Latin East, although they were not yet codified in written law. Thus Laws IV and V of the above-mentioned Title 29 stipulate that the property of captives should be protected and that the king was responsible for keeping it intact and restoring it to the captive on his return home. Although the detailed formulation of the Spanish law has no direct parallel in the East, we have seen that in the 1130s King Baldwin II felt compelled to see to the compensation of a returned captive and to safeguard his property. The main difference lies in the long list of those who “were bound to rescue those held in captivity” detailed in the *Siete partidas*.²³ In Spanish law these included relatives of the captive, both lords and vassals as responsible for each other, friends, and lastly people of the captive's class. In this thirteenth-century secular law the reason given for their duty is religious solidarity:

²² *Quia Maior*, translated by Bolton, “Innocent III's Approach to the Release of Captives”, in *La Liberazione dei 'captivi'*, ed. Cipollone, 461.

²³ *Siete partidas*, 2:29:3.

Liberation of persons from captivity is something very pleasing to God, for the reason that it is a work of piety and mercy.... The obligations...are of five kinds, namely; first, on account of the union of the Faith...; second, on account of the tie of lineage; third, on account of an agreement; fourth, on account of sovereignty, or vassalage; fifth, on account of the love of benevolence.²⁴

To some extent, the same obligations developed in the Latin East. We have seen the son's duty toward his father and the vassal's obligation to contribute to the ransom of his lord in the assises. The Spanish law, however, goes a step further:

A lord who refuses to liberate his vassal from captivity in which he was held while in his service, where he has the power to do so without great injury to himself, as, for instance, by giving up all his property, or a large portion of it, or by lessening the dignity of his sovereignty; without considering the perfidy of which he is guilty; the vassal can abandon him for this reason, renounce his allegiance, go to some other lord, make war upon him, and be the cause of his destruction without incurring reproach.²⁵

None of the above reactions on the part of the vassals would have been considered legal in the Latin Kingdom, and most of them would have been considered as *crimen laesae maiestatis*, treason punishable by confiscation of the vassal's fief.²⁶ It should be noted, however, that a lord withholding ransom was almost certain to find justification in the exceptions enumerated above. Ransom would almost always mean loss of property, and in the situation in the latter half of the thirteenth century in the Holy Land, even as lessening the dignity and sovereignty of the Frankish ruler. It was not considered the king's duty to ransom his vassals in the Latin East, and even when the attitude toward captives changed in later years the responsibility toward captives was that of the whole realm, not part of the personal, feudal tie between king and vassal. Similarly, the moral principle behind the Spanish law stipulating that a friend who was not willing to assist a captive to escape from captivity was to be denounced in the presence of the king and the proof of his baseness made manifest²⁷ would have been accepted in the East, but

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ *Siete partidas*, 2:29:3.

²⁶ Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, 430-39.

²⁷ *Siete partidas*, 2:29:3.

property in the western Mediterranean arena than in the East. Their hospitals in Marseilles, Montpellier, and Spain seem to have been more prominent and influential than in Acre. The other redemptionist orders, such as Mountjoy and Santiago, did not develop into full-fledged ransoming orders at all in the Latin Kingdom.

We noted above the marginal place of the Trinitarian Order in the will of Saliba of Acre in 1264. It may be instructive to compare his will with contemporary Spanish testaments, which also include bequests for ransoming captives. In 1144, almost a century before Saliba's will, Berenguer of Ripoll from the hinterland of Catalonia gave the following sums: a bed to the hospital of St. John in Narbonne; a lance, shield, sword, and small amount of money to the Templars; two *morabetins* each to the church of Ripoll, the monastery of Sant Cugat, and the bishop; thirty *morabetins* for masses; twelve *morabetins* for ransoming one captive. A will that earmarks for ransom forty percent of the sum donated for masses shows a marked concern for captives and a belief in ransom as a salutary charity. It may also show that in Spain, as in the East before and during the Crusades, a minimum price for an ordinary captive was known and in use.

In 1205 Berenguer of Fontallada from Barcelona left ten sous for the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and a hundred sous for ransoming captives.³⁶ The relation between the two sums could be explained by the dictum that charity begins at home and local captives were seen as in more pressing need than the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, far away in the Holy Land and not in Christian hands in 1205. It also undoubtedly demonstrates the prestigious nature of ransoming as a charity. In an early will the countess of Valence donated a quarter of her movable property to captives and to bridges, two charities rated in the same proportion as the donation to the church in which she wanted to be buried. In other words, already in 1100 the *liber feudorum* shows ransom to have a prominent place.³⁷ In such circumstances it is not surprising that the redemptionist orders in Spain accumulated quite large donations soon after their

³⁶ Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 10-11; idem, "Charity and Captives", 34-45.

³⁷ "Testamentum Valentiae comitissae Paliarensis 19.2.110(1)" [written 1100], in *Liber Feudorum Maior, Cartulario real que se conserva en el Archivo de la Corona de Aragon*, ed. F. M. Rosell (Barcelona, 1944), no. 142, p. 138.

foundation. This in turn enabled them to be active in buying slaves for the exchange and ransom of captives.

Even so, we note the paucity of solid evidence for their actual work of ransom in the early period. Brodman discounts the large numbers cited in the Mercedarian Order's internal semi-hagiographical sources as plain exaggeration. By way of example, the early Mercedarian historian Antonio Gari y Siumell counts sixty-five Mercedarian redemptions for the period from 1218 to 1295: thirty-one to peninsular locales; thirty-three to Africa, and one to an uncertain locale. In total, 9,727 captives were supposedly freed. Brodman sums up the numbers the Mercedarians were responsible for as several dozen captives each year, not hundreds. But the first real evidence for actual numbers of captives ransomed comes from Tunis in 1361.³⁸ Taylor, who declines to speculate about numbers in the thirteenth century, sees the Mercedarian Order as: "a relatively small institution...a widely but thinly spread organization, composed mostly of small communities many of which were little more than alms-collecting outposts."³⁹

If such was the situation in well-documented Spain, it is perhaps not surprising that we have no evidence of Trinitarian achievements in the Holy Land for the early period of their activity. The letter of introduction from the pope in which he refers to the Trinitarian Order is addressed to the sultan of Tunis, not to any potentate in the Holy Land. As they dealt with relatively small numbers of captives, and apparently not with highborn ones, and kept no records of their activity, we cannot elicit any details of their charitable work of ransom in the East. In this respect, however, Trinitarian activity in the East does not differ from that of the bigger, more influential orders in the West. Even in the case of the Hospitallers, their redemptionist activity in the East is mainly attested in private charters of donations in the West, which may be connected to the fund-raising linked with their activity. It is therefore not surprising that for the early generations of Trinitarian activity, the period before the final fall of the Latin Kingdom, we know more about the process of fund-raising and accumulation of property than about their actual involvement in works of mercy and ransom.

³⁸ Brodman, *Ransoming Captives*, 113-14.

³⁹ Taylor, *Structures of Reform*, 23.

With regard to what I have defined as our second theme, the emergence of restraint in battle, we can also distinguish between a full-blown development in Spain as opposed to a more incipient state of affairs in the East. Concurrent with the rise of municipal militias in Spain, certain standards of siege practice and restraining laws of war started to emerge. In 1064 when Coimbra was taken it was stated that residents of a town under siege who surrendered promptly could retain full freedom after the conquest. If the Muslims surrendered after having been under siege for some time, they could leave only with the goods they could carry. If they waited for the town to fall by force, they faced death or enslavement.⁴⁰ The differences between these restraining customs of warfare and the practices of conquest in the Latin East do not seem so great. There were instances of safe-conducts awarded to citizens of castles and towns that surrendered immediately in the Crusader Kingdom too, and the conquest of Tiberias and some of the coastal towns show the same tolerance toward a capitulating enemy. The more usual ways of conquest were, however, massacre of the civilian inhabitants without much regard for military law. What is different is the emergence in thirteenth-century Spain of a formal code, *Las Siete partidas*, which devoted a section to laws of war, in addition to its treatment of the technical conduct of war, distribution of booty, and treatment of captives. No comparable code governing restraint in battle emerged in the Latin East.

It remains to attempt to suggest some reasons for the disparate developments in the East and West. It is my belief that the distinction lies primarily in the successful history of the Spanish Reconquista as opposed to the ultimate failure of the Latin Kingdom. During the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, the frontier in Spain frequently changed location, and although there were instances of Christian defeat and of towns passing from one side to the other, the main trend was one of expansion of Christian sovereignty. By the 1260s, nearly the entire Iberian peninsula was in Christian hands. In contrast, after one generation of great victories, Frankish society in the Latin East enjoyed approximately seventy years of stable frontiers before the catastrophe at Hattin and its aftermath. For Frankish society the thirteenth century can be characterized as

⁴⁰ Powers, *Society Organized for War*, 18.

one of a constant struggle for survival. After 1244, Frankish society underwent a continuous process of contraction. At best they achieved stasis via treaties, but in most cases the Christians had to surrender one stronghold after the other and witness the erosion of their former borders. In Spain negotiations with the Muslim enemy often took place from a vantage of military superiority that brought with it relatively easy access to the resources necessary for ransoming or exchanging captives. In contrast, the thirteenth-century Latin Kingdom faced a situation in which increasing numbers of captives needed to be ransomed using the ever-decreasing resources at its disposal. In addition, Spanish society was less dependent on slave labor than the Frankish one. In the thirteenth century the Franks were heavily engaged in the erection of defensive works; consequently, they were reluctant to forfeit their Muslim captives in exchange for Christian ones who could not be utilized similarly. This was not the case in Spain. There the victorious Christian forces, less dependent on slave labor for their survival, could use their Muslim captives as a means of exchange.

It is primarily to the expansion-contraction contrast that I attribute the difference between the two Mediterranean arenas. In thirteenth-century Spain the mores and laws of war learned from the encounter with the Muslim enemies were distilled and formulated into codified laws such as the *Siete partidas* of Alfonso the Wise. Even if this law had no legal authority over large parts of Spain, it does prove the existence of clear customs of war. Such laws, though what they prescribe appears in incipient form in the Latin East, were far from being formulated in the parallel period in the East. We must also take the time difference into account. The Spanish development took place over three to four centuries, whereas the Latin Kingdom had a bare two centuries of existence, during the second of which it was engaged in a struggle for its very existence. This left little room for the luxury of sensitivity toward its own weaker elements or toward enemy captives. While further comparisons could be made between Spain and the Latin Kingdom, and the study could be expanded to future developments in the Latin East and in Europe, such as the fourteenth-century laws of chivalry and war, my goal has been to tell the tale of the captive in the Eastern arena, to show the effect of the Christian-Muslim encounter on Frankish society.

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Yvonne Friedman, Ph.D. (1980) in History is Senior lecturer in the Martin Szusz Department of Land of Israel Studies and the Department of History at Bar-Ilan University, Israel. Her publications include a book on medieval Christian Jewish Polemics (Peter the Venerable's *Tractatus adversus iudeos*, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio mediaevalis* vol. 58) and articles on medieval pilgrimage and the ransom of captives.

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